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An increasing variety of emerging systems relentlessly replace or aug-
ment the functionality of mechanical subsystems with embedded elec-
tronics. For quantity, complexity, and use, the safety of such subsys-
tems, often subject to regulation, is an increasingly important matter.
Those systems are subject to safety certification to demonstrate sys-
tem’s safety by rigorous development processes and hardware/software
constraints. The massive augment in embedded processors’ complexity
renders the arduous certification task significantly harder to achieve.
The focus of this thesis is to address the certification challenges in
multicore architectures: despite their potential to integrate several ap-
plications on a single platform, their inherent complexity imperils their
timing predictability and certification. For the former, Measurement-
Based Probabilistic Timing Analysis (MBPTA) has recently emerged
as an alternative to deal with hardware/software complexity. The in-
novation that MBPTA brings about is, however, a major step from
current certification procedures and standards.
The particular contributions of this Thesis include: (i) the definition
of certification arguments for mixed-criticality integration upon multi-
core processors. In particular we propose a set of safety mechanisms
and procedures as required to comply with functional safety standards.
For timing predictability, (ii) we present a quantitative approach to as-
sess the likelihood of execution-time exceedance events with respect
to the risk reduction requirements on safety standards. To this end,
we build upon the MBPTA approach and we present the design of
a safety-related source of randomization (SoR), that plays a key role
in the platform-level randomization needed by MBPTA. And (iii) we
evaluate current certification guidance with respect to emerging high
performance design trends like caches.
Overall, this Thesis pushes the certification limits in the use of multi-
core and MBPTA technology in Critical Real-Time Embedded Systems
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In the last decades, the ever-increasing expansion and evolution of computing sys-
tems have considerably increased their prevalence in everyday life activities. While
the most popularly recognized use of computing systems is that of desktop com-
puters or servers, the vast majority of them are embedded in a wide variety of quo-
tidian appliances up to the point that it would not be far-fetched to state that all
modern technology areas lean on embedded computing systems (LS17). Embedded
systems appear in applications as diverse as simple alarm clocks, medical devices,
multimedia products, industrial machinery and transportation systems among oth-
ers. This unprecedented growth is motivated by their potential to accomplish
complex tasks that replace systems’ components traditionally committed by me-
chanical or electrical systems and their ability to integrate new functionalities that
improve the automation, and hence ease of use, of systems (CVH08; Kop11; LS17).
As a consequence of the aforementioned ubiquity of embedded systems, they are
often used in critical domains where a system failure can have destructive effects
such as the loss of lives or devastating environmental damage (safety-critical),
substantial economic and property losses in an organization (business-critical),
disruption of critical activities adversely affecting a company or society (mission-
critical) or loss of sensitive personal data (security-critical). Commonly, the cor-
rectness of these critical embedded systems does not only depend on the functional
results of the computations, but also on their timing response in which case they
are accordingly categorized as Critical Real-Time Embedded Systems (CRTES).
In CRTES, the temporal behavior is – at least – as important as their functional
behavior as missing preset time boundaries, called deadlines, can lead to severe
consequences. In these circumstances, it is imperative to demonstrate that CRTES
comply with the legal directives in place in each state or country before they are
allowed to be deployed for operation. This involves undergoing a certification pro-
cess where an independent person, often from an independent certification entity
or in-house department, must approve that the system is suitable and safe enough
1
Chapter 1. Introduction
for its intended use.
To aid in the certification process, there is a set of standards that dictates the
needs of the critical system and establishes a number of constraints throughout
its development cycle (e.g., EN 50126 in railway and ISO 26262 in automotive).
Depending on the risk associated with the consequences, a discrete criticality at-
tribute is assigned to each CRTES subsystem, known as safety integrity, assur-
ance or criticality level. This criticality level highly constrains the system design
as special considerations must be applied to guarantee the correct operation of
the system. As a rule of thumb, the higher the criticality attribute, the higher is
the risk against which the system must be protected, and consequently, the more
stringent the requirements imposed by the standards. With each cycle of innova-
tion, CRTES are confronted with increasing demands to support new functionality
resulting in a high number of interacting functions, often with differing integrity
requirements (mixed-criticality). Taking as example the classical automotive case,
80% of innovation in a car is driven by electronics (Far14; Nel10). While a con-
temporary car already contained dozens of hierarchically interconnected Electronic
Control Unit (ECU)s in 2005, in the last decade this number has increased up to
few hundred by integrating advanced functionalities like infotainment, telematics,
emissions control and many safety-related applications like drive-by-wire, Anti-
Lock Braking System (ABS) or cruise control system (CC) (But12; Far14). This
trend is expected to continue in the future with the advent of autonomous driving
cars (Reb17) and it is estimated that electronics will take the larger share of the
total car costs (Nel10).
With large number of interconnected subsystems of differing criticality levels,
standards pose additional requirements to ensure that the applications that com-
prise the mixed-criticality system cannot adversely affect to each other and allow,
by ensuring independence of execution, the incremental certification of each ap-
plication according to its own assigned integrity level (IEC61508). Incremental
certification considerably simplifies the development and certification process as
otherwise, all components that share the same computing platform shall be cer-
tified according to the highest integrity level present on the system what is effort
and cost-prohibitive (WT08; PGN+14).
1.1 Trends in Mixed-criticality Systems
CRTES have come a long way since their beginning. This section gives an insight
of the current trends in CRTES with emphasis on their increasing integration and
computing demands.
2
1.1 Trends in Mixed-criticality Systems
1.1.1 Increased Integration Needs
In the past, traditional CRTES architectures have followed a federated architec-
ture paradigm: CRTES were composed of a number of functionally independent
interconnected subsystems with critical functions implemented on a number of
dedicated subsystems, physically separated from each other. This physical sepa-
ration allows incremental certification by construction, provided that the field bus
guarantees independence of execution among the interconnected subsystems. How-
ever, the increasing functional complexity in the real-time industry challenges the
continued viability of this architecture paradigm (Kop08). In the federated design,
the addition of new functionalities requires adding new computing subsystems that
are restricted by the limited scalability, flexibility or extensibility. Dealing with
increasing number of processors and associated communication networks leads to
bigger reliability challenges (e.g., Electromagnetic Compatibility sensitivity, in-
creased number of connector and cables, etc.) and to bandwidth and quality of
service limitations. Altogether, federated designs require high maintenance and
upgrade costs. This is reflected in a wide variety of industry sectors where trans-
portation systems, such as automotive or railway, prevail. In such systems, the
increasing number of ECUs, cables, electrical parts and connectors decrease the
overall reliability of the system and raise the cost-size-weight factor (PGN+14).
For example, between 30-60% of electrical failures in the automotive domain are
attributed to connector problems (SMM00) and in the avionics domain, having
dedicated computing systems for each software application results in hundreds of
kilometers of cabling per aircraft (Iti07). This has caused that several modern
implementations already adopt integrated approaches where several applications,
frequently exhibiting different criticality characteristics, run together on a single
hardware platform (Kop04).
The paradigm shift from federated architectures towards integrated ones builds
on the principle of sharing same platform resources by multiple system functions
based on the concept of partitioning. Partitions provide separation among the
applications and design fault containment to prevent any partitioned application
from causing a failure in another partitioned application (AMI+11). A robust
partitioning technique therefore guarantees separation to allow the incremental
certification of mixed-criticality systems in an equivalent manner to the feder-
ated approach (ARINC653). The avionics domain has been successfully inte-
grating distributed avionics subsystems in centralized processing units under the
umbrella of Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) (Ram07; DO297; SAE01). The
significant benefits witnessed by the avionics domain thanks to IMA has also mo-
tivated other domains to adopt equivalent approaches like IMA for space (Win12)
or the Automotive Open System Architecture (AUTOSAR) in the automotive
field (AUTOSAR; DS10). These benefits include improved modularity and soft-
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ware re-use, weight and cost reduction and decreasing up to half the amount of
processor units in an airplane (Ram07). Following the trend towards increased
integration, the next natural step is considering parallel processing architectures
such as multicores to deal with the increasing performance requirements further
explained in next subsection.
1.1.2 Higher Performance Requirements
Besides the increasing number of processing units, the continuous technological
progress that CRTES are experiencing come along with increasingly complex soft-
ware and hardware systems (PGT+14). Taking lines of code as representative
proxy metric for complexity and performance requirements, the amount of lines
of code within a system is experiencing an exponential growth (Cha09; But12).
This gets exacerbated as new complex functionalities, like autonomous driving
technology, continue to be integrated. As a result, increased computing perfor-
mance requirements cause the traditionally used single-core processors reach their
physical performance, complexity, power consumption and heat dissipation limits.
As an alternative to the infeasibility of further increasing clock speeds and the
limits of Moore’s law on single-cores (Cor12), CRTES industries have started to
transition to multicore processors. In theory, multicore processors are an attrac-
tive solution for CRTES as they offer increased performance rates with reduced
cost, size, weight and energy consumption (PGN+14; PGT+14; But12; BCD+15).
Furthermore, their high performance interestingly makes them a key enabling tech-
nology for integrating multiple mixed-criticality applications on a single silicon die.
These advantages encourage even the most conservative CRTES domains to
venture considering multicore solutions (PDK+15; BCS+16). Furthermore, the
use of readily available and pre-tested Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) com-
ponents is on the rise, as they considerably shorten the development time and
associated costs (TLH97).
1.2 Future Mixed-criticality Systems’ Challenges
In spite of the aforementioned trends that promote the inclusion of multicore
processors for mixed-criticality integration, several challenges related to the cer-
tification and timing predictability of multicore approaches must be considered
before endorsing multicores’ unrestrained adoption in CRTES.
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1.2.1 Certification
Unlike conventional computing systems, where multicores are well established,
CRTES are bound to be certified. Certification is the process of proving (provid-
ing evidence) that the design of a product complies with what it is established
in the relevant standards. This is a fundamental step to support a declaration
of conformance with legal product directives, which is compulsory to allow their
deployment and operation. Certification requires a robust system design and de-
velopment process that involves high efforts even for single-core processors. As a
consequence, the CRTES industry has adopted the conservative trend of employ-
ing simple, predictable and proven-in-use processors. As an illustrative example,
the automotive industry is still using 8-bit architectures on some of the ECUs
that host safety-related software (Far14). On the other hand, modern multicore
platforms provide rather the opposite properties with complex high performance
features, lack of temporal predictability, weak support in the established standards
and absence of history of use in the CRTES domain.
Regarding mixed-criticality, although existing solutions have succeeded on single-
cores (Kop04; Ram07; DS10), the integration solutions adopted for single-core pro-
cessors do not scale well (in terms of certification) on multicore architectures. New
issues arise from their inherent complexity and unpredictability that challenge hav-
ing sufficient guarantees of independence of execution among functions required
to conduct an incremental certification. Resource sharing and high-performance
hardware features like caches are determinant in providing the increased mul-
ticore performance. However, these features considerably complicate platform
predictability and hence, determining CRTES’ worst-case performance. In this
scenario, a trade-off between increased average performance and separation for
mixed-criticality is often necessary. Several emerging hardware designs favor time
predictability and ease certification (PQC+09; SEH+12). However, COTS multi-
core architectures incorporate such features very slowly. In spite of the opportuni-
ties that COTS processors provide for embedded system designers, their adoption
in CRTES is not straightforward as they are primarily designed to increase av-
erage performance at the cost of increasing complexity. Fortunately, in the last
years, certification-amenable processors are being slowly introduced in the mar-
ket, where manufacturers – most of them targeting the automotive domain – start
to integrate principles such as, fault management and safety measures in their
commercial architectures (TMS570; MCP5xx; AURIX; ZynqFS).
1.2.2 Timing Predictability
Standards impose rigorous analysis and verification processes. Timing is an im-
portant aspect for the verification and validation of CRTES to ensure deadlines
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are met and confirm the temporal schedulability of the system. In general, the
verification and validation of embedded systems require high effort, resources, and
time. Subsequently, verification and validation activities are considered as the
most costly development phases; more notably when safety or availability issues
are involved (DGG09). Despite strict testing procedures are well established to
verify conformance to functional specifications, generally temporal properties are
not equally verified. The quality of the timing verification, i.e., evidence that the
software is timely correct with respect to its specification, is predominantly depen-
dent on previous experience and engineering judgment (CVH08). In this line, a
common industry practice is running a set of tests and measuring their execution
time for then adding a conservative safety margin, typically 20% of the maximum
observed value (also known as High-Water Mark (HWM)). While the intend of the
safety margin is to compensate for the uncertainties of the testing process, com-
plex hardware complicates the selection of a suitable margin and it is almost never
proven that the resulting system will meet its temporal requirements under every
possible hardware and software condition that it may encounter at operation.
The intrinsic complexity of multicore architectures further exacerbates this is-
sue and negatively impacts the existing timing analysis solutions. Two main tim-
ing analysis paradigms have been used in industrial domains so far: Static Timing
Analysis (STA) and Measurement-Based Timing Analysis (MBTA) (WEE+08). In
STA approaches, an estimate of the WCET is obtained by analyzing the program
instead of executing it. Therefore, these techniques require full characterization of
the execution behavior at all levels of the system, including abstract models of the
hardware. When applied to complex systems, such as multicores, it is very hard
to statically predict all runtime dependencies (AHQ+15). Assuming worst-case
scenarios for all uncertainties incurs high pessimism. MBTA techniques, on the
contrary, collect execution time measurements of the program of interest when it
is executed on the real hardware or a simulator. As explained above, this is the
most common industry practice (WEE+08) and, in this case, the challenge rests
on guaranteeing that the worst-case (or a good approximation to it) is encountered
during the test campaign. In fact, analyzing the worst-possible execution condi-
tions involves that low-level architectural features, which can contribute to signifi-
cant execution time variations, are exercised in the measurement runs taken during
the timing analysis process. Creating the test cases that factor in all possible com-
binations is not realistically possible given the inordinately large input space that
software tasks may have and the huge number of potential states of complex hard-
ware. Accordingly, timing analysis techniques are required to relieve the user from
the high burden of analyzing and controlling all low level hardware-software inter-
actions and to obtain safe WCET estimates without incurring undue pessimism.
Not surprisingly therefore, no golden solution exists so far for the estimation of
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trustworthy timing guarantees on modern multicore processors (AHQ+15).
Recently, a novel promising approach based on theory of probabilities has
emerged, Probabilistic Timing Analysis (PTA) (CSH+12; CQV+13; HHM09).
PTA in general and its measurement-based variant called Measurement-Based
Probabilistic Timing Analysis (MBPTA) in particular, derive WCET estimates
with an associated probability of exceedance. Accordingly, as opposed to the
traditional timing analysis approaches that compute a single WCET estimate
value, PTA derives a probabilistic WCET distribution called probabilistic WCET
(pWCET). Further explained in the Background Chapter (Section 2.1.3), MBPTA
has the potential to replace the qualitative safety margin selection (based on en-
gineers’ experience) by a quantitative justification based on its probability of ex-
ceedance. To this end, MBPTA rests on the premise that the timing behavior
of certain processor resources is time randomized or upper-bounded (KQA+14).
This practice serves to deal with uncertainties and notably reduces the need for
user-provided information during timing analysis. MBPTA has shown to be com-
petitive with state-of-the-art timing analysis techniques for single-core architec-
tures (CQV+13; WKL+13) and has been recently ported to multicore processors
with promising results to handle the complexity of high-performance hardware
features like caches (CAA+16; KQA+16; WKG+15). However, due to its novelty,
multicore MBPTA technology has not been yet evaluated with regard to CRTES
certification.
1.3 Contributions
The challenging certification and time predictability of multicores are a pre-requisite
for mixed-criticality integration and hence, the main motivating factors for this
Thesis. Subsequently, this Thesis proposes mixed-criticality design and develop-
ment considerations for multicore processors compliant with safety standards in
order to ease their adoption in the safety-critical CRTES domain. Further, this
Thesis pursues MBPTA’s industry-readiness. To this end, it elaborates on the
safety implications of MBPTA as a means to verify timing specifications and to
provide sufficient guarantees of independence of execution among mixed-criticality
safety functions in multicore processors. Finally, the ultimate goal of this The-
sis is to assess the practical compliance of current COTS multicore design trends
to existing multicore certification guidance, paying special attention on timing.
Accordingly, the contributions of this Thesis are classified into three major axes
(themes) as sketched in Figure 1.1: (i) mixed-criticality certification upon mul-
ticores; (ii) MBPTA considerations to fit in safety standards; and (iii) practical
multicore certification compliance. The contributions to each theme are structured
in chapters. Next subsections summarize both themes and contributions.
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Figure 1.1: Logical organization of Thesis’ contributions.
1.3.1 Multicore Mixed-criticality Certification
• The first contribution of this Thesis develops a certification argument for
mixed-criticality certification upon multicores. The safety argument includes
a set of safety mechanisms, diagnostic techniques and fault reaction features
as required to comply with IEC 61508 functional safety standard upon a
reference multicore architecture. The argument is built incrementally by
transitioning from common-practice federated certification considerations to
a mixed-criticality multicore solution.
• Secondly, as a proof of concept, we translate the generic assumptions and
requirements of the safety argument into technical solutions by defining
two alternative safety concepts for a railway (AAL+15) and an automo-
tive (AAL+16) case study respectively. These safety concepts were reviewed
and evaluated by an industrial certification authority. The former safety con-
cept considers two multicore architectures, a complex COTS platform and
an ad-hoc architecture. To deal with multicore challenges, the railway safety
concept mainly relies on multicore partitioning and virtualization techniques
through the use of a certified hypervisor. On the contrary, the automotive
safety concept is based on the use of a set of hardware protection mecha-
nisms that enforce separation in lieu of the hypervisor. This is achieved by a
state-of-the-art automotive certification-friendly COTS multicore platform
that embeds many valuable safety features in its architecture.
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1.3.2 MBPTA Potential Adherence to Standards
MBPTA is an attractive alternative to existing timing analysis techniques to
handle the complexity of multicore architectures. However, the innovation that
MBPTA brings about is a major step from current certification procedures and
standards. Currently, safety standards require quantifying the probability of fail-
ure of hardware components to assess the suitability of the design with respect
to reference values for each integrity level. Software, on the contrary, is quali-
tatively assessed based on practical experience, by demonstrating coverage of all
requirements of the standard.
• The third contribution of this Thesis is the quantification of the likelihood of
execution-time exceedance events and relating it to target failure metrics in
support of certification arguments, much like for hardware random faults. To
this end, we evaluate the MBPTA approach with respect to IEC 61508 and
we build on metrics such as failure rates and diagnostic coverage to determine
the cut-off exceedance probability for the execution time of a task.
In spite of its potential benefits in complex systems, MBPTA cannot be naively
used on every processor architecture as it requires certain timing properties that
make the platform MBPTA-compliant. The use of MBPTA to analyze the tim-
ing behavior of safety-critical systems rests on its ability to derive trustworthy
WCET bounds. This ability depends on the soundness of the MBPTA method
per se, as well as on the satisfaction of safety requirements placed on the Pseudo-
Random Number Generator (PRNG) that plays a key role in the platform-level
randomization needed by MBPTA.
• We present the design of a low-area, low-power PRNG for multicore pro-
cessors that meets IEC 61508 safety requirements for its use with MBPTA.
PRNG’s malfunction can compromise the safe operation and the availability
of the system by invalidating the pWCET estimates derived for safety-related
software. To avoid this, we adapt a reference PRNG design to a multicore
architecture and define the safety mechanisms required to achieve IEC 61508
SIL 3 compliance (AAH+15).
1.3.3 Practical Multicore Certification Compliance
Certification standards reflect the state of practice in industry rather than the
state of the art. As a result, they do not evolve as fast as technology and they
do not provide explicit guidance for multicore architectures yet. It is a common
pattern that certification guidance does not prescribe particular solutions but en-
sure the quality of any solution. Commonly, the user is expected to extrapolate
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the guidelines and requirements in standards to the specifics of the particular pro-
cessor under consideration. However, current certification guidelines are hard to
extrapolate to multicore architectures that involve novel design paradigms like
shared resources or high performance features not contemplated in the standards.
On the road to addressing this limitation, recently, certification authorities in the
airborne domain have published a position paper for multicore processors (CAST-
32A) (CAST-32A). The CAST-32A position paper lists a set of objectives to help
addressing multicore certification challenges and is, at the time of writing, the only
explicit certification guidance for multicore architectures.
• The last contribution of this Thesis focuses on the analysis of the objec-
tives of CAST-32A multicore certification guidance report, and discussion
of the feasibility of achieving them with current COTS multicore design
trends (AAA+17). We show potential limitations that embedded system
designers may face in achieving those goals and tailor some of the generic
principles in CAST-32A to a specific COTS multicore processor (the NXP’s
eight-core P4080 (P4080)).
1.4 Thesis Organization
Each of the major contributions of this Thesis is presented in a different chapter,
as visually depicted in Figure 1.1. Accordingly, this Thesis is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 defines the basic concepts on safety certification, multicore archi-
tectures and timing analysis. In addition, it covers the necessary background
by surveying mixed-criticality integration techniques and timing analysis so-
lutions on multicores.
• Chapter 3 explains the experimental setup used for the evaluation of the con-
tributions of this Thesis. In particular, it describes the multicore processors
considered, the applications, and the timing analysis procedure and tools.
• Chapters 4 and 5 cover the certification of multicore mixed-criticality archi-
tectures. More concretely:
– Chapter 4 defines the integrated multicore safety argumentation using
the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN).
– Chapter 5 applies and evaluates the safety argumentation on domain-
specific safety concepts for railway and automotive use cases.
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• Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 focus on the safety-critical industry readiness of
MBPTA for the timing analysis of multicores by addressing its certification
implications:
– Chapter 6 advocates for the treatment of software timing faults as ran-
dom hardware faults in standards.
– Chapter 7 proposes a safety criticality-cognizant PRNG design.
• Chapter 8 evaluates the practical certification compliance of complex mul-
ticore processors with particular emphasis on CAST-32A certification guid-
ance.
• Chapter 9 presents the main conclusions and potential future work of this
Thesis.
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Background and Basic Concepts
This chapter provides the essential background and introduces the basic concepts
on which the work on this Thesis is based. First, Section 2.1 defines the relevant
concepts and terms. Then, subsequent sections review the most relevant literature:
Section 2.2 summarizes existing solutions for mixed-criticality integration upon
multicore architectures; next, in Section 2.3, we discuss multicore timing analysis
solutions as a means to deal with the timing unpredictability and possible temporal
interferences on multicore processors. On each section we analyze how the set of
works consider safety certification. To conclude, Section 2.4 provides a summary
of the state-of-the-art.
2.1 Basic Concepts
This section briefly introduces the main constituent elements of this Thesis, which
span over three research fields: (i) safety-critical systems, (ii) multicore processor
architectures, and (iii) timing analysis.
2.1.1 Safety-critical Embedded Systems
Among the CRTES domains, the main focus of this Thesis is on safety-critical
systems. Various terms come into play when referring to safety-critical systems and
their certification. However, some of them often have slightly different meanings
or interpretations depending on the domain. Below we provide the definitions of
the basic terms related to safety-critical systems and we clarify the taxonomy used
throughout this Thesis.
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Safety and Functional Safety
Safety is a dependability attribute – together with reliability, availability, security,
survivability and maintainability – that can be defined as the absence of unac-
ceptable risk leading to catastrophic consequences (ALR+04). In this work, we
focus on the safety of electronic control systems, which is referred to as functional
safety (IEC61508).
Certification and Standards
The deployment of safety-critical systems requires to comply with legal regula-
tions in place on each country or state. This involves a certification process where
an independent certification body must approve through a conformity assessment
that the system is suitable and safe enough for its intended use (i.e., that it is com-
pliant with the active legal directives). Currently, the most common certification
approach is standard based, i.e., a conformity assessment is achieved by proving
adherence to the applicable safety standards.
There is an extensive set of safety standards that provide guidance and rec-
ommendations to aid in the certification process. Despite most standards tar-
get domain-specific applications, many of them are based on the generic interna-
tional IEC 61508 standard for the Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Pro-
grammable Electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related systems, which is applicable across
multiple industrial sectors. Some other domains, like avionics or space industries,
establish their own set of independent standards (e.g., DO 178, European Coop-
eration for Space Standardization (ECSS)) (Figure 2.1).
Safety Certification Standards
Industrial Space
DO 297 DO 178 B/C DO 254
Avionics ...
ECSS ...IEC 61508
EN 50126 EN 50128 EN 50129
Automotive







Figure 2.1: Relation among safety certification standards.
Safety standards define development processes with additional steps and re-
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quirements to cover safety and certification needs. As an example, Figure 2.2 illus-
trates the overall safety life-cycle defined in the IEC 61508 standard (IEC61508).
This life-cycle guides the developer into the adoption of special analyzes and safety
management activities in all phases of the development process of the safety-critical
system. The realization phase encompasses the system level safety life-cycle and
hardware and software development processes. IEC 61508 recommends the V-
model for designing safety-related software and hardware. The V-model requires a
clearly structured design process: the outcome of each step is the input to the next
step, until completing the implementation. This implementation is then verified
against the corresponding design in each step (i.e., unit testing, integration testing

















































Figure 2.2: IEC 61508 safety life-cycle (IEC61508).
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Criticality, Integrity or Assurance level
We use all three terms interchangeably to refer to the level of assurance and risk
reduction needed against failures. The risk associated to the possible dangerous
consequences (i.e., hazards) of a system determines the criticality level assigned to
a given safety function that aims to reduce such risk up to tolerable rates. This
criticality attribute is determined based on the severity, frequency of exposure and
controllability of the hazardous events. The criticality level dictates the require-
ments imposed by standards in each of the phases of the safety life-cycle; with
more restrictive measures for higher criticality levels. Different safety standards
use distinct nomenclatures and levels, e.g., Safety Integrity Level (SIL), Automo-
tive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL), Software Safety Integrity Level (SSIL), Design
Assurance Level (DAL), etc. Similarly, even if they are out of the scope of this
Thesis, security criticality levels are also defined (e.g., within Multiple Indepen-
dent Levels of Security, MILS). Table 2.1 shows the criticality levels defined in
different domains and an approximate equivalence among them.












SIL 0 SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 4
SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 4
SSIL 0 SSIL 1 SSIL 2 SSIL 3 SSIL 4
DAL E DAL D DAL C DAL B DAL A
D C B A
ASIL A ASIL B ASIL C ASIL D
For systems containing functionality with different safety implications and
thereby, different assurance levels, we use the term mixed-criticality.
Fault, Error and Failure
A fault is a (hypothesized) cause (abnormal condition or defect in an item) of an
error. Subsequently, an error is defined as an incorrect state of an entity that can,
therefore, cause a failure. A failure is a deviation from the correct service of the
entity given by the infringement of the specifications (ALR+04). The definitions
of these three terms are, however, dependent on system boundaries. The entity
may be either a single component, a subsystem or a system and a failure of a
component can be considered as a fault at a higher level of the system hierarchy.
A Fault Containment Region (FCR) defines the boundaries of an immediate failure
impact, i.e., it comprises the set of components that fail independently from each
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other. FCR are commonly different for hardware (physical FCR) and software
(design FCR) faults.
Whenever failures are deterministically related to a certain cause (e.g. a design
fault either in hardware or software), standards refer to them as systematic. On the
contrary, when a failure is the consequence of an arbitrary event (e.g., hardware
degradation) standards classify it as random (IEC61508; ISO26262; EN50126).
The probability of failure of the latter is quantified by the failure rate.
Considering the case of timing as an illustrative example, a design (timing)
fault can, for instance, be a bad (optimistic) WCET estimation (i.e., the esti-
mated WCET is below the real WCET). This fault may get activated in the form
of a deadline miss and lead to an error state that can cause a system failure. For
instance, the example depicted in Figure 2.3 shows that, due to a design tim-
ing fault, a task may need more time to execute than that allocated to it in the
scheduling. In the event of a deadline miss, this causes a context switch to happen
before the task completes its execution (e.g., before it writes the outcome of the
computations into the output ports). As a consequence, the outputs are not up-
dated in time and may contain obsolete data until next period. Within this time
interval, the system is in an erroneous state. Finally, this error may propagate into
an improper commanding of the actuators and, thereby, cause a systematic func-
tional failure (e.g., unexpected airbag activation in a car) or a systematic timing























Figure 2.3: Illustrative example of (timing) Fault, Error and Failure.
Fail safe and fail operational systems
The term fail safe is used for those safety-critical systems that, in case of a system
failure, they can transition to a safe state either by the safety function or diagnosis.
A system is said to be in the safe state when it reaches a state free from any possible
hazardous condition. For example, the safe state of a railroad barrier system is
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setting it in the stop position. On the contrary, if a system does not dispose of a
safe state during mission time, we refer to it as fail operational. For instance, in
the avionics domain, it may not be possible to define a safe state for some systems,
such as, a flight control system that must provide some minimal level of service
even in the presence of faults (Kop11).
2.1.2 Multicore Processors
Multicore processors comprise two or more processing cores implemented in the
same integrated circuit or silicon die. Tasks can run simultaneously on the different
cores of a multicore. While there are a plethora of different multicore implemen-
tations, most of them are built on the same pattern. The cores in a multicore
typically share platform level elements, such as, main memory, peripheral devices
and the interconnect to communicate with those components. Figure 2.4 sketches
the main components of a generic COTS-based multicore processor:
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Figure 2.4: Generic COTS based multicore architecture.
Private Resources
Private or core-local resources in a multicore are those resources attached to, or
for the exclusive use of, each of the cores in the processor (i.e., the resources that,
by design, can not be accessed by more than one core). Private resources include
the processing cores and first level caches. Depending on the particular imple-
mentation, some architectures also include additional private memory, like the
P4080 (P4080) that includes a private second level cache or the AURIX (AURIX)
that has private scratchpad memories attached to each core.
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If all processing cores in the multicore share the same architecture, the mul-
ticore is regarded as homogeneous. Examples include NXP’s QorIQ family with
power processor cores like the P4080 (P4080), ARM based layerscape (NXPLS)
family, and most of Intel’s solutions (e.g. Xeon (XEON)). On the contrary, a
multicore is heterogeneous if its cores are of two or more different processor archi-
tectures. NXP’s I.Mx family (NXiMX) and Texas Instrument’s Concerto micro-
controller family (TICon) are examples of heterogeneous multicore architectures.
In the recent years, the safety-critical domain has started using lockstep mul-
ticore processors. A lockstep processor is a special type of multicore – typically
homogeneous dual-core – which is specifically designed to achieve high reliability.
In such architecture, both cores execute the same program with the same inputs.
A hardware comparator is continuously comparing the outcomes of the computa-
tions among the two cores to detect any discrepancy and hence, possible hardware
faults. Accordingly, in this set-up, the additional core does not provide increased
performance but improved reliability.
Shared Resources
Most COTS multicore architectures are shared-memory based. For instance, they
typically include a second (or higher level) shared cache, also referred as platform
cache, and a shared main memory or platform memory connected to the cores
through an interconnect. Depending on the particular implementation, the inter-
connect can be implemented as a traditional system bus or crossbar or by means of
a Network-on-Chip (NoC). The communication between the platform memory and
the cores is handled by one or more memory controllers and an arbiter, generally
attached to the interconnect. The interconnect is hence the interface between the
cores and rest of platform components and all coherency traffic, memory transac-
tions, peripheral accesses and interrupts flow through it. In addition, there is a
wide range of possible I/O peripherals that a multicore can include depending on
the particular design and application domain. Peripherals are usually connected
to the interconnect through a peripheral bus.
It shall be noted that a multicore is different from a multiprocessor architec-
ture, although the latter also integrates multiple processing elements, they are not
always attached to the same silicon die and they commonly integrate a distributed
memory system. Similarly, when the number of cores is much larger (in the order
of hundreds), referred to as manycore, they are typically interconnected through
NoC rather than bus interconnects.
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Software distribution
Based on the software distribution, multicore systems are categorized as Symmetric
or Asymmetric Multiprocessing:
• Symmetric Multiprocessing (SMP): In SMP a single Operating Sys-
tem (OS) is distributed across all cores in the system. The OS manages
the programs executing on top of it and assigns them to the cores. Some
operating systems further allow to restrict which applications are allowed to
run on each specific core.
• Asymmetric Multiprocessing (AMP): In AMP each core may or may
not independently execute a different OS.
2.1.3 Timing Analysis
CRTES typically pose severe timing restrictions on the execution time of their
functions usually derived from the requirements of the control algorithms respon-
sible of commanding the system (e.g., the control of a braking system in a vehi-
cle). Real-time control systems must react to stimuli from the environment and
produce results before they reach a time instant called deadline (for example, a
steering system shall react within 50 ms (Kop11)). To guarantee the satisfaction
of such constraint, it is required to establish upper-bounds on the execution times
of real-time tasks (i.e., WCET estimates) during software development. WCET
estimation is a basic precondition for schedulability analysis and hence, for guar-
anteeing that all tasks will meet their deadlines in the designed real-time system.
The computation of these timing parameters is part of the process referred to as
timing analysis (WEE+08; Kop11).
Worst-Case Execution Time (WCET)
The worst-case execution time (WCET) of a task depends on many factors such as
the source code, programming language, compiler, the input data and underlying
hardware architecture. In fact, as the hardware has many state-full resources, the
same binary with the same inputs may have different execution times in different
consecutive runs. For instance, a cache memory takes advantage of the execution
history to obtain performance gains from run to run. As a result, the execution
time of a task is not a fixed value but a complex distribution as shown in Figure 2.5.
At the time of analyzing the worst-case timing of a system, in most cases, it is
not feasible to predict all possible conditions leading to worst-case execution time





















Figure 2.5: Basic concepts for WCET analysis (WEE+08).
commonly three different bounds are defined (equivalent bounds apply for the
Best-Case Execution Time):
• The Maximum Observed Execution Time (MOET), or High-Water Mark
(HWM), refers to the largest execution time value obtained by exhaustively
exploring the system, usually by collecting end-to-end measurements of a
task under different inputs and system states.
• The Real WCET is, by definition, the maximum time interval between task
activation and task termination that can occur during system operation (i.e.,
the maximum of all possible execution times for a task).
• The Estimated WCET is the result of the timing analysis to upper-bound
the real WCET.
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, a task not finishing its execution before its esti-
mated WCET expires may result in a temporal failure. As a result, it is crucial
that the estimated WCET value upper-bounds the application’s real WCET and
that it is, therefore, a trustworthy upper-bound. In addition to trustworthiness,
tightness is another vital property of timing analysis (AHP+14). The tightness
of an execution time bound refers to the deviation of the analysis results (i.e.,
estimated WCET) from the real WCET. The bigger the difference, the larger the
overestimation of the analysis method. The tightness of an estimation is usually
dependent on the timing predictability of the system, that is, on the hardware
architecture, complexity of the software and the method used for timing analysis.
Classification of Timing Analysis Techniques
Several methods have been adopted to compute such estimates on single-core
processors, which can generally be classified as static (STA), measurement-based
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(MBTA) or hybrid (HYTA) according to the procedure followed to obtain WCET
estimates:
• Static Timing Analysis, STA: Static methods analyze the source code
together with some (abstract) model of the hardware architecture and com-
pute WCET upper-bounds without executing the task or set of tasks under
analysis on the target hardware platform.
• Measurement-based Timing Analysis, MBTA: Measurement-based meth-
ods rely on end-to-end execution time observations obtained by executing the
program (or parts of it) on the real hardware or a simulator under different
execution conditions (e.g. different test vectors).
• Hybrid Timing Analysis, HYTA: A combination of STA and MBTA.
In addition, each method can also be grouped as Deterministic Timing Analysis
(DTA) or Probabilistic Timing Analysis (PTA) depending on the overall approach
and the nature of the computed results (AHP+14). DTA and PTA techniques can
either be static, measurement-based or hybrid, so in summary, according to the
taxonomy defined in (AHQ+15), there are six groups of timing analysis techniques





















Figure 2.6: Classification of timing analysis techniques (AHQ+15).
• Deterministic Timing Analysis: DTA techniques calculate a single WCET
estimate (as the estimated WCET bound depicted in Figure 2.5).
• Probabilistic Timing Analysis: PTA techniques obtain a probability dis-
tribution for the WCET, called probabilistic WCET (pWCET). The pWCET
distribution function determines a WCET value (e.g. 7ms) associated to a
cut-off probability of exceedance (e.g. 10−9).
As mentioned before in this document, the focus of this Thesis is on the
MBPTA approach as it is closer to industrial practice than its static counterpart.
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Measurement-Based Probabilistic Timing Analysis
PTA techniques generate a pWCET distribution function that upper-bounds the
execution time of the program under analysis. Figure 2.7 shows an example of
the pWCET outcome of PTA for a given task. The pWCET function allows to
determine the WCET upper-bound (e.g., 7.8 ms in Figure 2.7) for a given cut-off
probability of exceedance (e.g. 10−14), which can be arbitrarily low to fit with the

































Figure 2.7: MBPTA concepts and example pWCET outcome.
Regarding to its measurement-based variant, i.e., MBPTA, the pWCET pro-
jection is computed by collecting a number of end-to-end execution time mea-
surements on the target hardware – Analysis-time Distribution (ATD) in Fig-
ure 2.7 – and applying probabilistic analysis methods – i.e., Extreme Value The-
ory (EVT) (CSH+12) – to them to determine the probability of extreme values to
occur (the tail of the pWCET distribution in Figure 2.7). PTA techniques require
that the events under analysis, execution time observations in this case, have a
distinct probability of occurrence and are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.)1 (CAA+16; KQA+16). In addition, EVT predicts the extreme timing be-
havior of just the set of observations passed to it, and hence, the resulting pWCET
estimation is only valid for the execution conditions represented by those observa-
tions. As a consequence, the quality of WCET estimates depends on the represen-
tativeness of measurements, i.e., MBPTA requires that the set of measurements
1Independence among two random variables is attained when the occurrence of one event
does not impact on the occurrence of the other event. Two random variables are said to be
identically distributed if they have the same probability distribution (KQA+14).
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collected in the target platform at analysis time is representative of all possible
conditions that may arise during operation (Operation-time Distribution (OTD)).
The representativeness issue applies to both hardware (i.e., jittery platform re-
sources) and software (e.g., program execution path). Unfortunately, conventional
processor designs fail to provide these properties (KQA+14; KQA+16).
MBPTA has been shown to be applicable by adapting the platform to introduce
the concept of time-upper bounding and time randomization in the hardware/soft-
ware architecture (KQA+14; KQA+16; KVM+16; KCQ+13).
• Time Upper-bounding: This technique forces selected jittery hardware
resources to work at their highest latency during analysis. Time upper-
bounding is implemented in those hardware resources whose timing behavior
depends on elements beyond the reach of hardware (COBHAM; HAC+17).
The floating point unit provides an illustrative example: the latency of its
operations in fact depends on the operands; that is, multiplying a value by
0.0 can take shorter than with other parameters. MBPTA’s prescription
to force the floating point unit to work at its highest latency (per operation
type) during analysis ensures that operation conditions cannot lead to higher
execution times than those observed at analysis and hence, a single run
suffices to capture their worst-case operation-time behavior. Time upper-
bounding is also considered for other resources such as, for instance, the
number of contenders considered for arbitration in a shared bus.
• Time Randomization: This technique causes the response time of some
jittery resources to exhibit a probabilistic behavior that also holds during
operation. It is implemented in processor resources whose timing behav-
ior depends on the structural dependencies created by the hardware de-
sign (KQA+14; HAC+17). Randomization helps remove those dependencies,
which have no bearing on the program semantics. For instance, whether two
addresses compete for the same cache space depends on how they are mapped
to cache lines. Cache mapping can be randomized to make conflicts to oc-
cur probabilistically (KAQ+13b; KQA+16). Time randomization can also
be applied to the bus arbiter, to randomly choose the core that is granted
access to a shared resource (JKA+14). As a result, a representative distri-
bution of the impact that jittery resources may cause on execution time can
emerge after a statistically-significant number of observation runs.
In addition, solutions also exist to deal with the jitter caused by the software
program flow (i.e., execution paths). The Path Upper-Bounding (PUB) technique
(KAW+14) and the Extended Path Coverage (EPC) (ZMV+15) technique that
builds upon the former, upper-bound the execution time of any path of the pro-
gram by observing end-to-end traversals of it in MBPTA-compliant platforms. In
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this way, both i.i.d. and representativeness conditions are fulfilled. Figure 2.7
illustrates this notion. The dotted line depicts the Empirical Complementary
Cumulative Distribution Function (ECCDF) of the OTD1, and the dashed line
the ECCDF of the ATD. MBPTA design modifications guarantee that the ATD
upper-bounds the OTD by construction.
2.2 Mixed-criticality Integration on Multicores
Besides the certification process does not change with the advent of multicore pro-
cessors, existing multicore architectures bring significant limitations for achieving
certification. In fact, current standards provide very limited guidance on how to
tackle the challenges of modern multicores when used in CRTES. On the con-
trary, standards do consider the co-existence of mixed-criticality functions and
provide two options for their certification: (i) certify all components of the system
– including the non critical software – for the highest criticality level present on
the system, or (ii) provide enough evidence of independence among the applica-
tions of different criticality levels and allow, in this way, the certification of each
application according to its criticality level. The cost and effort of certifying a
system increases considerably with the criticality level (SEH+12). Consequently,
the cost and certification effort of the former approach is usually prohibitive. As
a consequence, it is crucial to prevent lower criticality applications from adversely
affecting higher criticality ones to guarantee such independence.
The challenge of achieving such independence of execution in mixed-criticality
systems is highly dependent on the implementation architectural paradigm, that
can either be federated or integrated :
• Federated Mixed-criticality system: Critical functions of a given crit-
icality level are allocated to dedicated hardware, physically separated from
the rest of the system with different criticality implications. This “one func-
tion = one device” paradigm provides physical separation by design.
• Integrated Mixed-criticality system: Critical functions of a given in-
tegrity level co-exist – in the same embedded platform – with subsystem
of different assurance levels or even with no critical implications. In this
implementation, the separation requirement involves considering additional
mechanisms due to new challenges, such as, the management of the use of
shared resources among the applications.
1We plot OTD for illustrative purposes only, since its retrospective nature (which observes
operation-time events) is too late to feed WCET analysis.
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Some application domains have adopted standardized integrated architec-
tures, such as, IMA (DO297) in avionics or AUTOSAR (AUTOSAR) in au-
tomotive and there are ongoing initiatives in other domains such as, Safe4Rail
project in Railway (S4R).
Standards provide some guidance for achieving independence among the dif-
ferent subsystems allocated to the same chip based on the concept of partition-
ing. Partitioning, firstly adopted in the ARINC-653 standard (ARINC653), is a
common approach for the implementation of integrated mixed-criticality systems.
Partitions provide functional separation of the applications and design fault con-
tainment (Rus99). To that end, a partition encapsulates the physical resources
both spatially and temporally:
• Spatial independence must ensure that one application does not alter
the code or private data of another application, nor command the private
devices allocated to them. A common approach proposed in standards is
using memory protection mechanisms like Memory Protection Unit (MPU)
or Memory Management Unit (MMU).
• Temporal Independence shall ensure that the execution of one applica-
tion does not obstruct, in the temporal domain (including performance, la-
tency and jitter), the execution of other applications. For achieving temporal
independence standards suggest using fixed and cyclic scheduling of parti-
tions (IEC 61508-3 Annex F (IEC61508), ISO 26262-6 Annex-D (ISO26262),
ARINC-653 (ARINC653), DO 178 6.3.3f (DO178), CAST-32A (CAST-32A)).
The most popular approach for partitioning and providing functional separa-
tion among mixed-criticality applications relies on virtual partitions running on
top of hypervisors. Hypervisors, also known as Virtual Machine Monitors (VMM),
can be defined as layers of software that establish independent execution environ-
ments (i.e., partitions) in a single computer platform. They can be classified as
Type 1 bare-metal hypervisors, which lay directly on the bare-metal hardware or
Type 2 hypervisors that run on top of an OS. Additionally, full-virtualization and
para-virtualization hypervisors are distinguished. The former provides a complete
virtual image of all hardware resources and thus, the software above it runs with-
out modifications as it is unaware of the virtualization. The latter, introduces
the concept of hypercalls or hypervisor services to request privileged operations.
This requires customization of the guest program or OS in order to support those
hypercalls.
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2.2.1 Partitioning on Multicore Processors
One can implement partitioning strategies either by software or hardware mecha-
nisms. The former is achieved by introducing additional abstraction layers (e.g.,
separation microkernel, hypervisor) into the system. For the latter, specific hard-
ware designs attain partitioning and independence by avoiding interferences, or by
special hardware extensions that protect the execution time and memory space of
each application.
Software Techniques
The design of most hypervisors on the market today emerged from scratch to sup-
port the fields of servers and workstations. This means that they contain a large
and complex code base not intended to be certified. For the embedded market,
hypervisors compete to offer low footprint and overhead as well as efficiency, good
isolation and real-time capabilities. Most of the hypervisors that particularly tar-
get embedded applications use bare-metal para-virtualization given the reduced
overhead of this technique. Additionally, if embedded applications are part of crit-
ical systems, the deployment of the hypervisor involves certifying it according to
the highest integrity level present on the system and hence, the simplicity of the
virtualization layer is pursued.
In this line, the design of many embedded hypervisors specifically addresses
safety certification on single-core architectures as listed in the survey provided by
the authors in (ZQ12). However, these solutions are not easily scalable to modern
multicore processors. Several hypervisor providers and research projects seek to
adapt existing embedded hypervisors, such as, the PikeOS hypervisor (PikeOS),
the open source XtratuM hypervisor (XtratuM) or the Wind River Hypervi-
sor (WINDRIVER) to multicores. PikeOS is the first hypervisor achieving mul-
ticore certification for a dual-core architecture according to EN 50128 (PikSIL4;
Fis14), however, it does not yet consider the parallel execution of critical applica-
tions. XtratuM is designed for embedded real-time systems and provides a set of
properties to support certification (MRC11). It has been evaluated in a specific
ad-hoc multicore system as part of the MultiPARTES project (CCM+14). Wind
River provides a Safety Profile on top of VxWorks (VxSP15; VxCer15) which
TÜV SÜD has positively assessed up to SIL 3 (IEC 61508) on single-cores. For
the avionics market, Wind River has developed the ARINC 653-compliant Vx-
Works 653, suitable for multicore architectures on its 3.0 version (Vx653). The
authors in (RM14) focus on meeting the isolation requirements for the integration
of a mixed-criticality application on the Infineon AURIX multicore platform using
a microkernel based hypervisor developed by ETAS Ltd. (RTA-HV).
All hypervisor-based solutions have many common features, such as, a para-
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virtualization layer with higher privilege rights, MMU/MPU management for en-
forcing spatial separation on memories, statically defined cyclic scheduling patterns
that assign available resources to tasks based on time partitions (based on ARINC
specification), inter-partition communication mechanisms and health monitoring
features for diagnosis. However, parallelization and resource sharing is often com-
promised to ensure safety, for instance by assigning exclusive time partitions for
critical tasks (single-core like execution) (Fis14). Overall, safety-related hypervi-
sors rely on cyclic ARINC based scheduling for dealing with temporal interferences
but they do not provide the details on how the execution time bounds of that
scheduling regime are computed. This is a big gap, since the temporal indepen-
dence at application level is contingent on the timing behavior exhibited by the
underlying multicore processor.
Hardware Techniques
As an alternative to software partitioning, hardware partitioning is enforced by pre-
dictable ad-hoc hardware architectural approaches specifically designed to attain
separation and predictability. Approaches such as the ACROSS MPSoC (SEH+12),
also referred as Time-Triggered System-on-Chip (TTSoC), and the CoMPSoC
Multi-Processor System-on-a-Chip (MPSoC) (HGB+09; GAC+13) provide ded-
icated hardware resources for partitions that are communicated by means of a
deterministic NoC rather than the buses present on modern multicore architec-
tures. Thanks to the network infrastructure, a message-based communication
centric approach is built, which relies on statically dimensioned Time-Division
Multiplexing (TDM) algorithms to improve temporal determinism. However, the
authors of these hardware-based separation platforms build their approaches based
on multi-processor designs rather than multicores.
The major drawback of these approaches is that they require novel specific
architectures. As a result, the implementation technology of these hardware ap-
proaches is often hard to deploy in industry. FPGAs require an extra certification
effort and ASICs are an expensive technology. A promising COTS multicore is
considered by the authors in (FSD+13), where they apply hardware modifications
to the state-of-the art automotive Infineon TriCore AURIX platform (AURIX) to
improve isolation.
Mixed Techniques
To reduce the overhead put on the hypervisor, today several COTS processors
provide Instruction Set Architectures (ISA) with support for virtualization to use
it in combination with hypervisors. These ISAs support virtualization by features
such as, an additional CPU privilege mode for the hypervisor, memory protection
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mechanisms and I/O protection. For instance, Wind River hypervisor solutions
(VxWorks) take advantage of the Intel virtualization support (Intel-VT) (Int09)
and NXP provides virtualization features in both hardware (PowerPC with hard-
ware assists for virtualization) and software layers (Freescale hypervisor) to use
them in combination (Free09; Free08; Bos13).
A novel mixed hardware-software approach is the MultiPARTES platform. It
comprises a heterogeneous multicore architecture (Intel dual-core ATOM (x86)
and a muticore LEON 3 processor prototyped on an FPGA) and the XtratuM
hypervisor in asymmetric multiprocessing (AMP) configuration (SAA+14). A
Time-Triggered Network-on-Chip (TTNoC) implemented on the FPGA logically
interconnects the cores taking the TTSoC architecture as a reference. At the soft-
ware layer, the XtratuM hypervisor manages spatial and temporal independence.
However, in the current approach, multicore contention in shared resources could
produce interferences in the execution time duration of partitions. In order to
achieve certification, the designer shall bound this interference and consider it in
the cyclic scheduling plan design (PGN+14).
2.2.2 Certification
The difficulties to certify safety-critical and in particular mixed-criticality systems
highly depend on their architectural properties, and therefore on systems’ complex-
ity. Current multicore processors fall into a “highly complex” category according
to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) (EASA12), as they include more
than one Central Processing Unit (CPU) that depend on each other. In 2014, the
certification authorities of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) presented
their conservative position with respect to the certification of multicore processors
in a position paper (CAST-32) (CAST-32). In particular, they consider multi-
cores with only two active cores. The major concerns of the authors concentrate
on the non-determinism caused by a number of features not present in single-core
processors (e.g., interference channels caused by shared resources), a greater ar-
chitectural complexity and undocumented and untestable features that may lead
to an undesired behavior. Recently, the FAA/EASA have published an update
of this paper, CAST-32A (CAST-32A), extending its applicability by removing
the “only two active cores” restriction. CAST-32A provides certification guide-
lines based on approaches accepted by certification authorities in projects using
multicore technology in Airbone systems.
A vast amount of research works target to enable the use of multicore architec-
tures on mixed-criticality applications (Kin09; Huy12; NP12; BK14; GK15). The
work described in (Kin09) lists per-component certification challenges (in shared
caches, memory controllers, interconnect, etc.). In (BK14) they describe the multi-
core extensions of AUTOSAR. Similarly, the authors in (Huy12) discuss the impact
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of multicore architectures in ARINC-653 based systems. However, multicore con-
tention is an uncovered issue that needs to be resolved. In the research conducted
by Geiger et al. (GK15), the unpredictability and difficulty to accurately esti-
mate WCET in modern multicores results in no current multicore suitable enough
for achieving the required level of independence for mixed-criticality and for this
reason they propose the use of an external monitoring device.
2.3 Timing Analysis on Multicores
As exposed in the previous section, most partitioning solutions rely on cyclic
scheduling algorithms for achieving temporal independence. Being WCET bounds
a basic pre-condition for designing the scheduling, determining upper-bounds on
execution times of tasks is of utmost importance for ensuring temporal indepen-
dence on multicores. In addition, in a certification process, the applicant shall
provide evidence of the timing correctness of the systems, i.e., guarantees that
tasks will finish within their corresponding deadlines. However, deriving WCET
estimates is a known challenge, specially when it comes to modern multicore archi-
tectures (AHQ+15; KP08; MV11). There is extensive recent literature that seeks
to address multicore WCET estimation, a detailed summary of existing works can
be found in (PDK+15; FAQ+14).
2.3.1 Minimizing Multicore Contention
On the one hand, several authors propose hardware designs to limit multicore inter-
ferences and favor time predictability (PQC+09; SEH+12). A common approach
rests on time-multiplexing shared resource usage with Round-Robin (PQC+09)
or Time-Division Multiple Access (TDMA) (RAE+07; PAH+15) arbitration of
requests. Cache partitioning is another common solution given the difficulties
that shared caches entail in timing analysis. Several works (CWK+15; LPS12;
KVC+14) study the impact of cache partitioning in mixed-criticality applications
where they try to balance the conflicting requirements of partitioning for safety and
sharing for increased efficiency through criticality-aware allocation mechanisms.
On the other hand, as COTS multicore architectures are not generally time-
predictable, researchers are developing software solutions to limit multicore con-
tention. For instance, the authors in (NPB+14; NPH+14) suggest to limit the
number of permitted accesses that each partition issues in a given time interval and
use single-core like timing analysis techniques to compute an interference sensitive
WCET. Similarly, other works prevent read/write phases of tasks to simultane-
ously use shared resources (e.g. interconnect) to prevent contention (BDN+16).
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2.3.2 Accounting for Multicore Contention
Approaches relying on static analysis to derive contention bounds entail many
limitations in multicore COTS architectures due to the complexity of modeling
high-performance features and the lack of hardware details to do so. As an illus-
trative example, the authors in (NPB+14) base their approach in static timing
analysis techniques, but the evaluation of their approach on a real processor (the
P4080) exposes the need for measurements to quantify the access latencies in which
their interference model is based on (NP12).
In the case of measurement-based techniques, which are currently the preferred
industry choice, the challenge rests on guaranteeing that the worst-case is encoun-
tered during measurements and that the obtained value is therefore sound. Of-
ten, measurement-based techniques use resource stressing benchmarks (FGQ+12;
NP12; BGGM14; BGG+14). The duty of benchmarks is generally to expose the
timing behavior of certain resources of an architecture. Authors in (BGGM14;
BGG+14) complement stressing benchmark analysis with an application specific
evaluation and timing analysis. Similarly, the work reported in (FJA+15) increases
the confidence of application measurements by complementing them with resource
stressing benchmarks. Typically, industry addresses uncertainty in MBTA tech-
niques by adding a safety-margin to the estimated execution time bound (e.g.,
commonly 20% margin). However, determining the size of this margin (which is
qualitative rather than quantitative) and providing a formal proof for its justifica-
tion is very difficult, even more in multicore architectures where the margin should
cover all uncertainties.
In this line, probabilistic approaches allow to select a WCET bound based on
its exceedance probability and thereby provide a formal justification for the cho-
sen margins. Research works on MBPTA (KAQ+13a; CSH+12) show the modi-
fications introduced in the hardware/software architecture of processors to apply
MBPTA techniques and hence, make them MBPTA-compliant (KQA+14). Time
randomization and upper-bounding techniques are implemented either in hardware
(KAQ+13a) or software (KVM+16; KCQ+13). The outcomes of the PROAR-
TIS (CQV+13; WKL+13; KQAF+14) project demonstrate the successful appli-
cation of PTA upon single-core architectures and in PROXIMA (PROXIMA) its
measurement-based variant, MBPTA, was ported to multicore processors (KQA+16;
CAA+16).
2.3.3 Certification
Standards do not generally impose specific requirements on the timing analysis
method itself. In fact, there are few allusions to timing analysis in standards.
For instance, taking IEC 61508 safety life-cycle of Figure 2.2 as reference, the
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standard only mentions timing analysis in specific verification requirements of
the hardware and software development processes. In spite of these allusions to
timing analysis, there is no guidance on which timing analysis technique is the most
appropriate neither on how the developer should compute estimates nor on how one
should verify the quality of the resulting WCET (GB13). Some timing analysis
tools, such as, AbsInt’s abstract interpretation (aiT) (AbsInt; KF12; KPG+14)
or Rapita’s RapiTime timing analysis tool (RPT; RPT178), have already been
evaluated and qualified against safety certification standards on their single-core
solutions. However, the suitability of the aiT static timing analysis tool is subject
to the predictability of the platform and hence, may not scale well to multicore
architectures. A model argument that explains the suitability of MBPTA for
single-cores was constructed by the authors in (ZAV13). In general, the multicore
approaches for WCET estimation, such as MBPTA, are still in their infancy and
due to their novelty, there are no certification evidences yet.
2.4 Summary and Conclusions
In this section we have surveyed the extensive existing literature concerned with
the hindrances that the transition to integrated multicore architectures involve
for mixed-criticality systems. However, there are no established approaches yet
to achieve their safety certification. Safety standards do not provide sufficient
guidance yet for multicore implementations. When integrating mixed-criticality
systems, safety standards require to guarantee temporal and spatial independence.
Nonetheless, as reviewed in Section 2.2, the techniques adopted for single-core
integration do not scale well to modern multicores.
Among the analyzed approaches, time deterministic processors and hardware
based separation would ease the certification process by providing predictable
timing guarantees and separation by design. In turn, they require completely
new hardware designs (which are generally based on multi-processor architectural
paradigms with distributed memory systems as opposed to modern COTS multi-
core designs) that often render difficult their deployment. On the contrary, hyper-
visors are an attractive solution from an industrial perspective to implement them
on top of COTS multicores. However, hypervisors imply an additional software
layer that introduces some overhead, compromises the simplicity of the overall sys-
tem and it is required to be certified according to the highest integrity level present
on the system. Overall, most hypervisors rely on ARINC-based cyclic scheduling
regimes. However, ARINC specification does not yet define how such scheduling
scheme should be translated to multicores where various tasks run in parallel on
different cores. As a result, there are no established approaches yet to achieve
mixed-criticality certification on multicore architectures.
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Moreover, most solutions assume that tasks are derived WCET bounds before
carrying out the scheduling. In multicores, the WCET of a tasks may considerably
increase when it is running in parallel with other tasks though (NP12). Thereby,
this approach only holds when all resources are partitioned in such a way that
the load that co-runner applications put on shared resources does not increase
tasks’ WCET (i.e., WCET estimates are fully time-composable). Under these
circumstances, the correctness of the hypervisor based solutions implicitly depends
on the correctness of the WCET estimates.
As a consequence, deep research activities are being held for dealing with mul-
ticore contention and WCET estimation as summarized in Section 2.3. Some ap-
proaches prevent the simultaneous use of shared resources to improve predictability
and independence at the cost of compromising performance. This requires to pre-
dict and control the maximum interference among co-running applications. The
common design principle of adding a conservative safety-margin to estimates be-
comes unrealistic for multicores, due to their increased timing uncertainties (w.r.t.
single-cores) and the subsequent difficulties at providing a formal argument for
the chosen margins. Probabilistic analysis methods are an emerging alternative
for replacing the ‘qualitative’ safety-margin by formal quantitative justification.
Nevertheless, MBPTA requires to adopt MBPTA-friendly processor design prin-
ciples.
In conclusion, unless all inter-core interferences in a multicore are minimized
(which is unlikely to be adopted by hardware manufacturers and difficult to realize
in software), achieving temporal independence by other solutions, like hypervisors,
requires a detailed analysis of the timing behavior exhibited by the underlying
multicore processor. Considering the individual drawbacks of the different tim-
ing analysis approaches, it is currently not possible to establish a general advice
on which timing analysis technique to use for multicore mixed-criticality system





This chapter presents the main components involved in the evaluation framework
of this Thesis: (1) the multicore processors considered, (2) the applications and (3)
the timing analysis procedure and tools. These components and their dependen-
cies with this Thesis’ contributions are illustrated in Figure 3.1 where the elements
developed in the scope of this Thesis are highlighted in green color. First, the con-
tributions related to safety are theoretically evaluated by the formulation of safety
concepts on industrial case studies for their formal review by a certification body.
Then, execution time measurements of tasks running on multicore processors are
collected to obtain WCET estimates and provide experimental support evidence













































Figure 3.1: Thesis contribution and evaluation dependencies.
37
Chapter 3. Experimeltal Setup
3.1 Multicore Architectures
The contributions of this dissertation are evaluated in three alternative multicore
architectures to cover a representative enough multicore spectrum: a commercially
available multicore, an ad-hoc design and a solution that integrates safety mecha-
nisms on its architecture to foster their certification. The first one, NXP’s P4080,
is representative of the complexity in modern multicore architectures relevant for
real-time industry. The second, symbolizes an in-house solution that, as opposed
to COTS, gives a better insight of processor internals and permits to customize the
hardware to implement MBPTA-compliant modifications. Finally, the third plat-
form, AURIX TC27x, integrates many safety mechanisms in its architecture that
make it a very promising for systems subject to safety certification constraints.
3.1.1 COTS Multicore: P4080
The NXP’s P4080 (P4080), whose main elements are sketched in Figure 3.2, em-
beds eight Power-Architecture e500mc processor cores interconnected through the
‘CoreNet Coherency Fabric’. Each core has private first level instruction (IL1) and
data (DL1) caches (32KB each) and a backside L2 cache (128KB). The intercon-
nect is able to perform several concurrent transactions in parallel and manages
cache coherency. In addition to the core-local caches, the platform includes a
shared L3 on-chip cache (1MB) between the CoreNet and each memory controller,
called CoreNet Platform Cache (CPC). The P4080 has two independent DDR3
memory controllers with interleaving support. As there are two memory con-
trollers, there are also two CPC (a total of 2MB) shared among all processors.
Additionally, the platform includes multiple peripheral interfaces. All cores have
independent boot and reset, as well as, secure boot capability.
Figure 3.2: High level block diagram of the P4080 (memory hierarchy).
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3.1.2 Ad-hoc Multicore: LEON3-MC
The LEON3-MC is an ad-hoc system-on-chip quad-core architecture designed and
prototyped in an FPGA in the scope of the FP7-PROXIMA project. The LEON3-
MC (COB16), depicted in Figure 3.3, has four LEON 3 based processor cores of the
Sparc v8 architecture interconnected through an AMBA AHB bus. Each processor
has an associated L1 cache while the L2 cache and DDR2 memory controller are
shared among all cores. The main peripheral interfaces include ethernet controllers,
serial communication, timers, interrupt controller and debugging capabilities. The
processor has a single clock source.
Figure 3.3: High level block diagram of the LEON3-MC (memory hierarchy).
3.1.3 Certification-friendly Multicore: AURIX TC27x
The chosen processor family is the AURIX TC27x COTS multicore provided by
Infineon (AURIX). The AURIX TC277, illustrated in Figure 3.4, comprises three
cores of the TriCore architecture (plus two additional ones that operate in lockstep
mode): one energy-efficient core and two performance-efficient ones. The latter
embed high-performance jittery resources such as caches and dynamic branch pre-
dictors. All cores are equipped with local scratchpad memories and caches, for both
instruction and data, and are connected via a crossbar called Shared Resource In-
terconnect (SRI) to a common ‘memory system’ comprising a shared SRAM, and
program/data Flash memories. Those elements are then connected to medium
and low bandwidth peripherals, such as, timers, I/Os and several communication
interfaces (e.g.,Controller Area Network (CAN)) through the System Peripheral
Bus (SPB).
The AURIX is a very promising processor family for CRTES for a number of
reasons. It embeds many safety features that makes it suitable to host safety-
critical applications up to ASIL-D level easing and reducing certification costs.
Moreover, unlike most multicore processors, the AURIX TC27x is designed with
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determinism in mind with features that ease the timing analyzability of the plat-
form; for instance, it includes core-local scratchpad memories and it does not share
cache memories among the cores.
Figure 3.4: High level block diagram of the AURIX TC27x (memory hierarchy).
3.2 Applications
For evaluation purposes we use two different industrial applications from the rail-
way and automotive domains developed in the framework of the FP7 PROXIMA
project and microbenchmarks designed to stress specific processor resources. The
industrial case studies show the mixed-criticality integration trends in different
CRTES domains. Both case studies include safety and non safety-related applica-
tions, together with hard real-time restrictions. In addition, each of it is subject
to the particular needs of its target domain.
3.2.1 Industrial Railway Application
We have designed a mixed-criticality railway application for both the evaluation
of the safety argumentation and to obtain evidence of the industrial application of
MBPTA. The case study is comprised of the following on-board train subsystems:
(i) safety-critical railway signaling subsystem and (ii) real-time traction control
subsystems for the control of the speed/pair of electric motors.
• European Train Control System (ETCS) on-board Railway Signal-
ing: The ETCS constitutes the on-board unit of the train signaling sys-
tem defined in the European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS)
(ERTMS; GW09), a European Union backed initiative defining a unique
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train signaling standard throughout Europe. The ETCS is a safety-critical
embedded system (Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 4) that protects the train by
supervising the traveled distance and speed and by activating the emergency
brake if authorized values are exceeded. To this end, it relies on the distance
and speed measurements provided by the on-board odometry system, which
performs dead reckoning based on a set of diverse sensors (e.g., wheel angular
speed encoders, Doppler radars, GPS). The railway infrastructure provides
train absolute positions through Eurobalises that are used to correct and re-
calibrate the odometry subsystem. This is executed in the the central safety
processing unit of the ETCS, called European Vital Computer (EVC). The
EVC executes the safety kernel that includes three main tasks (Figure 3.5):
– Odometry module: is the responsible of estimating a set of parameters
based on the information received from the train environment (e.g.,
estimated train’s position).
– Emergency module: Controls the emergency braking system.
– Service module: Controls the service braking system.
• Railway Traction Subsystem: It controls the speed/pair of the electric
motors varying the switching frequency of a power inverter. For the sake
of simplicity and to be able to demonstrate a mixed-criticality setup, the
traction subsystem is not considered as safety-related.
Figure 3.5: Block diagram of the railway case-study application.
The MBPTA technique is applied to a subset of the safety-critical ETCS sub-
system when executed on the real-time PikeOS operating system (PikeOS). In
particular, it is used to estimate the pWCET of the emergency module. This
task is composed of several data dependent paths that, as briefly discussed in the
Background Section 2.1.3, have an impact on the timing analysis process. MBPTA
provides pWCET estimates that upper-bound the execution time of those paths
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exercised with the input vectors. To conduct the measurement-based analysis, a
set of input vectors has been defined, which exercises the task at basic block level.
These input vectors allow the application of path coverage methods, such as, Ex-
tended Path Coverage (MFB+17) over MBPTA. However, the user has commonly
means to control those features during timing analysis, such as software code cov-
erage metrics. For simplicity, in this Thesis we exclude the execution path problem
from the analysis by studying each path independently by the execution time col-
lection procedure detailed in Subsection 3.3.2.
3.2.2 Industrial Automotive Application
The safety critical application we consider for the automotive safety concept defini-
tion is an automotive Cruise Control (CC) system derived from the CONCERTO
European research project (CONCERTO). To give the mixed-criticality flavor to
the case-study, a non safety-related application is also considered:
• Cruise Control: The main job of the CC is to control the speed of a vehicle
automatically without human intervention. The system takes control over
the throttle of the car to maintain the vehicle’s speed as set by the driver.
The CC is composed of two safety ECUs that perform the CC functionality
by the three tasks illustrated in Figure 3.6:
– Signal Acquisition ECU: Runs the Signal Acquisition task for reading
the set of input buttons, pedals and speed sensor and transmits the
commands to the engine control ECU.
– Engine Control ECU: Based on the received commands it sets the re-
quired torque value to control car’s speed, provide feedback through a
lamp and deactivate the CC system when necessary. This is executed
by the cruise control Monitoring and Speed Controller real-time tasks.
• Power window controller: The window controller is usually part of the
body computer module which implements additional functionalities (e.g.,
mirror control, central locking). For the sake of simplicity, only the power
windows controller is considered as the non safety-related subsystem.
The implementation and timing analysis of this case study were conducted
as part of the FP7-PROXIMA project by the University of Padova which was




Figure 3.6: Block diagram of the automotive case-study application.
3.2.3 Microbenchmarks
Microbenchmarks (CRV+09; FGQ+12; RGG+12), also known as resource stress-
ing kernels, rsk, are a set of specialized programs that put high load on some shared
resources and help (among others) determining the existence of some sources of jit-
ter and deriving bounds to their impact on execution time. The microbenchmarks
designed in the scope of this dissertation comprise a single loop that contains a
number of instructions of the same type, in this case load or store operations
(OP), to stress the memory hierarchy as defined in Listing 3.1. The reason to use
a loop is to avoid misses in the instruction cache and exercise the desired memory
resource long enough to be able to minimize the overhead of instrumenting and
measuring the execution time.
1 mr ARRAY, %r0 ; \n\ t //ARRAY: Address o f the array
2 mr END, %r1 ; \n\ t //END: End o f array (ARRAY + ALLOC SIZE)
3
4 loop :
5 op r2 , 0x000 (ARRAY) ; //op : load or s t o r e i n s t r u c t i o n s
6 op r2 , 0x040 (ARRAY) ;
7 op r2 , 0x080 (ARRAY) ;
8 op r2 , 0x0C0(ARRAY) ;
9 op r2 , 0x100 (ARRAY) ;
10 op r2 , 0x140 (ARRAY) ;
11 op r2 , 0x180 (ARRAY) ;
12 op r2 , 0x1C0(ARRAY) ;
13 addi ARRAY, ARRAY, sum ; //sum : s t r i d e ∗ 8
14 cmplw ARRAY, END;
15 b l t loop ;
Listing 3.1: Exemplary code of memory stressing microbenchmarks.
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In the rsk initialization, a contiguous section of memory (array) of size AL-
LOC SIZE is allocated. Then, the loop traverses the whole array with a stride
that determines the distance among two consecutive array accesses. By adjusting
the ALLOC SIZE and the stride the benchmark is customized to stress different
levels of the memory hierarchy. We develop the rsk in assembly code to reduce
the overhead to a minimum. We then collect end-to-end execution times of N
executions of this rsk.
3.3 Timing Analysis: MBPTA
The MBPTA approach introduced in Section 2.1.3 builds on top of two main pil-
lars: (i) managing the Sources of Jitter (SoJ) during the collection of measurements
to ensure that they are representative (upper bound) of systems’ operation-time
timing behavior; and (ii) applying statistical analysis techniques to those observa-
tions to compute a pWCET curve that determines the probability of exceedance
of each WCET estimation.
3.3.1 MBPTA-compliant Time Randomized Platforms
As introduced in the Background Section 2.1.3, MBPTA handles the architectural
SoJ either by time randomizing them (probabilistically upper-bound) or making
them to work in their worst latency (deterministically upper-bound). The mod-
ifications required to this end can be introduced following different hardware or
software approaches. Earlier work describes how to design and implement these
features in an MBPTA-friendly platform (KQA+16; KVM+16). In this disser-
tation we consider four different MBPTA-compliant platforms: (i) LEON3-MC-
HR platform, (ii) LEON3-MC-DSR platform, (iii) P4080-DSR platform and (iv)
AURIX-SSR platform.
• LEON3-MC-HR Platform. Time upper bounding and randomization
are applied at hardware level on the LEON3-MC prototyped in an FPGA
through the following platform modifications (HAC+17):
– Cache memories (DL1, IL1 and L2) are time randomized by implement-
ing random placement and replacement policies (KAQ+13a; KAQ+13b;
KAQ+14; HAG+16). The former breaks the dependence among mem-
ory mapping and cache layouts and the latter releases form the impact
of execution history by randomly selecting the victim in every cache
miss. In this way, every cacheable memory access will have a hit/miss
probability of occurrence in the timing analysis process.
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– The Floating Point Unit (FPU) is forced to always work on its worst
latency irrespective of which its input values are.
– Bus: The LEON3-MC-HR implements an enhanced random permuta-
tion arbitration bus (JKA+14). The basis of the arbitration defines
time windows divided in as many slots as cores being arbitrated. This
slots are randomly allocated to cores, while ensuring that each core is
only assigned one slot within a time window. This random arbitra-
tion allows to obtain fully time composable pWCET estimates when
analyzing a partition in isolation and making no assumption on the
contenders.
• LEON3-MC-DSR. The randomization is applied at software level in the
baseline LEON3-MC prototype. Instead of modifying the hardware, random-
ization is introduced at compilation time by using the Dynamic Software
Randomization (DSR) technique (KCQ+13; CKW+17). DSR introduces
randomization at runtime, by randomly changing the position of memory
objects (e.g., functions, basic blocks, data structures) in the main mem-
ory across different program runs and adding random padding among them.
In this way, objects are randomly mapped into cache lines and this gives
each cache layout a probability of occurrence with a similar randomized tim-
ing behavior in caches as that obtained with hardware-implemented random
placement.
• P4080-DSR. The P4080 is a COTS multicore processor and therefore the
same DSR technique, ported to PowerPC architecture, is used.
• AURIX-SSR. The AURIX is also a COTS multicore commonly used in
the automotive domain. In this case, randomization is also introduced at
software level but instead of using the dynamic approach of previous plat-
forms, it is done by Static Software Randomization (SSR) by a method called
Toolchain-Agnostic Software rAndomization (TASA) (KVM+16; KCM+16).
TASA is implemented in the form of a source-to-source compiler that ran-
domly reorders the definition of functions, stack frames and variables in the
source code. The approach relies on the observation that compilers generate
the elements of the executable (code, data, etc.) in the same order they
are encountered in the source file. This makes that the relative location of
each element inside the binary determines its placement in main memory,
and consequently its mapping in cache. It follows that, with TASA multiple
binaries with different (random) memory placements are generated.
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3.3.2 Collecting Measurements
To exclude the jitter caused by different execution paths in the program from the
analysis, we collect end-to-end execution time measurements of the software Unit
of Analysis (UoA) on a per-path basis (ET (x)) as illustrated in Figure 3.7. This
allows constructing a separate pWCET for each of the traversed paths. Input
vectors are therefore designed to trigger a different unique path of the software
task under analysis.
Figure 3.7: Execution time collection for MBPTA.
Similarly, we empty the caches right before executing the unit of analysis to con-
trol the initial conditions. Finally, we minimize the impact of the OS by avoiding
any context switch and other OS activity during UoA execution. For each path we
collect the execution time of N number of end-to-end runs as shown in Figure 3.7,
which is usually no less than a hundred and no more than two thousands, which
keeps the MBPTA overhead low (APC+17). Execution time measurements are
obtained by the introduction of inspection points in the executable code at com-
pile time. During the analysis-time experiments, the specific timestamp at which
each point is reached is logged (in this case start and end points in Figure 3.7).
To this end, we use Rapita Verification Suite tool (RVS).
3.3.3 Probabilistic Analysis
The second step of MBPTA, after collecting representative execution time mea-
surements, is to apply probabilistic analysis (EVT (CVQ+13)) to estimate the
probability of extreme (timing) events to occur. The utilization of EVT with
MBPTA requires that the observed execution times can be described by random
variables that are proven independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). While
this property is satisfied by the random timing behavior of MBPTA-friendly plat-
forms (ACQ+13), we apply the i.i.d. tests described in (CSH+12).
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Safety Argument for Multicore
Mixed-criticality Systems
Multicore processors are potential candidates to consolidate, in one platform,
mixed-criticality applications traditionally distributed in multiple subsystems in a
federated paradigm. This is motivated by the increased performance that multicore
architectures offer at reduced cost, size, weight and energy consumption. Despite
the interest shown by different CRTES industries in multicore architectures, such
as automotive (BK14), avionics (CAST-32A) or railway (PikSIL4) among others,
their adoption is hindered by the conservative restrictions required to achieve cer-
tification. New issues arise from their inherent complexity, unpredictability and
limited in-service experience that challenge having sufficient evidence required for
certification. In addition, safety standards provide limited guidance for multicore
architectures.
This chapter contributes with a safety argumentation for mixed-criticality cer-
tification upon multicores. The argument defines safety analysis and guidelines
for multicore processors and the partitioned applications running on them based
on a separation layer. The argumentation in this chapter focuses on the generic
international IEC 61508 standard, as it is written for the functional safety of Elec-
trical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related systems and
it is applicable across multiple safety-critical industrial sectors. Several domain-
specific functional safety standards are then based on the IEC 61508 standard (cf.
Figure 2.1). Accordingly, the certification metamodel proposed in this chapter is
built based on IEC 61508 and then, its application on the reference use case appli-
cations of Chapter 5 takes into account the required domain-specific considerations
(i.e., EN 5012X and ISO 26262).
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 introduces the graphical no-
tation used in the rest of this chapter. Section 4.2 introduces the strategy followed
to build the safety argument and introduces the top level argument structure.
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Section 4.3 briefly describes the safety implications of common-practice federated
approaches to later build integrated arguments on top of a well-accepted solu-
tion. Section 4.4 and Section 4.5, which are the core of the chapter, define the
measures for mixed-criticality integration and emphasize in multicore platforms’
implications respectively. Finally, Section 4.6 provides a chapter summary.
4.1 Notation
For building the argumentation metamodel we use the graphical Goal Structuring
Notation (GSN) (GSN11), one of the most commonly used notations to represent
safety arguments. The usage of a graphical notation aids in building clearer and
better structured arguments than textual narratives. The core elements of GSN,
illustrated in Figure 4.1, are the goals or claims represented as rectangles that are
then broken down into sub-goals until there is evidence, i.e., a solution, to support
them. Strategies provide the reasoning that link goals and sub-goals among them.
Some of these claims and strategies hold only under certain assumptions and for a
given context or definitions, documented explicitly within the assumption and con-
text elements. Justification symbols provide supplementary information related to
the goals or arguments, e.g., a rationale. Some goals and strategies include a hol-
low diamond symbol to indicate that they are intentionally left undeveloped in the
argument. To build compositional arguments with a set of interconnected argu-
ment structures, and handle in this way modularity, GSN introduces the module
symbol that contains an argument in it and it can be referenced from multiple
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Figure 4.1: Principal GSN elements (GSN11).
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4.2 Overall Safety Argument
This section introduces the overall mixed-criticality multicore safety argumenta-




























































Figure 4.2: Summary of goals in the safety argumentation.
The top level goal of the argumentation is represented in Figure 4.3 and seeks
building a safe integrated mixed-criticality system (G1). To bridge the gap between
multicore technology and certification, it is based on a certified common-practice
federated approach.
49
Chapter 4. Safety Argument for Multicore Mixed-criticality Systems
G1. The integrated mixed-criticality system is acceptably safe.
G1 can be claimed to be true in the context of the system defined in “C1.1
System definition”. The strategy (S1) is based on the management of systems
hazards, meaning that system hazards are eliminated or sufficiently mitigated
up to tolerable rates for the integrity levels assigned to the safety functions
(J1). To this end, the applicable domain standard shall be defined (C1.3)
and it is assumed that a hazard analysis has been accomplished (A1). The
resulting hazard list (C1.2) shall be handled by modules M1.1 and M1.2
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Figure 4.3: Top level argument structure for the mixed-criticality integration based
on a certified federated system.
The safety arguments to achieve G1 are developed in a three-step transfor-
mation process:
M1.1. includes sub-goal G2: “Hazards are appropriately managed in a feder-
ated architecture paradigm”. G2 describes the common-practice fed-
erated approach to be used as a reference for building the integrated
argument (Section 4.3). Software applications of the federated approach
are assumed to be certified and reused as compliant items for mixed-
criticality integration.
M1.2. includes sub-goal G3: “The mixed-criticality integration does not infer
in additional hazards”. G3 addresses mixed-criticality integration in a
top-down approach:
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• Federated to Integrated: the transition from the federated approach
to an integrated architecture is evaluated abstracted from the par-
ticular platform implementation (either single-core, multiprocessor
or multicore) (Section 4.4).
• Multicore Integrated: the mixed-criticality integration is refined to
tackle multicore architectures (Section 4.5).
4.3 Common-practice Federated Approach
The common-practice safety case is based on the claim that each safety subsys-
tem is compliant to safety standards in a federated architecture paradigm (G2.1).
Certifying a federated system with applications of differing safety implications is
a widely adopted approach by current safety-related industries. Accordingly, G2
is not developed in detail but only the most important aspects are considered in
the goal structure of Figure 4.4 to later build integrated arguments on top of a
well-accepted approach.
G2. Hazards are appropriately managed in a federated architecture
paradigm.
G2 (Figure 4.4) is claimed to be true in the context of the federated architec-
ture described in C2. A federated architecture is a distributed control system
architecture that usually follows a “one function, one computer” paradigm
with hierarchical standardized communication buses. Safety-critical sub-
systems are physically separated from other subsystems and they can be
independently certified in compliance to different integrity levels.
In consequence, G2 is supported by two sub-goals where the first considers
individual certification requirements for each subsystem separately (S2) and
the second evaluates their interactions:
G2.1. Each subsystem k is compliant with standard, where k ranges from 1 to
N subsystems that perform a safety function. Each safety subsystem k
is compliant with the requirements of safety standards for its assigned
integrity level (C2.1.1).
• Evidence for G2.1 is provided by the safety certification (i.e., con-
formity assessment) of each of the safety subsystems k (Sl2.1).
G2.2. Subsystems are physically separated from each other. This goal shall
be intrinsically achieved by the federated architecture paradigm, where
each safety application owns private hardware resources and the field-
bus provides safe communication (time-triggered communications, bus
guardians, etc.).
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Figure 4.4: Common-practice federated system certification - Goal G2 (M1.1).
4.4 Mixed-criticality Integration
Based on the federated argument of Section 4.2, mixed-criticality integration haz-
ards are managed in Goal G3:
G3. Mixed-criticality integration does not infer in additional hazards.
G3 (Figure 4.5) is claimed to be true in the context of the integrated archi-
tecture defined in C3.1. The strategy followed to support this goal is based
on the adoption of safety measures for the management of integration faults
(S3), which is achieved by modules M3.1, M3.2 and M3.3. This strategy
assumes that an analysis of the failure modes for partitions is conducted (A3
and C3.2). The individual elements of the goal structure of Figure 4.5 are
elaborated in next subsections:
• Section 4.4.1 defines the integrated safety architecture (C3.1).
• Section 4.4.2 includes a fault hypothesis and a partition-level Failure Mode
and Effect Analysis (FMEA) as part of the failure analysis process (A3).
• Each of the modules (M3.1, M3.2 and M3.3) for (i) the avoidance of sys-
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Figure 4.5: Mixed-criticality integration argument - Goal G3 (M1.2).
of mixed-criticality applications (G5) and (iii) controlling possible errors at
runtime (G6) is further detailed within the description of safety measures in
Section 4.4.3.
4.4.1 Integrated Safety Architecture
The applications that comprise the federated mixed-criticality system are inte-
grated as multiple partitions in a single platform referred to as Mixed-criticality
Central Processing Unit (MxCPU). The safety architecture of the MxCPU is com-
posed of a processor, partitioned software applications and diagnosis (both on-chip
and external).
In the IEC 61508 standard the safety architecture is highly dependent on the
target integrity level and the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF), i.e., the ratio of safe
and dangerous detected failures with respect to all failures. Depending on the
Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) provided by the architecture, the target SFF
varies, which can only be improved either by high design effort or by improving
the Diagnostic Coverage (DC) so that the portion of detected dangerous failures
is considerably higher than the portion of undetected failures. Commonly, HFT is
achieved by hardware node redundancy (several chips) where a HFT of N requires
at least N + 1 redundant channels. However, implementing this redundancy in a
single chip involves many conservative restrictions on the platform design like using
separate blocks on substratum for each channel (IEC 61508-2 Annex E) and hence
hinders the use of COTS processors for this purpose. For SIL = 4 safety functions,
on-chip redundancy is not even allowed by IEC 61508. Consequently, in this work
the focus is on single-channel integrated approaches without on-chip redundancy
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(HFT = 0). For systems requiring a HFT ≥ 1 the additional redundant channels
shall be implemented on different hardware devices, following a federated approach.
The reference integrated safety architecture (1-channel with separate watchdog)





























Figure 4.6: Safety architecture for partitioned processor (MxCPU).
Partitioned Processor:
• The partitioned processor conforms a single-channel, i.e., HFT = 0 (on-chip
redundancy is not considered).
• At this stage, the partitioned processor can either be a single-core processor,
a MPSoC, or a multicore.
• The partitioned processor implements a separation layer that guarantees
design fault containment among the partitions.
Partitions:
• N + 1 partitions are allocated to M cores of the platform, where:
– N is the number of software subsystems to be integrated in the MxCPU.
– Extra partition P (N + 1) DIAG is defined for diagnosis.
• SIL A, B and X refer to integrity levels, where
– A and B ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} for IEC 61508.
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– Different partitions may implement safety functions of different integrity
levels (i.e., A 6= B).
– P (N+1) DIAG has the maximum integrity level present in the system,
i.e., X = max(A,B).
Watchdog (WDG): The MxCPU integrates a separate watchdog (WDG)
external to the processor for diagnosis.
4.4.2 Failure Analysis
The first step for ensuring that G3 of the goal structure of Figure 4.5 is fulfilled is
to analyze the possible events that may compromise the safety of the system. First,
the fault hypothesis for the MxCPU is defined and then an FMEA for partitions
is presented.
Fault Hypothesis
The MxCPU fault hypothesis encompasses several safety assumptions to elicit the
faults to be addressed in the system design (PGN+14; kop06; PGT+14).
Federated to Integrated - Assumptions. In the transition of a federated
system to an integrated approach, we assume that the development and certi-
fication of individual components (software applications, hardware platform or
components) follow a traditional certification processes:
• Software partitions are compliant items derived from the certified federated
applications and hence, are compliant with Functional Safety Management
(FSM) and safety life-cycle.
• System, platform (MxCPU) and additional software development is compli-
ant with FSM and safety life-cycle as in the federated approach.
• Off-chip communication is replaced by on-chip inter-partition communica-
tion.
• External interfaces are equivalent to the federated approach.
• The system architect is responsible of the safe integration of previous com-
ponents taking into account safety manuals and applying additional safety
measures as required in the standard.
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Unit of Failure. The impact of faults in the MxCPU is delimited by the
following fault containment regions:
• The partitioned processor forms a single physical FCR. As a result, on-chip
redundancy is not considered.
• The external watchdog forms another physical FCR.
• A partition forms a single design FCR (i.e., FCR for software faults).
Failure Modes and Frequency of Failures. The MxCPU, composed of
platform, partitioning mechanism (e.g., hypervisor) and external WDG is provided
as a compliant item for the appropriate SIL level. It can fail in an arbitrary failure
mode and the assumed failure modes and estimated failure rates shall be included
in safety manuals.
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Taking into account the assumptions in the fault hypothesis, it is assumed that
the residual failure rates for the MxCPU are below the acceptable threshold for
the particular application domain. Thereby, the FMEA presented in Table 4.1 is
abstracted from low level hardware components up to partition level failure modes
to emphasize on mixed-criticality integration level failures.
Table 4.1: Simplified Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) for partitions.
Failure Mode Failure Effect Potential Cause
Failure detection and
compensation (MxCPU)
Not Executed Safety function Random HW fault <Diagnostic
not performed. in a platform mechanisms>
component (e.g., core)





Blocking of execution <Platform
(e.g., contention configuration>
in shared resource) <Timing Analysis>
Incorrect Safety function Memory / I/O <Diagnostic






Memory corruption <Spatial indep.>




Incorrect Safety function Random HW fault <Diagnostic
(temporal) does not in a platform mechanisms>
Execution compute its component
outputs on time
and may cause Blocking of execution
dangerous (e.g., contention <Temporal
deadline overruns. in shared resource) independence>
<Platform
Incorrect allocation Configuration>
of execution time <Timing Analysis>
Blocking execution by <Inter-partition
inter-communication communication>
Integration fault <Compliant item>
(e.g., scheduling) integration tests.
Write’ access Safety peripherals Memory / I/O <Diagnostic
to non- commanded by corruption (random) mechanisms>
assigned incorrect partition.
memory Data written by Memory corruption <Spatial indep.>
or I/O safety partition <Configuration>
may be Faulty virtualization
invalidated. (wrong address translation) <Safe partitioning>
Unable to Safety partition Memory / I/O <Diagnostic
write in outputs not corruption (random) mechanisms>
assigned consistent
memory with expected Faulty virtualization
or I/O value. (wrong address translation) <Safe partitioning>
Blocking shared <Temporal
resource independence>
Multiple Uncontrolled / Faulty virtualization <Safe partitioning>
combinations unpredictable (privileged partition access)
of previous behavior of safety
failure modes partition. Partition resets core









The safety argument of Figure 4.5 is supported by a number of safety measures
that aim to reduce the residual risk of integrating mixed-criticality applications to
an acceptable level.
G4. Avoidance of systematic faults in the safety life-cycle.
The measures to avoid systematic faults during the different phases of the
safety life-cycle are represented in Figure 4.7. The top level goal is divided in
three sub-goals based on three requirements of IEC 61508: S4.1 - complying
with FSM requirements in IEC 61508-1 clause 6, S4.2 - adopting defensive
techniques against systematic faults (IEC 61508-3 Annex A) and S4.3 - in-
tegrating compliant items appropriately (IEC 61508-2 and -3 Annex D).
S4.2:
Argument over the adoption of 
defensive techniques according 
to IEC-61508-2 Annex B and 
IEC-61508-3 Annex A 
G4:
Avoidance of 
systematic faults in the 
safety life-cycle
S4.3:
Argument over the safe 
integration of compliant items 
as defined in safety manuals 
(IEC-61508-2 and -3 Annex D)
S4.1:
Argument over the 
satisfaction of a FSM in 
compliance of IEC-61508-1 
clause 6 techniques
G4.1:
All safety relevant 
subsystems are 





Systematic fault prevention 
techniques are adopted in the 
system, HW and SW life-cycles
G4.3:







Figure 4.7: Argument for the avoidance of systematic faults - Goal G4 (M3.1).
G4.1. All safety relevant subsystems are developed using a <FSM>, includ-
ing system, platform and partitions (IEC 61508-1 Clause 6 compliant).
Documentation evidence shall be made available (Sl4.1).
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G4.2. Systematic <Fault prevention> techniques are adopted in system,
HW and SW life-cycles. This reduces the probability of introducing
systematic faults during system life-cycle (IEC 61508-2 Annex B), in-
cluding software (e.g., IEC 61508-3 Table A.4 Defensive Programming)
and hardware (IEC 61508-2 Table F.1) development.
G4.3. Safe integration of <Compliant items> according to hardware (IEC
61508-2 Annex D) and software (IEC 61508-3 Annex D) safety manu-
als. The system architect is responsible for analyzing safety manuals
of compliant items and to define their safe integration into the system.
Adherence to safety manuals shall be demonstrated (Sl4.3).
G5. Safe co-existence of mixed-criticality applications.
Module M3.2 is developed in Figure 4.8, where goal G5 aims to achieve the
composable certification of each application according to its criticality level
as defined in IEC 61508-3 paragraph 7.4.2.9 (S5).
The argumentation for G5 aims to provide enough evidence of independence
of execution (G5.1) among the applications of different criticality levels or,
alternatively, guaranteeing that any violation of independence is controlled
(AG5.2).
G5.1. There is <Independence of execution> among applications. In-
dependence of execution is pursued based on partitioning techniques
described in IEC 61508-3 Annex F (S5.1):
G5.1.1. There is <Spatial independence> among partitions. Spatial in-
dependence ensures that one partition does not modify the data
or I/Os of another partition, either when the partitions run in the
same core or in different processing units of a MPSoC or multicore:
• Memory: Each partition is assigned a private address range
(virtual or physical) protected by means of MPU / MMU.
• I/O: Each safety partition has exclusive access rights to shared
peripheral devices.
M5.1.2. There is <Temporal independence> among partitions. Tempo-
ral independence guarantees that one partition does not exceed its
timing deadline due to the effect of other partitions, either when the
partitions are allocated to the same core, or running simultaneously
in different processing units of a MPSoC or multicore:
• Same core: Partitions allocated to the same core share proces-
sor time in a statically defined cyclic scheduling basis supported
by WCET analysis.
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Figure 4.8: Argument for the co-existence of mixed-criticality applications - Goal
G5 (M3.2).
• Different cores: For partitions simultaneously executing on dif-
ferent cores and using shared resources, the scheduling shall
preserve all timing deadlines. This module, based on the anal-
ysis of time interferences (multicore contention), is explained in
more detail in G7 (Figure 4.12).
G5.1.3. <Inter-partition communication> is interference-free. Data
communication interfaces shall be unidirectional and they shall
guarantee that data transmission does not block or cause inter-
ferences in the execution of partitions.
G5.1.4. The partitioning mechanism is safe (<Safe partitioning>). The
mechanisms used to enforce partitions (e.g., hypervisor) shall be
certifiable (Sl5.1.4. compliant item) according to the highest in-
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tegrity level among all partitions in the system (A5.1.4).
G5.1.5. Static system <Configuration> is defined (by the system archi-
tect) during design stage with qualified tools. It includes configu-
ration features, such as, memory and I/O association to partitions,
partition to core allocation, scheduling and inter-partition commu-
nication channels. System configuration is protected against unin-
tended runtime modification.
G5.2. Any <Independence violation> is controlled by runtime diagnostic
measures defined in the away goal AG5.2 that points to module M6.2
of goal structure of Figure 4.9. In the event of detecting an interference,
the system is turned into its safe state. As a consequence, controlled
interferences do not jeopardize system safety but its availability.
G6. Control of random hardware, systematic, environmental and oper-
ational errors at runtime.
At runtime, the effects of random hardware, systematic, environmental and
operational errors shall be controlled. To this end, as depicted in Figure 4.9,
error detection diagnostic measures are implemented (S6.1), independence
violations are controlled (S6.2) and safe system reactions to errors are de-
fined (6.3) assuming that the system is fail safe (A6.3) and that it therefore
disposes of a safe state defined in C6.3.
G6.1:
Diagnostic mechanisms to 
achieve the required 
diagnostic coverage (DC) 
are implemented
G6.3:
On error detection, safe 
state is achieved or 
maintained
S6.1:
Argument over the 
adoption of diagnostic 
techniques in accordance 
to IEC-61508-2 and -3 
Annex A 
G6:
Control of random hardware, 
systematic, environmental and 




IEC-61508-2 p.7.4.8 for 
system behavior on error 
detection
A6.3:


















Figure 4.9: Argument for the runtime control of errors - Goal G6 (M3.3).
G6.1. <Diagnostic mechanisms> to achieve the required diagnostic cover-
age (DC) are implemented for runtime error detection. The particular
measures shall be selected from IEC 61508-2 and -3 Annex A according
to the required diagnostic coverage defined in C6.1. They include:
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• Autonomous hardware diagnostics: the MxCPU includes autonomous
diagnostic mechanisms (e.g., Power Failure Monitor (PFM) IEC 61508-
2 Table A.9).
• Software-commanded diagnostics: the MxCPU includes hardware
diagnostic components to be commanded by software including fea-
tures for the diagnostic of independence violations (e.g., IEC 61508-
2 Table A.10 watchdog, MMU/MPU). These mechanisms are im-
plemented in the DIAG partition.
• Platform independent diagnostics: additional diagnostics for hard-
ware components (e.g., IEC 61508-2 Table A.7 Input comparison
voting) and software applications (e.g., IEC 61508-3 Table A.2 fault
detection by software diversity).
• MxCPU Diagnostics: system diagnostics external to the partitioned
processor, e.g., off-chip redundancy with majority voter (IEC 61508-
2 Table A.4) or external watchdog for temporal and logical moni-
toring (IEC 61508-2 Table A.11).
G6.2. Measures for the detection of <Independence violations> are im-
plemented by hardware diagnostic mechanisms (e.g., MPU, watchdog)
and by the DIAG partition that supervises the correct temporal behav-
ior of each partition and handles the external WDG in case of execution
time exceedance events.
G6.3. On error detection, safe state is achieved or maintained (<Error reac-
tion>). System reactions are defined to control the effects of faults in
case of error detection. The safe state defined in C6.3 of Figure 4.9 must
be reached or maintained by the safety function or safety mechanisms.
In the reference architecture of Figure 4.6 the safe state is reached by
the safety chain illustrated in Figure 4.10 either by: (i) the safety func-
tion, (ii) safety measures after detecting an error by diagnostics (e.g.,
WDG reset) or (iii) inherently (e.g., power down).
• DIAG partition handles the errors detected by the diagnostic mech-
anisms in the platform or partitions and controls the external WDG.
In case of error detection, it does not refresh WDG.
• If the WDG is not refreshed in time, it reaches time-out and resets
the platform. Platform reset de-energizes safety-relays achieving
safe state. In addition, the watchdog detects timing errors in the
processor or faults affecting to the DIAG partition.
• The system is inherent fail safe, i.e., falls into the safe state au-
tomatically during system initialization, power off, shut down and













Figure 4.10: Safety chain for safe state activation.
4.5 Multicore Integration
In multicore architectures, running software applications in parallel makes that
the access of applications to platform resources is not exclusive anymore. As a
result, it is required to analyze the architecture to determine the impact of the
contention in shared hardware resources and their effects on execution time.
4.5.1 Multicore Safety Architecture
The architecture of Figure 4.6 is adapted to include the features of a generic
multicore. The multicore safety architecture with main hardware resources of
relevance is depicted in Figure 4.11:
Multicore Processor:
• The multicore processor conforms a single-channel, i.e., HFT = 0 (1-Channel
with separate watchdog).
• M is the number of cores of the multicore platform.
• For systems requiring HFT > 0, off-chip redundancy (external to the multi-
core processor) is required.
• The processor implements a separation layer that guarantees design fault
containment among the partitions.
Partitions:
• N + 1 partitions are allocated to the M cores of the multicore:
– Partitions can be exclusively allocated to a core (P0 → c0 and P1 →
c1), or
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Figure 4.11: Reference safety architecture for generic multicore (MxCPU).
– various partitions to the same core (PN and P (N + 1)→ cM).
• SIL A, B and X refer to integrity levels, where X = max(A,B).
Watchdog (WDG): The MxCPU integrates a separate watchdog (WDG)
external to the processor for diagnosis.
4.5.2 Independence in Multicore Architectures
In the transition from the integrated approach to multicore architectures, the main
challenge rests in preserving independence guarantees (G5 of Figure 4.8). This is
explained by the fact that, while spatial separation can still be attained by state of
the art mechanisms (MMU/MPU), temporal independence is jeopardized by the
jittery resources present in multicores that cause hardly predictable execution time
variations and the simultaneous access to shared resources by multiple software
applications causing multicore contention. This section defines module M5.1.2 of




G7. There is temporal independence among partitions.
This goal is achieved by ensuring that software partitions will not fail in the
temporal domain (i.e., miss a timing deadline) due to the timing interfer-
ences caused by other partitions running simultaneously in other cores in
multicore architectures. This requirement involves minimizing the possible
interferences in the platform configuration (G7.1) and defining a static sched-
ule of partitions (S7) that considers the worst possible impact of interferences
(e.g., shared resources) (G7.2).
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Figure 4.12: Multicore temporal independence argument - Goal G7 (M5.1.2).
G7.1. <Platform configuration> reduces possible temporal interferences.
The aspects impacting execution time shall be studied and defined:
G7.1.1. Resource allocation: Partition to core allocation, exclusive use of
peripherals, bus access priorities, resource configuration.
G7.1.2. Resource partitioning: shared cached partitioning, memory space
partitioning.
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G7.2. Temporal interference is estimated and considered in the design in such
a way that no partition exceeds its deadline (<Bounded temporal
interferences>). Considering the impact of <Bounded temporal
interferences> in the design guarantees that the static scheduling ta-
ble (C7) defined by the system architect is suitable to run all partitions
without exceeding deadlines. This goal is supported by the WCET
analysis of each partition k (S7.2.1), where k ranges from 1 to n par-
titions:
G7.2.1. The <Timing analysis> method accounts for the impact of sources
of jitter and multicore contention. This claim shall be evidenced
by demonstrating that computed WCET is safe and always below
the budget assigned to the time partition (TP), i.e., WCET ≤ TP
(Sl7.2.1).
In addition, temporal independence shall be preserved by the con-
trol of <Independence violations> as explained in G5 (Figure 4.8).
If WCET estimates are too optimistic, when exceeded the respective
guard (WDG) protects the system switching to a safe state at the ex-
pense of compromising system availability.
4.6 Summary
The work in this chapter reduces the big conceptual gap between multicore pro-
cessors and certification. In this chapter we thoroughly review IEC 61508 require-
ments and propose a set of guidelines, in the form of GSN argumentation, to com-
ply with them in a multicore based mixed-criticality architecture. To this end, the
safety argumentation defines IEC 61508 based safety measures at different levels
of abstraction. First, we define a reference safety ECU incorporating a multicore
processor and safety mechanisms for diagnosis purposes. Then, we focus on the
safety analysis at software partition level by the definition of a generic FMEA that
defines the failure modes for partitions. These failure modes are handled by sep-
aration mechanisms that seek to guarantee the independence of execution among
partitions. All this is complemented by functional safety management throughout
the development process.
In summary, we propose a three-step incremental adaptation to multicores by
taking current federated and single-core integrated practices as a baseline. First,
an overview of the common-practice federated approach is provided. Then, the
integration of the federated subsystems into a single platform is evaluated. Finally,
the last refinement step focuses on multicore specific challenges which are mainly
related to the platform configuration (i.e., resource allocation) and the timing





Safety certification is a long process that includes several interactions with a cer-
tification body until the system is regarded as safe for its purpose. An impor-
tant aspect of the certification is the review of specific documentation generated
throughout the development process. This documentation often includes the def-
inition of a safety concept with safety analysis, assumptions, requirements and
measures to achieve the required level of safety. A preliminary concept review is
usually a recommendable industrial practice to assess the design and detect any
failure, inconsistency or limitation at the early phases of the life-cycle.
This chapter defines two multicore mixed-criticality safety concepts for the
railway and automotive domains based on the safety argumentation metamodel
defined in Chapter 4. The two safety concepts rely on alternative solutions and
different multicore architectures. The first one, deals with multicore integration
requirements by the adoption of a certified hypervisor that provides the required
partitioning over an ad-hoc and a COTS multicore architecture. On the con-
trary, the second safety concept is build upon a certification-friendly multicore for
the automotive domain that integrates a set of hardware protection mechanisms.
For evaluation purposes, both safety concepts have been reviewed and judged as
suitable by an external certification body (TÜV Rheinland). The positive result
reflects that it is feasible to achieve multicore certification according to IEC 61508
if several assumptions with respect to the timing analyzability of the multicore
processors hold valid.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 provides the def-
inition of the terms used in this Chapter. Section 5.2 presents the railway safety
concept over the ad-hoc LEON3-MC (COB16) and COTS P4080 (P4080) multi-
cores. Likewise, Section 5.3 presents the automotive safety concept on the AURIX
processor (AURIX). Finally, Section 5.4 presents a summary of the chapter.
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5.1 Glossary
1oo1 “1 out of 1” single channel architecture without redundancy where the node shall be
operational to preserve safety function (HFT=0).
2oo3 “2 out of 3” architecture, where at least two redundant nodes out of three shall be oper-
ational to preserve safety function (HFT=1).
Address Protection Sets (APS) Access protected instruction and data areas in the core-
local memories of the AURIX TC27X processor.
ASIL Automotive Safety Integrity Level ranging from A to D (ISO26262).
Compliant item An element or subsystem on which a claim is being made with respect to its
compliance to a safety standard (IEC61508; EN50126).
Composite fail safety Safety-related functions performed by at least two items independent
from each other (EN50126).
CoreNet Platform Cache (CPC) Last level shared cache (L3) on the P4080.
Failure in Time (FIT) 1 failure per 109 hours of operation (10−9h−1).
Fault Containment Region (FCR) The boundaries of an immediate failure impact.
Fault Tolerant Time Interval (FTTI) Time-span in which a fault can be present before a
hazardous event occurs (equivalent to PST) (ISO26262).
Functional Safety Management (FSM) Organizational and failure-avoidance measures.
Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) Number of faults that don’t cause the loss of the safety
function.
Health monitoring Set of functions that monitor the state of (virtualized) applications.
MxCPU Mixed-criticality Central Processing Unit, composed of platform, partitioning mech-
anism and external WDG.
PAMU Peripheral Access Management Unit in the P4080 processor.
Process Safety Time (PST) The time by which an action has to be completed to prevent a
hazardous event occurring (IEC61508).
Protected Memory Region (PMR) A specific memory range with exclusive write permis-
sions in the shared SRAM of the AURIX TC27X processor.
Qualified tool Software tool that provides the required level of reliance.
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety.
Safety Communication Layer (SCL) Services and protocol for safety communications.
Safety Element out of Context (SEooC) Equivalent to compliant item for the automotive
domain (ISO26262).
Safety goal Top-level safety requirement in the automotive domain (ISO26262).
Safety manual Document that provides all the information relating to the functional safety of
a compliant item.
SIL Safety Integrity Level ranging from 1 to 4 (IEC61508; EN50126).
Triple Module Redundancy (TMR) Three implementations of the same logic with voting.
Watchdog (WDG) External timing element to monitor computer’s behavior.
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5.2 Railway Safety Concept
This section defines a safety concept for the industrial mixed-criticality railway
system, for its evaluation and review with a certification authority. The case
study comprise the two self-contained subsystems introduced in Section 3.2.1: an
ETCS signaling subsystem that performs SIL 4 safety functionality and traction
subsystems that control train’s motors. The safety concept builds on the generic
IEC 61508 standard, inline with the safety argumentation presented in Chap-
ter 4. However, where required, references are made to railway domain standards
(EN 5012x).
5.2.1 Safety Requirements
Table 5.1 summarizes the most representative safety requirements for the railway
ETCS system (SR RE), which are extracted from the ETCS standard (ERTMS).
Table 5.1: Main safety requirements for the EVC.
ID Requirement
SR RE 1 A The safety function “Speed and distance supervision” supervises that the ‘train
speed’ does not exceed the ‘maximum authorized train speed’ and that the
‘train traveled distance’ does not exceed the Movement Authority (MA).
SR RE 1 B The safety function “Speed and distance supervision” must be provided with a
SIL 4 integrity level (EN 50126).
SR RE 1 1 The safety function “Speed supervision” ensures that the ‘train speed’ does
not exceed the ‘maximum authorized train speed’.
If exceeded ‘emergency brake’ safety function is activated.
SR RE 1 2 The safety function “Distance supervision” ensures that the ‘train traveled
distance’ does not exceed the MA.
If exceeded ‘emergency brake’ safety function is activated.
SR RE 1 3 The safety function “Emergency brake” activates the ‘safe state’
SR RE 1 4 The ‘safe state’ is the de-energization of output ‘safety-relay(s)’.
SR RE 1 5 The Process Safety Time (PST) is 1 second.
The ETCS standard (ERTMS) provides an extensive set of documents that
specify in detail the system interoperability and safety requirements. These docu-
ments could be directly used to identify safety requirements as needed in phase 4
(System Requirements) of EN 50126 with no need to perform a risk analysis. The
railway case study is a simplification of this standard.
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5.2.2 Federated Safety Concept
On-board railway subsystems are traditionally implemented in a federated ap-
proach as sketched in Figure 5.1. In order to safely perform the SIL 4 safety
requirement SR RE 1 A, the central processing unit of the ETCS subsystem is im-
plemented as composite fail safety by means of Triple Module Redundancy (TMR)
computing nodes (EVC TMR). The TMR safety architecture is achieved by three
parallel implementations of the same EVC logic and a comparison of the outputs.
This architecture allows to identify any discrepancies among the replicated nodes.
Figure 5.1: Railway case study context diagram.
Each computing node has an instance of the safety software application and
satisfies the following safety features:
A. Life-cycle and development tools : The development of safety-related nodes
is compliant with safety life-cycle (EN 50126 clause 5.2 / IEC 61508-1 clause
7) and corresponding FSM (EN 50126 clause 5 for RAMS management /
IEC 61508-1 clause 6).
A.1. Safety-related nodes are developed using qualified tools and compilers
(for up to SIL 4 EN 50128/EN 50129 and IEC 61508 SIL 3).
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A.2. The system architect takes reasonable measures to develop a safe prod-
uct taking into consideration the safety manuals of all compliant items
(as requested in 4.7.6c EN 50126 / IEC 61508 parts 2 and 3 Annex D).
B. Architecture: 2oo3 safety architecture composed of TMR computing nodes
compliant with composite fail safety technique (EN 50129 clause B.3.1 /
IEC 61508-2 Table 3 HFT = 1).
B.1. The system achieves EN 50128/EN 50129 and IEC 61508 SIL 4 in TMR
architecture.
B.2. Platform compliant item: each computing node, composed of hard-
ware and associated platform software is compliant with EN 5012X
/ IEC 61508 SIL 3 (see A.2).
B.3. Each computing node executes a software application instance of the
EVC (see C).
B.4. The internal communication among EVC nodes is implemented by a
‘safe communication’ protocol (see D).
B.5. Safety-related subsystems are physically separated (in different ECUs)
from non safety-related applications.
C. Software Application:
C.1. EN 50128 SIL 4 (IEC 61508 SIL 3) life-cycle and FSM compliant soft-
ware development for EVC computing nodes.
C.2. Safety-related inputs, subsystems and outputs are managed exclusively
by associated safety-related software tasks.
C.3. After start-up, the safety software application commands digital-outputs
according to ‘emergency brake’ command (emergency brake activation
corresponds to digital-outputs deactivation).
D. Safe Communication: Safe communication protocol such as compliant TTEth-
ernet (KAG+05; Ste08) or black channel safety communication that provides
equivalent safety techniques and attributes of interest:
D.1. Safety-related computing nodes integrate a Safety Communication Layer
(SCL) provided as SIL 3 compliant item.
D.2. When used in redundant star topology with TMR system the SCL can
reach up to SIL 4.
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D.3. The SCL ensures safe data communication among communicating com-
puting nodes, and provides diagnosis to detect all possible failure modes
of a black channel communication: frame corrupted, incorrect order of
frame, frame outside temporal constraints and frame lost.
D.4. A global notion of time is established by means of a transparent global
clock synchronization for the EVC and safety-related subsystems.
D.5. SCL associated tools are qualified tools, for up to SIL 4 (EN 50128 /
EN 50129) and IEC 61508 SIL 3.
E. External Interfaces :
E.1. Each computing node manages two redundant digital outputs (at least
SIL 2) to be connected to two external redundant safety-relays that
perform 2oo3 voting.
E.2. The safety-relays participate on the “Emergency brake” safety func-
tion (requirement SR RE 1 3) and safe state activation (requirement
SR RE 1 4) by controlling two diverse braking systems, an electric and
a pneumatic one.
E.3. The fail safe state of digital outputs is de-energized (see F).
E.4. The default state of digital outputs is de-energized, i.e., during no-power
and start-up (inherent fail safe state).
E.5. After start-up the safety software application commands digital-outputs
(activation and de-activation).
E.6. Each external safety-relay provides an output that represents the output
state of the safety-relay, input to the EVC, used for diagnosis purposes.
F. Safe state:
F.1. Safe state is achieved by means of de-energization of safety digital-
outputs connected to external safety-relays.
F.2. If the system, hardware or software diagnosis detects a ‘major’ or ‘signif-
icant’ error the safe state must be reached within the PST (requirement
SR RE 1 5).
G. Diagnosis :
G.1. At system level the EVC implements diagnosis techniques according to
EN 50126, EN 50128, EN 50129 and IEC 61508. The EVC supports up
to SIL 4 level with HFT = 1, therefore, at least a DC> 99% is required
according to IEC 61508-2.
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G.2. At node level, each safety computing node is a SIL 3 IEC 61508 com-
pliant item with HFT = 0, and therefore, requires a DC > 99% for
memories, power supply, clock, program sequence, I/Os, communica-
tion, etc. (EN 50129 Annex E and IEC 61508-2 Tables A.2-A.14).
G.3. The safety-related software implements safety life-cycle related tech-
niques (e.g., IEC 61508-3 Table A.4 defensive programming), performs
reciprocal comparison diagnosis (“monitored redundancy” of the trip-
licated application, IEC 61508-3 Table A.2) and complements/uses di-
agnosis techniques provided by the compliant platform, (e.g., refresh
watchdog, monitor external safety-relays).
G.4. The system architect implements additional measures taking into con-
sideration the safety manuals of all compliant items (as requested 4.7.6c
EN 50126, IEC 61508-2 and 3 Annex D).
5.2.3 Integrated Node Architecture
Non safety-related traction computing nodes are integrated into one of the tripli-
cated EVC computing nodes following an integrated architectural approach based
on mixed-criticality. At system level the TMR safety architecture remains in a
federated fashion (with each safety node in a different computing platform). Nev-
ertheless, the node level integration of traction nodes together with one of the EVC
replicas benefits from the advantages of integrated mixed-criticality systems.
Integrated Safety Architecture
The different functionalities that compose the railway case study are allocated
into different partitions of the Mixed-Criticality Node Safety CPU (MxCPU) in
the architecture depicted in Figure 5.2 and described below:
• MxCPU: Composed of partitioned processor, hypervisor and external WDG.
• Partitions: Subsystems of the federated approach are segregated into differ-
ent software partitions based on criticality.
– The ETCS is segregated into three different partitions:
∗ P1-ODOMETRY estimates the traveling distance and speed of the
train. As the main safety function “Speed and distance super-
vision” (SR RE 1 A) relies on the parameters computed by the
odometry, this partition is SIL 4.
∗ P2-ETCS EVC (Safe) performs the SIL 4 “Speed and distance
supervision” safety function (SR RE 1 A).
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Figure 5.2: Safety concept (one processor; partitioned).
∗ P3-ETCS EVC (No-Safe) performs additional non safety-related
ETCS functionality (e.g., warning signal activation and information
logging).
– The non safety-related traction computing nodes are partitioned ac-
cording to their functionality:
∗ P4-TRACTION CONTROL UNIT executes non safety-related trac-
tion control.
∗ P5-INVERTER CONTROL UNIT executes non safety-related in-
verter control.
– The mixed-criticality node includes two additional partitions that in-
herit the maximum safety integrity of the partitions present in the sys-
tem (SIL 4):
∗ P6-COM SERVER manages communication with other EVC nodes
and peripheral subsystems.
∗ P7-DIAG to implement safety-related diagnostic measures.
• Hypervisor: Partitions are implemented on top of a certifiable hypervisor
that provides the required virtual environment in a safe, transparent and
efficient way.
• External WDG: The MxCPU integrates a separate WDG for diagnosis.
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Multicore Safety Architecture
The partitioned integrated approach is evaluated on top of two particular multicore
processors, the COTS NXP’s P4080 (P4080) and ad-hoc LEON 3 based multicore
implementation (LEON3-MC) (COB16). Figure 5.3 depicts the partition alloca-
tion to the P4080 and LEON3-MC multicores and shows their main architectural
features of relevance:
(a) MCN SECU detailed deployment in P4080 COTS processor
(b) MCN SECU detailed deployment in ad-hoc LEON3-MC
Figure 5.3: Safety concept in partitioned multicore processor.
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• COTS P4080 Processor. As the P4080 comprises 8 cores and the railway
application is implemented by 7 partitions, each partition is allocated to one
core as depicted in Figure 5.3a. The empty core could be used for additional
diagnostics or to integrate additional applications.
• Ad-hoc LEON3-MC. Similarly, Figure 5.3b illustrates the ad-hoc safety
concept on the LEON3-MC 4-core implementation. In this case, some of the
cores integrate two partitions.
5.2.4 Failure Analysis
The fault hypothesis for the MxCPU is defined first, followed by the FMEA for
partitions of the railway case study.
Fault Hypothesis
Based on the generic fault hypothesis defined in Section 4.4.2, the fault hypothesis
for the railway mixed-criticality multicore integration is as defined below:
Federated to Integrated - Assumptions. The integrated multicore so-
lution requires further safety measures with respect to the federated approach.
Although the same safety attributes apply at system level (e.g., off-chip TMR
redundancy), several new challenges arise at the mixed-criticality node level:
• Software safety partitions P1 Odometry and P2 ETCS EVC (safe) are pro-
vided as SIL 3 compliant items.
• Same safety life-cycle and FSM measures (Section 5.2.2-A) apply for system,
platform and software applications.
• External TTEthernet/black channel communication is now replaced by the
internal on-chip communication of the partitioned processor.
• Communication between the three redundant nodes remains the same (TTEth-
ernet/black channel as defined in Section 5.2.2-D).
• Same digital input / output management (Section 5.2.2-E) and safe state
requirements (Section 5.2.2-F) apply.
• Diagnostic techniques described in (Section 5.2.2-G) must be extended with
particular techniques for the selected platform and to prevent from the haz-
ards that the sharing of a single computing platform involves.
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Unit of Failure. The impact of faults in the MxCPU is delimited by the
following fault containment regions:
• The processor (P4080 or LEON-3 MC ) forms a single physical FCR.
• The external WDG forms another physical FCR.
• Each partition forms a single design FCR.
Failure Modes and Frequency of Failures. The MxCPU is provided as
a SIL 3 IEC 61508 compliant item, also compliant with EN 5012X, composed
of platform and hypervisor ported to this platform. The MxCPU can fail in an
arbitrary failure mode with the permanent failure rate in the order of 10-100 FIT
and the transient failure rate in the order of 100,000 FIT:
• The processor can fail in an arbitrary failure mode.
• A partition can fail in an arbitrary failure mode when it is affected by a
fault, both in the temporal as well as in the spatial domain (as defined in
Table 4.1).
• The hypervisor (ported to the P4080 and LEON3-MC) provides indepen-
dence of execution as described in G5 (Figure 4.8) (spatial independence
and bounded temporal interference) among partitions. It can fail in an ar-
bitrary failure mode when it is affected by a fault.
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
The generic failure modes for partitions of Table 4.1 described in Section 4.4.2 ap-
ply to each of the safety partitions of the railway application, i.e., P1-ODOMETRY,
P2-ETCS EVC (Safe), P6-COM SERVER, and P7-DIAG. Table 5.4 extends this
FMEA with the most relevant hardware resources that may cause interferences in
the selected multicore architectures1:
P4080:
• Potential spatial interference sources in the platform are the shared SRAM
and addressable I/O devices and may be originated in any platform compo-
nent with bus master access rights (cores, interrupts, DMA, I/Os).
1Further interference sources may exist like other low level hardware features, software exe-
cution path or initial conditions.
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• Temporal interferences may happen in the event of simultaneous accesses
to the shared resources present in the P4080 (L2 and CPC shared caches,
main memory, CoreNet interconnect, shared peripherals). In addition, some
P4080 components introduce potential execution time variability and tem-
poral undeterminism that shall be considered in the design to avoid potential
temporal interferences. These features include the memory coherency, im-
pact of caches and barely documented features like the CoreNet.
LEON3-MC:
• Spatial interferences in the LEON3-MC may occur in the shared SRAM
memory and addressable I/O devices.
• The main platform component amenable to temporal interferences in the
form of multicore contention is the system AHB bus, as it is the responsible
of arbitrating parallel requests. In addition, as in the case of the P4080, some
platform components may lead to execution time variability like cacheable
memory accesses (in private L1 and shared L2 cache) and the impact of the
coherency protocol.
• As a result of the integration of partitions in the same core, interferences may
also originate in core local resources of the LEON3-MC (processor time, L1
cache line evictions, TLBs, etc.).
5.2.5 Safety Measures
This section describes the safety measures that support the railway safety concept
in compliance to the safety arguments defined in Section 4.4. Table 5.2 provides a
summary of the measures and shows IEC 61508 equivalence with respect to railway
EN 5012X standards.
G.4. Measures for the avoidance of systematic faults: As defined in the
federated safety concept (Section 5.2.2), the system and partition develop-
ment shall comply with SIL 4 FSM and all software safety partitions are
SIL 3 compliant. In addition, the mixed-criticality approach requires that:
G4.1. <FSM>, P6-COM SERVER and P7-DIAG partitions are developed
in compliance to SIL 3 IEC 61508 / SIL 4 EN 50128.
78
5.2 Railway Safety Concept
Table 5.2: Summary of safety measures and IEC 61508 to EN 5012X references.
Safety Implementation Reference to Standards
Measure (Goal) IEC 61508 (Strategy) EN 5012X
G4 Avoidance of systematic faults in the safety life-cycle (Figure 4.7)
<FSM> (G4.1) SIL 4 compliant Part 1 clause 6 (S4.1). EN 50126 clause 5.
<Fault Measures for P6 COM Part 2 Annex B EN 50129 Annex E
prevention> SERVER, P7 DIAG, (HW) / Part 3 (HW) / EN 50128
(G4.2) SW/HW integration. Annex A (SW) (S4.2). Annex A (SW).
<Compliant P1, P2, P6, MxCPU Part 2 and EN 50126 clause
item> and hypervisor SIL3 Part 3 Annex D p. 4.7.6.c.
(G4.3) compliant items. (S4.3).
G5 Safe co-existence of mixed-criticality applications (Figure 4.8)
<Spatial Hypervisor-based Part 3 Annex F EN 50128
Independence> virtualization. (S5.1). clause 7.3.4.9.
(G5.1.1)
<Temporal Hypervisor-based Part 3 Annex F EN 50128
Independence> scheduling suppor- (S5.1). clause 7.3.4.9.
(M5.1.2) ted by MBPTA.
<Inter-partition Hypervisor-based Part 3 Annex F EN 50128
Communication> communication. (S5.1). clause 7.3.4.9.
(G5.1.3)
<Safe Parti- Certifiable Part 3 Annex F n/a
tioning> (G5.1.4) hypervisor. (S5.1).
<Configuration> Defined by system n/a n/a
(G5.1.5) architect using
qualified tools.
<Independence Away goal to Part 3 p. 7.4.2.9 n/a
violations> G6.2. (S5).
(AG5.2)
G6 Control of random hardware, systematic, environmental and operational
errors at runtime (Figure 4.9)
<Diagnostic SIL 3, HFT = 0, Part 2 Annex A EN 50129
Mechanisms> DC ≥ 99% tech- (S6.1). Table E.5.
(G6.1) niques in MxCPU.
<Independence Detected by Part 3 p. 7.4.2.9 n/a
violations> hypervisor, DIAG (S6.2).
(G6.2) or WDG.
<System Reac- Safe state by SF Part 2 p. 7.4.8 EN 50129
tion to Errors> (relay), or diag- (S6.3). Annex B.3.4.
(G6.3) nostics (reset).
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G4.2. <Fault prevention>,
• The development of new P6-COM SERVER and P7-DIAG software
partitions adopts measures for the avoidance of systematic faults
according to IEC 61508-3 Tables A.2-A.5 / EN 50128 Tables A.2-
A.11 (e.g., Defensive Programming).
• The integration of software partitions and the hardware platform
and system validation includes systematic fault prevention activ-
ities compliant with IEC 61508-3 Tables A.6-A.7 and EN 50128
Table A.5 (e.g., Performance testing) and takes into account all
safety manuals for compliant items.
G4.3. <Compliant item>,
• The MxCPU is provided as a SIL 3 compliant item with associated
safety manual.
• The hypervisor meets the requirements of a certifiable hypervisor
(SIL 3 compliant item) and it is integrated in the system in accor-
dance to its safety manual.
• Safety partitions P1, P2, P6 are provided as SIL 3 compliant items
with associated safety manual. They include the techniques adopted
in the federated approach to achieve software systematic capability
SIL 3 (EN 50128 SIL 4) of safety partitions. The system archi-
tect shall define the additional hardware-software integration and
system safety validation procedures according to safety manuals.
G.5. Measures for the co-existence of mixed-criticality applications: Mixed-
criticality co-existence in the railway case study shall be supported by the
features provided by the SIL 3 compliant hypervisor. The integrated hy-
pervisor shall provide the following minimum services according to the goal
structure of Figure 4.8:
G5.1.1. <Spatial independence [Memory]>: The hypervisor assigns a pro-
tected (virtual) memory region to each partition and manages the hard-
ware MMUs.
G5.1.1. <Spatial independence [I/O]>: Safety-related peripherals are ex-
clusively managed by safety partitions:
• ‘ETCS EVC (Safe)’ partition controls associated digital outputs
and inputs for safety-relays (command digital output and confirm
state with digital input).
• ‘DIAG’ partition controls associated digital outputs and inputs for
WDG (command digital output and confirm state with digital in-
put).
80
5.2 Railway Safety Concept
• The ‘COMM SERVER’ partition manages the Ethernet communi-
cation bus.
G5.1.2. <Temporal independence>: The hypervisor implements a cyclic
schedule of partitions and ensures that time slots are assigned as stati-
cally configured (LPA+15).
• The system architect defines a static scheduling table for all parti-
tions supported by WCET analysis that guarantees bounded tem-
poral interference (G7).
G5.1.3. <Inter-partition communication>: The hypervisor supports mech-
anisms that allow safe data exchange between:
• All safety partitions to DIAG: [P1→ P7], [P2→ P7], [P6→ P7]
• ‘COM SERVER’ to Odometry: [P6→ P1]
• ‘Odometry’ to ‘ETCS EVC (Safe)’: [P1→ P2]
G5.1.4. <Safe partitioning>: The hypervisor is compliant with SIL 3 require-
ments and its execution is in privileged mode, isolated and protected
against external software faults.
G5.1.5. <Configuration> is static and defined during design stage with qual-
ified tools. The hypervisor must start up, configure and initialize in a
known, repeatable and correct state within a bounded time (e.g., inter-
nal data structures, virtualized resource initialization, etc.).
In addition, the safety hypervisor includes a fault-tolerant time synchro-
nization that provides a global notion of time to the hypervisor partition
scheduler and health monitoring to control random and systematic failures
at hypervisor or partition level.
G.6. Measures for runtime error control: The system integrates the features
to detect and control errors at runtime according to what it is specified in
the argument structure of Figure 4.9.
G6.1. <Diagnostic Mechanisms>: The MxCPU includes diagnostic mea-
sures equivalent to the federated architecture, achieving a high diag-
nostic coverage (DC ≥ 99%, SIL 3, HFT = 0). Table 5.5 gathers the
diagnostic measures defined for the railway case study. Those mecha-
nisms are classified according to goal G6.1 of Figure 4.9 as follows:
• Autonomous hardware diagnostics and software commanded diag-
nostics are implemented in all platform components that participate
in the execution of the safety function in accordance to IEC 61508
Annex A / EN 50129 Table E.5.
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• Platform independent diagnostics:
– Safety-related digital outputs connected to the WDG and safety-
relays confirm their state by associated digital inputs and as-
signed partitions (‘DIAG’ and ‘ETCS EVC (Safe)’) periodically
write (and read back) a dynamic signal on the outputs.
– Off-chip redundancy: Reciprocal comparison by software for
three channels, 2oo3 input comparison/voting for safety-related
sensors.
– The hypervisor includes health monitoring for the detection of
hypervisor or partitions level errors.
• MxCPU Diagnostics:
– Independent WDG controlled by the ‘DIAG’ partition for the
combination of timing and logical monitoring of program se-
quence.
– Diverse dual-channel output for the shut down path for safe
state activation (electric and pneumatic braking systems) with
2oo3 voting of output signals.
G6.2. <Independence violations> The hypervisor detects and handles spa-
tial independence violations with hardware MMU support. For timing
interferences the ‘DIAG’ partition implements software diagnostics by
periodically monitoring the completion of all partitions and controlling
the external WDG accordingly.
G6.3. <Error reaction> Safe state is achieved by the safety chain depicted
in Figure 5.4, either by the safety function (that commands safety-relays
to stop the train) or by the different diagnostics that act in the WDG
and force a MxCPU reset in case of error detection. Table 5.6 defines



















Figure 5.4: Safety chain for ETCS safe state activation.
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Independence in Multicore Architectures
The use of a safety hypervisor reduces the burden of the transition from the in-
tegrated abstract approach to particular multicore implementations as the hyper-
visor is the responsible of providing independence guarantees among partitions as
required in G5.1.
<Spatial independence> (G5.1.1) is ensured by hypervisor configuration:
• P4080: The hypervisor manages the memory MMU and I/O MMU (PAMU)
available in the P4080 to avoid the presence of spatial interferences. The
system architect is the responsible of assigning safety peripherals to exclusive
safety partitions.
• LEON3-MC: Spatial interferences are managed by assigning different MMU-
protected memory ranges to each partition in the hypervisor.
Similarly, the hypervisor provides non-blocking <Inter-partition commu-
nication> (G5.1.3) interfaces and protects the <Configuration> (G5.1.5) of
critical settings against unintended modifications.
G7. <Temporal independence> in the railway multicore processors requires
considering the specific platform resources (memories, peripherals, commu-
nication buses) and mitigating the effects of execution time variations and
interferences that can lead to the partition level failures analyzed in the
FMEA of Table 5.4. To this end, the system architect shall mitigate the
effects of temporal interferences in the design through the configuration set-
tings and a convenient timing analysis technique, in this case MBPTA:
G7.1. <Platform configuration>:
• P4080: Execution time variations caused by cache line evictions in
the CPC shared caches are avoided by partitioning the CPC in 7
segments assigned to the different software partitions.
• LEON3-MC: L2 cache is partitioned across the 4 cores avoiding,
in this way, the effects of shared cache line evictions by contender
partitions. For those partitions sharing the same core, they are se-
quentially executed in a static cyclic scheduling basis implemented
by the hypervisor and supported by WCET (MBPTA).
G7.2. <Bounded temporal interference> is ensured by means of MBPTA:
G7.2.1. <Timing analysis>: MBPTA is used to upper-bound the im-
pact of execution time variation (e.g., caches) and multicore con-
tention sources (i.e., simultaneous access requests) in the WCET
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estimates computed for both the P4080 and LEON3-MC. To this
end, MBPTA is applied to the three MBPTA-compliant platform
designs introduced in Section 3.3: P4080-DSR, LEON3-MC-HR
and LEON3-MC-DSR.
The pWCET resulting from the hardware randomization approach,
is representative for any load in the contending cores, as the arbi-
tration policy in the bus is modified to upper-bound the number of
contenders and their bus access latency; and time randomized to
determine which core is granted access to the shared cache. In this
way, the LEON3-MC-HR ensures fully time composable estimates
(i.e., valid for any contending software partition) without making
any assumption on the contenders that will be executed in the other
cores at operation time (Figure 5.5b).
With software randomization instead, bus contention needs to be
managed offline. One solution to handle bus jitter is to deter-
ministically upper bound it by monitoring the number of requests
issued by the software partition under analysis (through Perfor-
mance Monitoring Counters (PMC)s) and applying a contention
model that upper-bounds the interference it can suffer in the pres-
ence of co-runner tasks (DFK+17). In the railway case study, as
all software partitions are known a priori from the federated imple-
mentation, the actual requests of the contenders can also be mon-
itored to estimate tighter partially time composable bounds (i.e.,
only valid for the analyzed contenders). Accordingly, DSR solution
provides estimates for the particular railway contenders executed
in two contenting cores (Figure 5.5c).
As an illustrative example of the application of MBPTA in the railway case
study the pWCET of ‘Emergency Brake’ safety function (P2) is obtained in the
three platform setups described above. Figure 5.5 shows the pWCET curve re-
sulting from the application of MBPTA to the longest execution time path of the
railway application subset and Table 5.3 provides WCET values at relevant ex-
ceedance thresholds. The analysis-time distribution (ATD) is also reported in the
form of Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF), to show that
the pWCET curve always upper-bounds the observed data.
Table 5.3: pWCET at relevant exceedance thresholds for railway case study.
Platform HWM 10−3 % 10−6 % 10−9 % 10−12 %
LEON-HR 34464 36259 5.21 39130 13.54 42001 21.87 44872 30.20
LEON-DSR 33914 34094 0.53 34298 1.13 34462 1.62 34667 2.22
P4080-DSR 13322 13716 2.96 14639 9.89 15579 16.94 16501 23.86
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(a) P4080-DSR (b) LEON3-MC-HR (c) LEON3-MC-DSR
Figure 5.5: MBPTA application in the railway case study.
Results show tighter WCET results in the P4080 (Figure 5.5a) than in the
LEON3-MC. This is explained by the increased performance of this architecture
and the limited impact from multicore contention in the P4080 for the analyzed
function, which fits in local L1 and L2 caches. Regarding the LEON3-MC ar-
chitecture, DSR approach (Figure 5.5c) shows more accurate results than HR
(Figure 5.5b) for the railway case study, as the contention impact of the particu-
lar railway contenders is used in the analysis. LEON3-MC-HR instead, provides
increased flexibility and scalability as the computed bounds are also valid if the
software applications in contending cores are updated or modified. In either case,
results show that under the analyzed conditions ‘Emergency brake’ safety func-
tion’s WCET is below its timing deadline.
The pWCET projection allows to choose the safety margin based on exceedance
probability with a formal justification of the chosen bounds, instead of using
common-practice 20% margin based on experience or engineering practice. The
resulting estimate provides independence of execution guarantees by the verifica-
tion of the execution time budgets assigned to software tasks in the scheduling.
Chapter 6 provides further details on the application of MBPTA, with special
emphasis on its safety implications.
5.2.6 Detailed Tables






























Table 5.4: Simplified Failure Mode and Effect Analysis for railway case study (partitions).
Failure Mode Failure Effect Potential Cause
Multicore resource Failure detection and
P4080 LEON3-MC compensation (MxCPU)
Not Executed Safety function Random HW fault <Diagnostic mechanisms>.
not performed.
Design fault <Fault prevention>
to reduce the probability of
Integration fault systematic faults.
Blocking execution CoreNet, Core, <Temporal independence>
by another partition CPC, AHB/APB buses, guaranteed by hypervisor,
main memory, L2 cache, <Platform configuration>,
undocumented main memory, supported by <Timing analysis>.
Incorrect Safety function Memory / I/O <Diagnostic mechanisms>.
(functional) performed corruption (random)
Execution with wrong
data, incorrect Memory corruption Main memory Main memory <Spatial independence>
outputs may be by contending partition for memory by hypervisor managed MMU.
computed.
Memory corruption Interrupt Interrupt <Spatial independence>
by components with controller, controller, by hypervisor managed PAMU (P4080).
bus master rights DMA DMA
I/O corruption Addressable Addressable <Spatial independence>
by contending partition devices devices for I/Os by hypervisor managed MMU.
Incorrect Safety function Random HW fault <Diagnostic mechanisms>
(temporal) does not
Execution compute its Blocking execution CoreNet, Core, <Temporal independence>
outputs on time by another partition L2, CPC, local L1 cache, guaranteed by hypervisor
and may cause main memory, buses, L2 cache, <Platform configuration>,
dangerous Incorrect allocation cache coherency, main memory, supported by <Timing analysis>.



















undocumented FPU by means of MBPTA and HW/SW Rand.
Blocking execution by CoreNet, AHB bus, <Inter-partition communication>
inter-communication main memory main memory by compliant item hypervisor.
Integration fault <Compliant item> integration tests.
’Write’ access Safety peripherals Memory / I/O <Diagnostic mechanisms>.
to non- commanded by corruption (random)
assigned incorrect partition.
memory Data written by Memory corruption Main memory, Main memory, <Spatial independence>
or I/O safety partition addressable I/O, addressable I/O, by hypervisor managed MMU.
may be Faulty virtualization Hypervisor Hypervisor <Safe partitioning>.
invalidated. (wrong address translation)
Unable to Safety partition Memory / I/O <Diagnostic mechanisms>.
write in outputs not corruption (random)
assigned consistent
memory with expected Faulty virtualization Hypervisor Hypervisor <Safe partitioning>.
or I/O value. (wrong address translation)
Blocking shared CoreNet, Core, <Temporal independence>
resource main memory, AHB/APB buses, and exclusive I/O access by hypervisor,
I/O main memory <Platform configuration>,
supported by <Timing analysis>.
Multiple Uncontrolled / Faulty virtualization Hypervisor Hypervisor <Safe partitioning>.
combinations unpredictable (privileged partition access)
of previous behavior of safety
failure modes partition. Partition resets core <Safe partitioning>.
and / or other core(s) <Spatial independence>.
































Table 5.5: Railway system measures for runtime error control.
Subsystem Technique IEC 61508-7 Maximum DC Description
Processing Reciprocal comparison A.3.5 High Three processing units (TMR) exchange data (including
units by software for three results, intermediate values and test data) reciprocally. A
channels comparison of the data is carried out using SW in each core.
Invariable Signature of a double word A.4.4 High Inclusion of 32 bit CRC in memory.
memory Program code protection n/a n/a Configuration parameters are not configurable in runtime.
Test of program code memory and fixed data memory
during boot procedure.
Variable Test RAM A.5.3 High Periodic test “checkboard” or “march”.
memory
Interconnect Inspection using A.7.4 High SW commanded cyclic test with a defined test pattern to
test patterns check the correctness of on-chip buses.
Clock Watchdog with separate A.9.2 High Watchdog with upper and lower time windows and
time base and window independent time base from the multicore clock.
Power Voltage or current control A.8.3 High Power failure monitor that implements safety shut-off in
supply case of power supply malfunction (under/overvoltage).
Program Combination of timing A.9.4 High Watchdog with upper and lower time window, only refreshed
sequence and logical monitoring if the result of monitoring user program execution is correct.
Interrupt Majority voter A.1.4 High Comparison between the three processing units (TMR).
controller
Digital Input comparison/voting A.6.5 High 2oo3 voting among the three TMR processing units with
I/O and periodic dynamic test signal monitoring.
Actuators Monitored outputs A.6.4 High External actuators monitored by means of a digital input
(relay, WDG) to the MxCPU that represents the state of the contact.
Partition Independence n/a n/a Certifiable hypervisor that provides the minumum services
violation detection defined in G7.1/G7.2 of Section 5.2.5.
Platform Built-in Self-Test (BIST) n/a n/a Start-up tests during platform initialization. At operation
and start-up tests further BIST shall be run periodically.
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Table 5.6: Railway system reaction to errors.
ID Error Group System Reaction Final State
SR1 Safety partition 1. DIAG does not receive confirmation Safe state
P1, P2, P6 error (as from faulty partition P1, P2 or P6.
defined in Table 5.4). 2. DIAG does not refresh WDG.
3. MxCPU reset.
4. MxCPU reset de-energizes safety-relay.
SR2 P7 DIAG partition 1. DIAG does not refresh WDG. Safe state
error (as defined in 2. MxCPU reset.
Table 5.4). 3. MxCPU reset de-energizes safety-relay.
SR3 Non-safety partition 1. DIAG does not receive confirmation Safety partitions
[P3− P5] error (as from faulty partition. remain operational
defined in Table 5.4). 2. DIAG re-starts the faulty partition.
SR4 P4080/LEON3-MC 1. Error detected by diagnostics. Safe state
platform error 2. DIAG does not refresh WDG.
detected by 3. MxCPU reset.
diagnostics. 4. MxCPU reset de-energizes safety-relay.
SR5 P4080/LEON3-MC 1. WDG is not refreshed. Safe state
platform error 2. WDG reaches time-out and
undetected by resets MxCPU.
platform diagnostics. 3. MxCPU reset de-energizes safety-relay.
SR6 Error in external 1. Safety function remains operational. Operational /
WDG. 2. Error detected by DIAG partition. Safe state
3. MxCPU reset.
4. MxCPU reset de-energizes safety-relay.
SR7 Random error 1. Error detected by DIAG partition Safe state
in safety-relay. (periodic test by dynamic signal
generation and read back).
2. DIAG does not refresh WDG.
3. MxCPU reset.
4. MxCPU reset de-energizes safety-relay.
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5.3 Automotive Safety Concept
This section presents the safety concept definition for the automotive case study.
The case study comprised of the subsystems introduced in Section 3.2.2: a safety-
critical Cruise Control (CC) system and a non safety-related power window con-
troller. In this case, as opposed to the railway case study of Section 5.2, parti-
tioning is enforced by hardware and software enabled techniques with the aim of
reducing the overhead introduced by the hypervisor. As in the case of railway, the
safety concept is derived from the IEC 61508 safety argumentation presented in
previous sections. As a result, the safety concept definition includes many refer-
ences to IEC 61508 and specific allusions to automotive ISO 26262 standard are
made where required.
5.3.1 Safety Requirements
The CC shall perform a set of safety goals compliant with ISO 26262 ASIL D
requirements. In this case study, the following safety goal and associated safety
requirements for the CC system (SR CC in Table 5.7) are defined as an example
for the definition of the safety concept:
• SG-1: Avoid the inability to deactivate CC when required (SIL 3 / ASIL D).
Table 5.7: Main safety requirements of the cruise control system.
ID Requirement
SR CC 1 A The safety goal “Cruise Control Deactivation” avoids the inability to deactivate
the CC when required. In case of a fault leading to inability to deactivate CC,
the engine control unit shall switch to a ‘safe state’ within the PST
/ Fault Tolerant Time Interval (FTTI).
SR CC 1 B “Cruise Control Deactivation” must be provided with SIL 3 / ASIL D level.
SR CC 1 1 The ‘CC commands’ transmitted by the Cruise Control Signal Acquisition
functional unit shall be consistent with the status of the buttons (set,
speed+, speed-, off, resume).
SR CC 1 2 The “Cruise Control Monitor” function shall generate a ‘Cruise Control
Disengagement’ signal consistent with the input button/pedal requests.
SR CC 1 3 The ‘safe state’ shall be achieved by deactivation of the Cruise Control System
(by commanding safety digital-outputs connected to external safety-relays).
SR CC 1 4 The PST (IEC 61508) / FTTI (ISO 26262) is 1 second.
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5.3.2 Federated Safety Concept
The high level SIL 3 / ASIL D requirement SR CC 1 A is assigned to the CC
signal acquisition and CC monitor and control functions allocated in two different
























Figure 5.6: Federated system architecture for the automotive use case.
The safety-critical acquisition and engine control ECUs execute safety software
compliant with the following features:
A. Life-cycle and development tools : The system, platform and software de-
velopment of the CC system is compliant with safety life-cycle (ISO 26262
Figure 1 / IEC 61508-1 clause 7) and corresponding FSM (ISO 26262-2 /
IEC 61508-1 clause 6).
A.1. The CC system is developed using qualified tool and compilers (ASIL D
/ SIL 3).
A.2. The system architect takes reasonable measures to develop a safe prod-
uct taking into consideration the safety manuals of all compliant items
/ Safety Element out of Context (SEooC) (ISO 26262-10 clause 4 /
IEC 61508 parts 2 and 3 Annex D).
B. Architecture: The stringent size-weight-power requirements of the automo-
tive domain result in prevailing single channel 1oo1 safety architectures. De-
spite redundancy is considered at component level (e.g., dual-core lockstep
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setups, redundant communication buses) completely redundant hardware ar-
chitectures (e.g., TMR) are out of the scope of ISO 26262 standard. Ac-
cordingly, in this concept definition each ECU adopts a 1oo1 single channel
architecture:
B.1. Platform compliant item/SEooC: Signal Acquisition and Engine Control
ECUs, composed of hardware and associated platform software, are ISO
26262 ASIL-D SEooC / IEC 61508 SIL 3 compliant items (see A.2).
B.2. Each ECU executes a functionally independent software application (see
C).
B.3. The vehicle communication bus is shared with other ECUs (see D).
B.4. Each ECU is physically separated from other ECUs and has indepen-
dent resources (i.e., memories, peripherals, clock).
C. Software Application:
C.1. ASIL D (IEC 61508 SIL 3) life-cycle and FSM compliant software de-
velopment for Signal Acquisition and Engine Control ECUs.
C.2. Safety-related inputs, subsystems and outputs are managed exclusively
by associated safety-related software tasks.
C.3. After start-up the safety software application commands digital-outputs
according to SG-1 and diagnosis status (a failure corresponds to digital-
output deactivation).
D. Vehicle communication bus : Safe communication protocol that provides safety
techniques and attributes of interest:
D.1. CAN based Time-Triggered communication protocol (TTCAN):
D.1.1. Compliant with ISO-11898-4 (ISO-11898) specification (e.g., min-
imum bus length, signaling rate, maximum number of nodes, ca-
bling, etc.).
D.1.2. It establishes a global notion of time by means of a Time Master
(TM) that transmits a synchronization message to all the nodes
(ISO-11898-4).
D.1.3. It provides freedom from interference among safety-related and non
safety-related communication.
D.2. Analogous black channel safety communication that provides equivalent
safety properties.
E. External interfaces :
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E.1. The Signal Acquisition ECU reads safety-related digital inputs for the
CC driver interface buttons (SET/SPEED+, SPEED-, OFF, RESUME)
and safety-related analogue inputs (break, accelerator and clutch pedals
and speed sensor).
E.2. The Engine Control ECU exclusively manages an external safety-relay
through a digital output for the hardware deactivation of the CC (safe
state activation).
E.3. The fail safe state of the safety digital output is de-energized (see F).
E.4. The default state of the safety digital output during no-power and ini-
tialization is de-energized (inherent fail safe state).
E.5. The safety-relay is monitored by means of a digital input to the Engine
Control ECU that represents the state of the contact.
F. Safe State:
F.1. Safe state is defined as the de-activation of the CC system (giving back
control to the driver) as defined in the safety requirement SR CC 1 3
of Table 5.7.
F.2. Whenever there is a violation of a safety goal or if the system, hardware
or software diagnosis detect an error, the safe state must be reached
within the FTTI / PST and maintained.
G. Diagnosis : The system includes diagnostic measures with a high coverage
(DC >99%) for ASIL D (ISO 26262-5 Annex D).
G.1. Diagnosis with a high coverage are implemented on all relevant com-
ponents of each safety-related ECU (e.g., signature of a double word
in memories, Power Failure Monitor, watchdog timer, clock monitor-
ing, I/Os, communication, etc.) (ISO 26262-5 Tables D.2-D.14 and
IEC 61508-2 Tables A.2-A.14).
G.2. The safety software application implements additional life-cycle related
techniques (e.g., ISO 26262-6 Table 8 / IEC 61508-3 Table A.4 de-
fensive programming), error correction/detection techniques and com-
plements the diagnosis techniques implemented in the platform (e.g.,
refresh watchdog, monitor external safety-relays).
G.3. The system architect implements additional diagnosis and verification
measures taking into consideration the safety manuals of all compliant
items (ISO 26262-10.4 / IEC 61508 part 2 and 3 Annex D).
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5.3.3 Integrated Node Architecture
The integrated solution hosts the federated applications of the automotive case
study in a single partitioned processor.
Integrated Safety Architecture
The overall safety architecture is depicted in Figure 5.7 and described below:
Figure 5.7: Automotive safety concept (one processor, partitioned).
• MxCPU: Composed of partitioned processor with hardware partitioning sup-
port and external WDG.
• Partitions: Equivalent to the ECU distribution of the federated system and
additional partition for diagnostics:
– P0 encapsulates the CC Signal Acquisition ECU.
– P1 includes both the CC monitor and control functionality which are
executed one after the other in a sequential manner.
– P2 hosts the non safety-critical power windows controller.
– P3 DIAG performs software-based diagnostics, configuration and pro-
tection activities.
• Processor: Partitions are enforced by hardware protection mechanisms. These
means shall prevent non-safety partitions from interfering with safety parti-
tions and freedom from interference among safety partitions.
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• External WDG: Separate watchdog timer for diagnosis and error reaction.
Multicore Safety Architecture
The case study is evaluated on the state-of-the-art AURIX processor family (AURIX)
that integrates three cores as introduced in Section 3.1.3. Figure 5.8 illustrates
the partition to core allocation and the main hardware resources of relevance of
the AURIX TC27X architecture. Safety-related partitions P0 - P1 are allocated
to cores c0 and c1 as they provide increased safety by means of lockstep processor
redundancy. P3 has also safety implications and it is therefore executed in core
0 together with partition P0. The non safety-related partition is allocated to the
remaining core without redundancy.
Figure 5.8: Safety concept in AURIX TC27X multicore processor
5.3.4 Failure Analysis
As part of the failure analysis process, the fault hypothesis and a simplified FMEA
for the automotive case study are described below.
Fault Hypothesis
The fault hypothesis for the automotive mixed-criticality multicore integration is
based on the generic fault hypothesis defined in Section 4.4.2:
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Federated to Integrated - Assumptions. The following safety properties,
described in the federated approach of Section 5.3.2, are assumed to be maintained
when integrating the applications in a single platform:
• Software safety partitions P0 and P1 of the cruise control system are pro-
vided as SIL 3 / ASIL D compliant items.
• Same safety life-cycle and FSM measures described in Section 5.3.2-A apply
for system, platform and software applications.
• External (off-chip) communication is replaced by on-chip communication.
• External interfaces are equivalent to those described in the federated im-
plementation (Section 5.3.2-E) and the fail safe system requirements are
maintained to reach the safe state (e.g., de-energization of safety-relay as
described in Section 5.3.2-F).
• The definition of required diagnostic techniques described in Section 5.3.2-
G can be reused taking into account the properties of the new hardware
platform and additional diagnostics shall be implemented to prevent from
the new hazards that the sharing of a single computing platform involves.
Unit of Failure. The impact of faults in the MxCPU is delimited by the
following fault containment regions:
• The AURIX processor forms a single physical FCR.
• The external WDG forms another physical FCR.
• Each partition forms a single design FCR.
Failure Modes and Frequency of Failures. The AURIX platform is pro-
vided as an ASIL D SEooC. The MxCPU can fail in an arbitrary failure mode with
the permanent failure rate in the order of 10-100 FIT and the transient failure rate
in the order of 100,000 FIT:
• The AURIX can fail in an arbitrary failure mode. The residual failure rate
of the AURIX with respect to hardware random failures is equal or lower
than 0.1 FIT after applying the provided safety mechanisms as established
in the safety manual (Inf14).
• A partition can fail in an arbitrary failure mode when it is affected by a
fault, both in the temporal as well as in the spatial domain (as defined in
Table 5.10).
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
The simplified FMEA for partitions of Table 4.1 shall be considered for each of
the safety partitions of the automotive application: P0-Signal Acquisition, P1-CC
Monitor and Control and P3-DIAG. This FMEA is updated in Table 5.10 with
the main spatial and temporal interference sources of the AURIX processor that
may result in partition failures:
• Spatial interferences among different cores may happen in the shared SRAM
memory or addressable I/O devices.
• Regarding temporal interference sources, the effects of the arbitration policy
shall be considered in the event of simultaneous accesses to shared resources
in order to decide which core to serve first. While the main interconnect
(SRI) implements a crossbar architecture, which allows several parallel re-
quests, when the requests target the same resource (e.g., SRAM memory),
they can affect each others timing. The peripheral bus (SPB) instead, is
implemented as a shared bus, and provides mutual exclusive access to the
connected peripherals. This causes significant impact on the timing of the
different cores that try to access it at the same time. In addition to the
impact of simultaneous accesses as explained above, all cacheable memory
accesses can result in a hit or miss in cache, which creates another source of
timing variability.
• As partitions P0 and P3 of the automotive system are allocated to the same
core, core-local resources are also potential interference sources, such as, local
scratchpad memories, L1 caches and the core itself.
5.3.5 Safety Measures
This section describes the safety measures to fulfill with the requirements of the
safety argumentation of Section 4.4. Table 5.8 summarizes the safety measures
that support the automotive safety concept and shows the ISO 26262 equivalence
for the IEC 61508 based strategies defined in the goal structures of Section 4.4.
G.4. Measures for the avoidance of systematic faults: As defined in the
federated safety concept (Section 5.3.2) the system and partition develop-
ment is compliant with SIL 3 / ASIL D FSM and software safety partitions
are SIL 3 / ASIL D compliant items with associated safety manuals. In
addition, the mixed-criticality approach requires that:
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Table 5.8: Summary of safety measures and IEC 61508 to ISO 26262 references.
Safety Implementation Reference to Standards
Measure (Goal) IEC 61508 (Strategy) ISO 26262
G4 Avoidance of systematic faults in the safety life-cycle (Figure 4.7)
<FSM> (G4.1) SIL 3 compliant Part 1 clause 6 (S4.1). Part 2 (ASIL D).
<Fault Measures for Part 2 Annex B Part 5 Annex D
prevention> P4 DIAG and (HW) and Part 3 (HW) and Part 6
(G4.2) SW/HW integration. Annex A (SW) (S4.2). sections 7 to 9.
<Compliant [P0 - P2] and Part 2 and Part 10 clause 4
item> MSCPU SIL3 Part 3 Annex D ASIL D SEooC.
(G4.3) compliant items. (S4.3).
G5 Safe co-existence of mixed-criticality applications (Figure 4.8)
<Spatial HW partitioning Part 3 Annex F Part 6 Annex D
Independence> in the AURIX. (S5.1).
(G5.1.1)
<Temporal AURIX configuration Part 3 Annex F Part 6 Annex D
Independence> and WCET analysis (S5.1).
(M5.1.2) (MBPTA).
<Inter-partition Unidirectional chan- Part 3 Annex F Part 6 Annex D
Communication> nels based on protec- (S5.1).
(G5.1.3) ted shared memory.
<Safe Parti- AURIX is ASIL-D Part 3 Annex F Part 6 Annex D
tioning> (G5.1.4) compliant item. (S5.1).
<Configuration> Defined by system n/a n/a
(G5.1.5) architect using
qualified tools.
<Independence Away goal to Part 3 p. 7.4.2.9 Part 6 p. 7.4.11
violations> G6.2. (S5).
(AG5.2)
G6 Control of random hardware, systematic, environmental and operational
errors at runtime (Figure 4.9)
<Diagnostic SIL 3, HFT = 0, Part 2 Annex A Part 5 Annex D
Mechanisms> DC ≥ 99% tech- (S6.1).
(G6.1) niques.
<Independence Detected by AURIX Part 3 p. 7.4.2.9 Part 6 p. 7.4.11
violations> safety features, (S6.2).
(G6.2) DIAG or WDG.
<System Reac- Safe state by SF Part 2 p. 7.4.8 Part 5 p. 7.4.3.3
tion to Errors> (relay), or diag- (S6.3).
(G6.3) nostics (reset).
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G4.1. <FSM>, safety partition P3 DIAG is conceived, developed and cer-
tified using a SIL 3 / ASIL D FSM (highest integrity level among all
partitions in the system).
G4.2. <Fault prevention>,
• The development of new software partitions (i.e., P3 DIAG) adopts
measures for the avoidance of systematic faults according to IEC 61508-
3 Tables A.2-A.5 / ISO 26262-6 sections 7-9.
• The integration of software partitions and the hardware platform
and system validation includes systematic fault prevention activi-
ties compliant with IEC 61508-3 Tables A.6-A.7 / ISO 26262-5/6
section 10 (e.g., resource usage test) and taking into account all
safety manuals for compliant items.
G4.3. <Compliant item>,
• The MxCPU is provided as an ASIL D / SIL 3 SEooC with associ-
ated safety manual.
• Safety partitions [P0 − P1] are provided as an ASIL D / SIL 3
compliant items. Functional safety requirements of each item are
contrasted with the functional safety requirements assumed for the
SEooC (assumptions of use). The system architect shall define the
additional hardware-software integration and system safety valida-
tion procedures according to safety manuals.
G.5. Measures for the co-existence of mixed-criticality applications: Par-
titions in the automotive case study are enforced based on hardware support,
by the configuration of protection mechanisms available in the ASIL-D com-
pliant AURIX platform and an OS layer that provides minimal services. In
this context, a partition is defined as an independent execution environment
enforced by hardware and each partition shall comprise the following mini-
mum features:
G5.1.1. <Spatial independence [Memory]>: The local memory of core 0
is segregated in at least two independent regions for the two partitions
allocated to it. Similarly, shared memory is divided in different address
ranges for each partition. Memory regions need to be protected against
unintended accesses.
G5.1.1. <Spatial independence [I/O]>: Partitions are granted exclusive ac-
cess to associated peripherals:
• CC monitor and control partition (P1 ) is granted exclusive access
to the digital output connected to the external safety-relay.
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• Diagnostics partition P3 has exclusive access to the digital output
for controlling the external watchdog.
G5.1.2. <Temporal independence>: Platform configuration and a statically
defined schedule of partitions implemented by the OS and supported by
WCET analysis to ensure that time deadlines are preserved.
G5.1.3. <Inter-partition communication>: Safe communication is guaran-
teed by the system configuration not to jeopardize spatial and temporal
independence.
G5.1.4. <Safe partitioning>: AURIX platform and OS are ASIL D compli-
ant.
G5.1.5. <Configuration> is static and defined during design stage with qual-
ified tools. The AURIX processor provides protection for safety config-
uration registers.
G.6. Measures for runtime error control: The system integrates the features
to detect and control errors at runtime according to what it is specified in
the argument structure of Figure 4.9.
G6.1. <Diagnostic mechanisms>: The system includes diagnostic mea-
sures to achieve a coverage equivalent to the federated architecture
(DC≥ 99%, SIL 3, HFT = 0). Table 5.11 gathers the diagnostic mea-
sures for relevant system components based on the following features:
• Autonomous hardware diagnostics: The AURIX architecture in-
tegrates diagnostic mechanisms in hardware (‘AURIX Safety Fea-
tures’ ):
– Cores: c0 and c1 are redundant (lockstep configuration). Each
core has code and data MPUs for software tasks (16 data pro-
tection ranges, 8 code protection ranges) and a watchdog timer.
All cores have independent reset and power management.
– Shared memory: SRAM with configurable write protected re-
gions (up to eight address ranges with a Tag ID for granting ac-
cess rights). The memory system includes a Memory Test Unit
(MTU) with features such as, configurable memory Built-in-
Self-Tests (MBIST), error detection/correction via ECC, ROM
content verification (initialization and data integrity checking)
and multi-bit error detection.
– On-chip buses (SRI and SPB): SRI with end-to-end monitor-
ing of data and address failures and MPU in every SRI slave.
Register access protection in SRI and SPB.
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– Additional measures:
∗ I/O monitoring (e.g., comparison with reference value) and
redundancy (e.g., for Analogue to Digital Converters (ADC)).
∗ Two clock sources: crystal oscillator and backup clock with
monitoring functions (over/under-frequency control).
∗ Power supply with power monitoring functions (over/under-
voltage control).
• Software-commanded diagnostics: partition (P3 DIAG) manages
and implements the required additional safety techniques:
– Configures the ‘AURIX Safety Features’ at start-up (memories,
internal watchdog timers, ADC, BISTs).
– Performs the required additional periodic checks (I/O checks,
communication bus, WDG) (IEC 61508-7 A.6.1 / ISO 26262-5
D.2.6.1 test pattern).
– Controls the external watchdog (WDG).
• Platform independent diagnostics:
– Safety-related digital outputs connected to the WDG and safety-
relay are monitored by associated digital inputs (IEC 61508-7
A.1.1 / ISO 26262-5 D.2.1.1: failure detection by online moni-
toring).
• MxCPU diagnostics:
– Independent WDG controlled by P3 DIAG partition for the
combination of timing and logical monitoring of program se-
quence (IEC 61508-7 A.9.4 / ISO 26262-5 D.2.9.4).
G6.2. <Independence violations> The hardware mechanisms protect mem-
ory space and I/Os against independence violations. For timing inter-
ferences, the correct timing behavior is monitored by the core local
watchdogs and P3 DIAG partition implementing software diagnostics
that periodically monitor the completion of all partitions.
G6.3. <Error reaction> Safe state is achieved either by safety function (P1
commanding safety-relay) or diagnostics that act in the WDG and force
a MxCPU reset in case of error detection (Figure 5.9). Table 5.12 defines
the system reaction to main subsystem errors.
Independence in Multicore Architectures
The implementation details to achieve the aforementioned independence guaran-
tees in the AURIX multicore are described below.
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Figure 5.9: Safety chain for CC safe state activation.
<Spatial independence> (G5.1.1) is achieved by the segregation and pro-
tection of memory areas for each individual software partition:
• Local memories: Local memories on each core of the AURIX can be config-
ured in four memory Address Protection Sets (APS) per CPU, with specific
permissions for code and data accesses based on the address generated by an
application. Figure 5.10a shows the configuration of the different memory
regions for the partitions executing on core 0. In each time slot of core 0
only one of the address protection sets is active (Figure 5.10b). In this way,
in each partition switch or if an interrupt or trap handler is entered, the
associated address protection set is selected and accesses from other parti-
tions are not permitted. The OS kernel is the responsible for setting up the
address protection correctly on each context switch. This OS service shall
be developed according to ASIL D safety requirements.
Core Partition / Task Address Protection Set (APS) Protection
C0 P0 Data Scratchpad APS 0 read / write
Program Scratchpad APS 0 Fetch
C0 P3 Data Scratchpad APS 1 read / write
Program Scratchpad APS 1 Fetch
C0 Data Scratchpad APS 2 read / write
Program Scratchpad APS 2 Fetch
C0 OS kernel Data Scratchpad APS 3 read / write
Program Scratchpad APS 3 Fetch
Interrupt
handlers
(a) Address protection on core 0
P3 P0-Signal Acq.
APS 1 APS 0APS on Core 0 code
and data memories
Core 0
APS 3 APS 3
t
OS
(b) Scheduling of partitions on core 0
Figure 5.10: Memory and time segregation on core 0.
• Shared memory: The shared SRAM memory can be configured in eight write
protected address ranges. A Protected Memory Region (PMR) is configured
for each safety-critical partition as shown in Figure 5.11 (PMR 0 for P0,
PMR 3 for P3 and PMR 4 for P1 ). In each PMR, write accesses are pro-
tected by checking the ID used to initiate SRI master transactions (master
TAG ID). Each core has two master interfaces (code and data) to access to
the SRI, each of it with an unique ID. For core 0, where two different parti-
tions are executed, the platform gives the option to configure two additional
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IDs on the same core, by identifying the partitions as safe (C0 DATA S) or
regular (C0 DATA NS).
• I/Os: Addressable on-chip resources are protected by a firewall mechanism
where the access to the SRI and SPB slaves is only granted to the masters
configured with such rights. Accordingly, partitions P1 and P3 are configured









C0 P0 PMR 0 write
C0 P0 PMR 1 write
C0 P0 PMR 2 write
C0_DATA_S C0 P3 PMR 3 write
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(DO for WDG)
C1 P1 PMR 4 write


































(b) Shared memory and I/O protection
Figure 5.11: Platform protection mechanisms against spatial interferences.
Safe <Inter-partition communication> (G5.1.3) is guaranteed by means
of shared SRAM memory. Each shared memory is configured as a write protected
address range where only one partition has write permissions. Accordingly, inter-
partition communication channels are unidirectional with an independent shared
memory for each of the required communication channels. Three additional pro-
tected memory regions are defined in Figure 5.11 for the communication among
P0 and P1 (PMR 1), P0 and P2 (PMR 2) and P1 and P2 (PMR 5).
The <Configuration> (G5.1.5) of critical settings such as, partition to core
allocation, protection sets, routing of interrupts to cores, scheduling and arbitra-
tion policies in the SRI and SPB, watchdog time windows, etc.. is protected. On
the one hand, configuration registers can only be accessed in supervisor mode and
a register protection mechanism is also in place to define which masters may have
modification rights on the safety-related registers (in this case only P3 DIAG). On
the other hand, after system initialization, whenever the software in supervisor
mode and from an authorized master attempts to modify a safety configuration
register, it first needs to unlock a password protected bit. Once this bit is un-
locked, the software is allowed to modify the registers within a predefined time
period protected by the watchdog (the password protected bit needs to be locked
again before watchdog time-out).
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G7. <Temporal independence> is achieved by mitigating possible time inter-
ferences among partitions (as those analyzed in the FMEA of Table 5.10) in
the configuration and by gauging the effects of remaining time interferences
by MBPTA:
G7.1. <Platform configuration>:
• The SRI crossbar supports parallel transactions between different
SRI-Master and SRI-Slave peripherals. Still, there is contention
when two masters simultaneously target the same SRI-Slave (i.e.,
on-chip memories). To ensure a fair arbitration of the simultaneous
requests and prevent one partition from being starved by higher
priority requests, a round-robin arbitration is established in the
configuration and its maximum contention is considered in WCET
analysis.
• The SPB is implemented as a shared bus that provides mutual
exclusive accesses to on-chip peripherals. Each master needs to be
granted bus ownership to initiate a transfer, which is arbitrated on
a priority-based basis. To protect against bus starvation of lower
priority masters, the AURIX includes a prevention mechanism that
guarantees that all masters are granted bus access in a pre-defined
period of time.
• To guarantee temporal independence among partitions P0 and P3
in core 0, a static cyclic scheduling algorithm is implemented as
shown in Figure 5.10b. This scheduling is defined at design time
based on WCET estimates computed for each partition by means
of MBPTA.
G7.2. <Bounded temporal interference> is ensured by means of MBPTA:
G7.2.1. <Timing analysis>: The impact of relevant variability sources in
the AURIX (e.g., cache) are captured by MBPTA using software
randomization during execution time measurements. Time ran-
domization in the AURIX is applied using the TASA variant (KVM+16)
that has been shown to effectively handle cache-induced execution
time variability in the AURIX platform (KVM+16). Bus jitter is
deterministically upper-bounded offline by monitoring the number
of requests and applying a contention model (DFK+17).
As an illustrative example of the application of MBPTA in the automotive case
study, the pWCET of the safety-critical ‘Signal Acquisition’ (P0), ‘Monitoring’
and ‘Speed Control’ (P1) functions are illustrated in Figure 5.12 and Table 5.9
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provides WCET values at relevant exceedance thresholds1.
(a) Signal Acquisition (b) Monitoring (c) Speed Control
Figure 5.12: MBPTA application in the automotive case study.
The application of MBPTA to the automotive functions led to extremely tight
results as, when compared to their respective HWM, the predicted pWCET bounds
are always below the iconic 20% margin. The low distances for higher exceedance
thresholds can be partially ascribed to the overall high predictability of the execu-
tion platform. In spite of the high determinism of the architecture, the execution
time observations reflect a variability that ranged up to approximately 5% for
the same program path of the three application tasks as determined by the dif-
ferent program layouts randomly-generated with TASA. This kind of variability,
mastered by MBPTA, is typically neither controlled nor taken into account by
traditional, static and measurement-based, WCET analysis procedures.
Table 5.9: pWCET at relevant exceedance thresholds for automotive case study.
Platform HWM 10−3 % 10−6 % 10−9 % 10−12 %
Signal Acq. 880 891 1.25 919 4.43 947 7.61 975 10.80
Monitoring 595 603 1.34 627 5.38 651 9.41 674 13.27
Speed Control 80554 80888 0.41 81574 1.27 82260 2.12 82946 2.97
1The implementation and timing analysis of this case study were conducted as part of the































This section contains the tables that support the automotive safety concept.
Table 5.10: Simplified Failure Mode and Effect Analysis for automotive case study (partitions).
Failure Mode Failure Effect Potential Cause
Multicore resource Failure detection and
AURIX compensation (MxCPU)
Not Executed Safety function Random HW fault <Diagnostic mechanisms>.
not performed.
Design fault <Fault prevention>
to reduce the probability of
Integration fault systematic faults.
Blocking execution Core, <Temporal independence> supported by
by another partition SRI, SPB <Timing analysis> and
<Platform configuration>.
Incorrect Safety function Memory / I/O <Diagnostic mechanisms>.
(functional) performed corruption (random)
Execution with wrong
data, incorrect Memory corruption Core-local scratchpad, <Spatial independence>
outputs may be by contending partition shared SRAM by Address Protection Sets (APS) and write protected
computed. address ranges in the <Configuration>.
Memory corruption Interrupt <Spatial independence>
by components with system, by write access memory protection.
bus master rights DMA
I/O corruption Addressable <Spatial independence>
by contending partition devices by write access protection in SRI / SPB.
Incorrect Safety function Random HW fault <Diagnostic mechanisms>.
(temporal) does not
Execution compute its Blocking execution Core, <Temporal independence>
outputs on time by another partition L1 caches, supported by <Timing analysis> and





















dangerous Incorrect allocation Impact of runtime SoJ captured in WCET
deadline overruns. of execution time by means of MBPTA and TASA.
Blocking execution by SRI, <Inter-partition communication>
inter-communication shared SRAM by protected shared memory regions.
Integration fault <Compliant item> integration tests.
’Write’ access Safety peripherals Memory / I/O <Diagnostic mechanisms>.
to non- commanded by corruption (random)
assigned incorrect partition.
memory Data written by Memory corruption Shared SRAM, <Spatial independence>
or I/O safety partition addressable by write access protection in SRI / SPB.
may be invalidated. devices
Unable to Safety partition Memory / I/O <Diagnostic mechanisms>.
write in outputs not corruption (random)
assigned consistent
memory with expected Blocking shared SRI, SPB <Platform configuration>
or I/O value. resource prevents resource starvation and locking.
Multiple Uncontrolled / Partition resets core Protected <Configuration>
combinations unpredictable and / or other core(s) registers.
of previous behavior of safety
failure modes partition. Uncontrolled or not Protected <Configuration>































Table 5.11: Automotive system measures for runtime error control.
Subsystem Technique IEC 61508-7 Maximum DC Description
Processing Hardware redundancy: A.1.3 High Safety Partitions allocated to AURIX’s lockstep cores.
units dual core lockstep Lockstep Comparator Logic (LCL) with self monitoring for
configuration runtime HW comparison of the main and checker cores.
Invariable Signature of a double word A.4.4 High Inclusion of a 32 bit CRC in memory.
memory Program code protection n/a n/a MBIST included in the AURIX processor.
The Memory Test Unit (MTU) performs ROM content
verification (initialization and data integrity checking).
Variable Test SRAM A.5.3 High Periodic test “checkboard” or “march”.
memory MBIST included in the AURIX for SRAM monitoring.
Interconnect Inspection using A.7.4 High ‘P3 DIAG’ commanded cyclic test with a defined test pattern
test patterns to check the correctness of on-chip buses.
End-to-end data and address monitoring in SRI crossbar.
Clock Watchdog with separate A.9.2 High Watchdog with upper and lower time windows and
time base and window independent time base from the multicore clock.
Over/under frequency n/a n/a AURIX integrates clock monitoring functionality.
threshold monitoring
Power Voltage or current control A.8.3 High Power failure monitor that implements safety shut-off in
supply case of power supply malfunction.
Over/under-voltage control included in the AURIX.
Program Combination of timing A.9.4 High Watchdog with upper and lower time window, only refreshed
sequence and logical monitoring if the result of monitoring user program execution is correct.
Additional core-local watchdog timers in the AURIX.
Analogue Input comparison/voting A.6.5 High The AURIX includes redundancy and comparison for ADCs.
inputs






















Actuators Monitored outputs A.6.4 High External actuators monitored by means of a digital input
(relay, WDG) to the MxCPU that represents the state of the contact.
Partition Independence n/a n/a AURIX HW protection mechanisms and configuration enforce
violation detection spatial and temporal independence (G7.1/G7.2 of Section 5.3.5).
Temporal independence is supported by WCET analysis.
Platform BIST n/a n/a Start-up tests and AURIX BIST during platform initialization.
and start-up tests At operation further periodic BIST are executed.
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Table 5.12: Automotive system reaction to errors.
ID Error Group System Reaction Final State
SR1 Safety partition 1. P3 DIAG does not receive confirmation Safe state
[P0 - P1] error (as from faulty safety partition P0 or P1.
defined in Table 5.4). 2. DIAG does not refresh WDG.
3. MxCPU reset.
4. MxCPU reset de-energizes safety-relay.
SR2 P3 DIAG partition 1. DIAG does not refresh WDG. Safe state
error (as defined in 2. MxCPU reset.
Table 5.4). 3. MxCPU reset de-energizes safety-relay.
SR3 Non-safety partition 1. DIAG does not receive confirmation Safety partitions
(P2) error (as from faulty partition. remain operational
defined in Table 5.4). 2. DIAG re-starts the faulty partition.
SR4 AURIX 1. Error detected by diagnostics. Safe state
platform error 2. DIAG does not refresh WDG.
detected by 3. MxCPU reset.
diagnostics. 4. MxCPU reset de-energizes safety-relay.
SR5 AURIX 1. WDG is not refreshed. Safe state
platform error 2. WDG reaches time-out and
undetected by resets MxCPU
platform diagnostics. 3. MxCPU reset de-energizes safety-relay.
SR6 Error in external 1. Safety function remains operational. Operational /
WDG. 2. Error detected by DIAG partition. Safe state
3. MxCPU reset.
4. MxCPU reset de-energizes safety-relay.
SR7 Random error 1. Error detected by DIAG partition Safe state
in safety-relay. (periodic test by dynamic signal
generation and read back).
2. DIAG does not refresh WDG.
3. MxCPU reset.
4. MxCPU reset de-energizes safety-relay.
5.4 Summary
This chapter evaluates the certification argument of Chapter 4 through the elabo-
ration of two safety concepts for the railway and automotive domains respectively.
We use two different approaches, a hypervisor based solution and an approach
based on hardware protection mechanisms embedded in the processor architec-
ture, respectively. The assumptions and analysis considered at this design stage
have been reviewed and positively assessed by a certification body.
110
5.4 Summary
Still, one key open subject is the method to determine WCET bounds of each
software application to ensure temporal independence in an efficient way (without
excessive resource over-provisioning). Although defined safety mechanisms factor
in the impact of software timing faults in the system by switching to a safe state
in case of timing overrun, assessing the correctness of the timing bounds is still
crucial to preserve system’s availability. The WCET estimation of multicore pro-
cessors is highly complicated by the presence of complex architectural features and
shared resources that result in inter-task resource contention interferences. As a
consequence, several limitations arise regarding predictability, timing analysis and
providing sufficient evidence to confirm that timing requirements are met in the
access to hardware shared resources. In this chapter this limitation is addressed
by the use of the novel MBPTA approach that provides, by construction, evidence
to quantify the probability of timing overruns. However, the novelty of MBPTA
entails an eminent cultural change with respect to current certification practices.





Exceedance into Safety Standards
The safety concepts of the previous chapter rely on MBPTA technology to estimate
probabilistic execution time bounds. To some extent, the concept of determining
exceedance probabilities for execution time bounds may seem counter-intuitive in
CRTES domains where avoiding design faults is of paramount importance. How-
ever, the reality is that probabilistic modeling is a close match to functional safety
standards’ philosophy to handle random hardware faults, by determining the fail-
ure rates of hardware elements and considering design techniques that make their
probability sufficiently low. IEC 61508 and its child standards, like automotive
ISO 26262 or railway EN 5012x, define different procedures for the management
of deterministic design faults (i.e. systematic faults) and unpredictable hardware
faults (i.e., random faults). They all use cognizant assessment, based on judgment
from practical experience to guarantee that systematic faults are duly mitigated
or controlled in such a way that their contribution to the residual risk of the sys-
tem is acceptably low. Conversely, random faults can only be controlled at run
time, and IEC 61508 requires their likelihood of occurrence to be quantified and
assessed against reference values to assert with sufficiently high confidence that
the necessary risk reduction is achieved. While for hardware parts the standard
contemplates both systematic and random hardware faults, software faults are all
deemed systematic.
The chapter proposes the quantification the likelihood of execution-time ex-
ceedance events and relating it to target failure metrics in support of certification
arguments – much like for hardware random faults – instead of trusting judg-
ment from practical experience (which is the current practice for managing sys-
tematic faults). To this end, we use MBPTA to quantify, constructively, the
failure rates resulting from the likelihood of execution-time exceedance events.
Earlier work describes how to design MBPTA-friendly hardware and software plat-
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forms (KQA+16; KVM+16) such that execution-time exceedance occurs with an
(arbitrarily low) probability. So far however, there is lack of understanding of how
the probabilistic treatment of execution-time exceedance events can be understood
by safety certification standards. Accordingly, we survey the management of sys-
tematic and random faults in IEC 61508 and propose an asymmetric treatment of
software faults, addressing execution-time exceedance with MBPTA. We build on
IEC 61508 metrics such as failure rates and diagnostic coverage to determine the
adequacy of the design with respect to timing, much like residual hardware faults.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We summarize how IEC 61508
deals with hardware and software faults in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2 we intro-
duce the concept of execution time exceedance probability in the quantification
of safety related parameters. Section 6.3 evaluates MBPTA and the hardware/-
software modifications it requires with respect to the safety life-cycle defined in
IEC 61508. Section 6.4 evaluates other domain-specific standards. Section 6.5 pro-
vides experimental support evidence on the railway case study. Finally, Section 6.6
presents a summary of the chapter.
6.1 Systematic and Random Faults in IEC 61508
IEC 61508 requires to provide evidence of the absence of unreasonable risk due to
hazards caused by the malfunction of E/E/PE systems. To this end, IEC 61508
deals in a systematic manner with the activities necessary to develop a safety re-
lated system by adopting the safety life-cycle illustrated in Figure 2.2 of Chapter 2.
Figure 6.1 provides an schematic view of the system analysis and definition phases
(i.e., system specification), and realization activities of such life-cycle where the
asymmetric treatment of systematic and random faults is manifested.
• System specification: IEC 61508 process starts by determining the scope
of the system and by conducting a hazard and risk analysis to define the
set of hazardous events and situations foreseeable for the system under anal-
ysis. Then, an evaluation of the risk associated to these hazards shall be
performed, based on the severity, probability of exposure and controllability
of the event. The fundamental goal of the standard is then to reduce this
risk down to tolerable rates by the formulation and implementation of safety
functions with associated SIL levels based on the level of risk. These safety
functions are documented in the safety requirement specification file which
is often complemented with the definition of a safety concept.
• Realization: The realization phase is divided into system, hardware and
software development processes that define the activities to design, build and
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Figure 6.1: Schematic view of IEC 61508 treatment of systematic and random
faults in the life-cycle.
validate the safety-related E/E/PE system.
6.1.1 Software Faults
IEC 61508 holds a deterministic view of software faults and classifies them all as
systematic. Moreover, IEC 61508 assumes that all systematic faults have to be
controlled, tolerated or prevented during the development process. The software
development process is similar to the hardware one (Figure 6.1), except that the
software development does not include a quantitative analysis of its possible faults.
IEC 61508 states that “the probability of occurrence of systematic faults cannot
in general be quantified”. IEC 61508 sustains this assertion by arguing that, due
to the nature of systematic faults, they can not be predicted with sufficient accu-
racy. For instance, the effects of systematic faults depend on the life-cycle phase
in which they are introduced and the effectiveness of the prevention measures
(e.g., structured programing) is difficult to quantify. However, IEC 61508 allows
to consider that the target failure reduction for a safety function is achieved by
demonstrating compliance to all requirements of the standard. In this regard, the
standard introduces SIL-dependent quality management procedures for preventing
systematic faults in each phase of the software development process. In practice,
however, process-oriented solutions cannot provide positive evidence of the lack
of residual faults, especially with the complexity of nowadays software functions,
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and the hardware-software interaction that occurs in them. For this reason, the
standard does also reckon runtime mechanisms suitable for the detection of errors
that are the result of systematic faults.
6.1.2 Hardware Faults
As opposed to software faults that are all deemed as systematic, hardware faults
are differentiated between systematic and random. Resultantly, the hardware de-
velopment process demands (i) measures to prevent systematic faults, (ii) measures
to control both systematic and random faults, and (iii) determination and calcula-
tion of safety related parameters to assess the suitability of the design with respect
to reference threshold values.
The measures to avoid systematic faults are equivalent to those defined in the
software development process, based on quality management measures during the
different hardware life-cycle phases sketched in Figure 6.1. The importance to
apply specific measures is dependent on the SIL level and their effectiveness is
qualitatively ranged as high, medium or low. Still, IEC 61508 recognizes that
there is a residual probability of systematic faults occurring resulting from the
design, environmental stress or external influences or operator mistakes. Despite
their probability not being quantified, the standard proposes a set of methods to
control them at runtime (e.g., diversity, failure detection by on-line monitoring).
For hardware random faults instead, the procedure starts by the definition of
the safety architecture and determination of associated target architectural metrics
(e.g., HFT, SFF) as shown in the left side of Table 6.1 for complex components.
For the calculation of safety related parameters, faults are classified as safe or
dangerous faults, with the latter being further differentiated among detected or
undetected faults. Safe and dangerous detected faults can be regarded as safely-
ignorable since their effects become “visible” before they can do harm, or they are
simply harmless. The fraction of safely-ignorable faults with respect to the overall
failure rate is given by the SFF while the percentage of detected faults is given
by the Diagnostic Coverage (DC). Depending on the HFT achieved by the safety
architecture of the subsystem, the required SFF varies, which can only be improved
either by high design effort or by increasing the portion of detected dangerous
failures by the application of safety techniques and measures with appropriate
DC. The SFF and DC parameters are commonly derived from an FMEA where
the basis for the calculations are the failure rates of the components, that is,
the average number of faults over time. In addition, for redundant components
composed of two or more channels, the standard requires to determine the effect of
common cause failures affecting to both channels. IEC 61508 acknowledges that
diagnostic techniques cannot achieve full coverage for all types of faults and defines
mechanisms with diagnostic coverages between 60% and 99%. The system may
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therefore be exposed to dangerous undetected faults, which results in a residual
risk that needs to be assessed by the quantification of the safety related metrics
shown in the right side of Table 6.1: the average Probability of Failure on Demand
(PFDavg) and Probability of Failure per Hour (PFH).
Table 6.1: IEC 61508 quantification metrics (IEC61508).
Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) Target probability of Failure
SIL HFT 0 HFT 1 HFT 2 PFDavg PFH
4 not allowed ≥ 99% ≥ 90% ≥ 10−5 to < 10−4 ≥ 10−9 to < 10−8
3 ≥ 99% 90% to < 99% 60% to < 90% ≥ 10−4 to < 10−3 ≥ 10−8 to < 10−7
2 90% to < 99% 60% to < 90% < 60% ≥ 10−3 to < 10−2 ≥ 10−7 to < 10−6
1 60% to < 90% < 60% n/a ≥ 10−2 to < 10−1 ≥ 10−6 to < 10−5
To assess whether the residual risk (and hence the implemented measures to
control faults) is acceptable, IEC 61508 defines strict pass/fail reference figures for
these metrics depending on the SIL level and the mode of operation1 of the system
(Table 6.1).
6.2 Execution Time Exceedance Rates
The increasing complexity of modern computing platforms threaten the soundness
of the qualitative assessment of timing correctness, and may allow execution-time
exceedance situations to escape prevention. Execution-time exceedance may result
from hardware/software interactions that are often too remote from the user reach
and too difficult to control and prevent, for instance, by the combination of specific
task interleaving or initial cache states. Accordingly, system’s timing design can
benefit from treating execution-time exceedance events much like random hardware
faults, by considering the former too in the quantification of safety functions’
probability of failure.
To this end, we introduce the concept of timing failure rate, λT , in the quan-
tification of safety related parameters. The probability of failure (PFD/PFH)
of a safety function is determined by calculating and combining the probability of
failure for all the subsystems which together implement the safety function (e.g.,
sensor, logic, actuator). The probability of failure of these subsystems is time
dependent and characterized by their dangerous failure rate. This is reflected in
Equations 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 from IEC 61508-6 (IEC61508) for fail safe systems
assuming a single-channel architecture with diagnostics:
1PFDavg metric is used for safety functions that are only performed with a low demand
frequency (i.e., less than once per year). For safety functions with a high operating demand or
continuous mode of operation the equivalent PFH metric is used.
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where TPTI stands for the proof test interval
1 and λDU relates to the portion
of dangerous undetected (hardware) failures. Detected dangerous failure rates
(λDD) are not considered in these equations as it is assumed that the diagnostic
measures will detect them and switch to a safe state within the process safety time,
i.e., before the fault can become dangerous (IEC 61508-2 §7.4.4.1.4).
We adapt PFD/PFH definition by considering the probability of timing failure
as an additional subsystem in the safety loop. As opposed to hardware metrics,
the probability of timing failures is constant over time and it can’t be improved by
proof tests and component repairs. Accordingly, we break down the PFD/PFH of
the safety loop into (i) the application of Equations 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 for dangerous
undetected hardware failure rates (λDUHW ) and, (ii) the addition of the dangerous
undetected timing failure rate (λDUT ) constant over time:









To relate the λDUT with the overall timing failure rate (λT ), first the portion
of dangerous timing failures shall be determined. The division among dangerous
(λDT ) and safe failures (λST ) is usually derived from a detailed analysis of each fail-
ure mode of the subsystem (e.g., FMEA). However, IEC 61508 generally accepts a
50% division for complex components with uncertain failure modes (Part-6, Annex
C). In the case of timing, it is not easy to a priori determine whether an execution
time exceedance event will result in a dangerous failure of the safety function as
its propagation depends in many other system level factors as the coexistence with
other tasks or its impact in shared hardware resources. Accordingly, we apply this





1The proof test interval (PTI) is the maximum period of time between two proof tests that
seek to diagnose undetected dangerous hardware failures, to repair the system when required
and guarantee that the PFD(t) does not exceedingly increase in the course of time.
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The diagnostic coverage for timing events (DCT ) then determines the fraction
of detected timing failures (λDDT ) with respect to all dangerous timing failures:
λDDT = DCT × λDT (6.8)
Given that λDT = λDDT + λDUT , we can replace λDDT in Equation 6.8:
λDUT = λDT −DCT × λDT (6.9)




× λT × (1−DCT ) (6.10)
Subsequently, Equation 6.10 can be integrated in Equation 6.5 or in Equa-





× (λDUHW × TPTI + λT × (1−DCT )) (6.11)
PFH = λDUHW + (
1
2
× λT × (1−DCT )) (6.12)
The resulting probability is evaluated with respect to target system probability
of failure metrics (defined in Table 6.1) together with other (hardware) fault modes
to determine whether the system design is adequate for the integrity level assigned
to the safety function.
6.3 MBPTA Adherence to IEC 61508
MBPTA provides by-construction evidence to quantify the probability of execution-
time exceedance events by the determination of a pWCET distribution as that
introduced in Figure 2.7 of page 25 (Chapter 2). MBPTA’s viability for industrial
use in safety-related systems relates to the cost of the required hardware or soft-
ware changes, and how the approach can be fitted in the overall IEC 61508 safety
life-cycle.
6.3.1 MBPTA Application and Feasibility
As introduced in the Background section, MBPTA requires the system to exhibit
a probabilistic – hence probabilistically analyzable – timing behavior. To this end,
previous work presents hardware (HAC+17; COBHAM) and software (KQA+16;
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KCQ+13) solutions to implement the required time upper-bounding and time-
randomization as described in Section 2.1.3. This section evaluates the safety
implications of those approaches.
Hardware Modifications
Every hardware implementation that targets safety-related applications must ad-
here to the design guidelines determined by the certification requirements for the
application domain. A solution to implement time upper-bounding and time ran-
domization as required by MBPTA is introducing the required modifications at the
hardware level. The required modifications only affect to the non-functional part
of the system, in particular to the timing behavior. MBPTA hardware modifica-
tions neither change the regular hardware design flow nor the target manufacturing
technology. Hence, MBPTA-compliant hardware does not involve major additional
certification efforts with respect to the conventional design process.
Time-upper bounding modifications are implemented in such a way that they
can be enabled during analysis and disabled during operation to avoid decreasing
average performance. For instance, the hardware feature that allows enforcing the
highest latency in FPU can be enabled or disabled by setting the corresponding
configuration register accordingly. Similarly, the hardware is modified to cause
arbitration to occur across all potential contenders regardless of whether they have
pending requests or not, and, after selection of a contender, the bus is kept busy
for the highest request latency. Selectively disabling this feature allows operation-
time to experience fewer stalls than considered for WCET analysis. Accordingly,
time upper-bounding has no influence in the executable at runtime.
On the contrary, time randomization must be kept enabled during both, analy-
sis and operation phases, since this is the only way to guarantee that observations
during analysis match (probabilistically) those during operation. Bus protocols
like AMBA (AMBA) (one of the most, if not the most, used), do not define any
particular arbitration policy. This situation allows adding random arbitration
policies with no impact on the protocol specification. The same happens for cache
placement and replacement. While the latter is already supported in many pro-
cessors, adding the former requires combining the address being accessed with a
random number, changed across runs, to map the address to a random cache set.
This change causes the timing behavior of cache conflict scenarios that are proba-
bilistically relevant to be close to average behavior which, in turn, is very close to
the typical behavior on conventional hardware designs. However, all components
building upon time randomization, if implemented in hardware, require a Source
of Randomization (SoR) also in hardware. This has been achieved by implement-
ing a suitable PRNG that provides a sequence of random numbers presented in
Chapter 7. The very fact that a failure in this SoR impacts the timing behav-
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ior of safety functions at runtime, causes it to become a safety-related item, with
corresponding safety-related requirements.
Software Modifications
COTS processor’s hardware cannot be customized as proposed in the previous
approach. As an alternative, time upper-bounding can be applied offline by mon-
itoring relevant events and padding execution time observations accordingly. For
instance, for the FPU, the highest latency of floating point operations is multi-
plied by the number of executed floating point operations, obtained by means of
PMCs. Similarly, bus jitter can be deterministically upper-bounded by monitoring
the number of bus access requests with PMCs and applying a contention model
that assumes worst-case overlap among them (DFK+17).
For randomizing the timing behavior of COTS architectures, software solu-
tions have been developed to apply modifications either dynamically (KCQ+13)
or statically (KQAF+14; KVM+16). The former, DSR, introduces randomiza-
tion at runtime, by placing memory objects dynamically in random locations in
memory every time the program is invoked and/or when objects are created. This
requires the compiler to introduce some runtime randomization code (indirections
through pointers) in the program executable. The latter, SSR, achieves the re-
quired randomization effect in an entirely static manner by generating several
binaries, with different (randomly generated) memory layouts, for the same pro-
gram. SSR can be implemented at linker level (KQAF+14) or alternatively, at
source code level (KVM+16). In the former, the linker randomly places functions
in the binary while the latter directly randomizes the location of memory objects
by using their definition in the source-code of the program.
DSR and linker level SSR require modifications at compiler-linker level. While
they only alter the regular software development process by introducing an addi-
tional compiler pass, considering a compiler that lacks of in-service evidence in the
safety-critical industry and that modifies the binary at runtime, challenges certifi-
cation. On the contrary, the static source code level randomization, referred to as
Toolchain-Agnostic Software Randomization (TASA), requires no changes in the
system standard stack toolchain and is hence, the most promising solution from a
certification viewpoint, as it can be used with regular (qualified) compiler-linker
tools. However, the generation of multiple binaries is not contemplated in the
safety software lifecycle. For the application of MBPTA with TASA the binaries
shall be used as follows (Figure 6.2):
• N automated executions with statistically significant number of N different
TASA-generated binaries are used in the timing analysis phase.
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– The execution time observations of the N different TASA-generated
binaries are fed to MBPTA to derive a pWCET estimate. The resulting
pWCET curve is probabilistically representative of the timing events of
each particular (TASA-generated) binary.
• Then, only one of those binaries, with a given memory layout, is deployed in
the final system. This binary, at operation time, meets the MBPTA require-
ment of representativeness, as the corresponding extreme timing behavior fits
the envelope computed by MBPTA, since the probability of exceedance de-
termined by the use of TASA is equivalent to the execution-time exceedance
probability of all systems with the same randomly-generated binary.
• Functional tests are performed only on the deployment-time binary, as in the
regular development process, except for the verification of timing properties
where MBPTA is used with N binaries as depicted in Figure 6.2. There is
no need to functionally test the other binaries as (i) they are not destined to


















Figure 6.2: Implications of SSR on a typical development cycle.
6.3.2 MBPTA in IEC 61508 Safety Life-cycle
Coming back to IEC 61508 development process and with emphasis in timing-
related requirements, next we describe how the MBPTA approach can fit within
the software development process defined in the standard (Figure 6.3). MBPTA
activities relate to IEC 61508 software development cycle as follows:
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Figure 6.3: Sketch of how MBPTA fits in IEC 61508 software development process.
1. IEC 61508 requires that system designers specify the time budgeting of criti-
cal software in the software requirement specification phase. MBPTA results
shall be compared with respect to these bounds in the verification phase to
assess the suitability of the designed system with respect to the requirements.
2. Software design requires adopting safety measures for the avoidance of sys-
tematic faults, including cyclic scheduling regimes that rely on worst-case
execution time analysis techniques for the dimensioning of the time slots.
3. During unit and integration testing, the standard requires evidence that the
software is allocated enough time to complete its functionality. This implic-
itly requires controlling all low-level hardware/software sources of execution-
time jitter during the analysis process to assure that the obtained WCET
estimation does upper-bound, as tightly as possible, the real WCET.
4. Covering this requirement by means of MBPTA, results in a pWCET dis-
tribution rather than in a single WCET value. Accordingly, the designer
needs to derive the appropriate cut-off exceedance probability (or execution
time exceedance rate per hour). In this chapter we propose deriving this
bound from the system tolerable failure rate, evaluating it together with the
diagnostic coverage for timing errors and the SIL of the safety function.
5. Finally, with the cut-off probability, the corresponding WCET is extracted
from the pWCET curve.
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6.3.3 Cut-off Probability Determination
The cut-off probability of execution time exceedance can be determined from Equa-
tions 6.11 and 6.12 of Section 6.2 based on the reference PFD or PFH values
defined in Table 6.1. The hardware and dynamic software solutions, attain ran-
domization at program run granularity. Accordingly, the pWCET distribution
provides the execution time exceedance probability per execution of the task. In
order to relate the cut-off probability of exceedance with the timing failure rate
(λT ) per hour or Failures In Time (FIT), the pWCET exceedance probability
(EPpWCET ) shall be multiplied by the task’s execution frequency per hour (FUoA):
λT = EPpWCET × FUoA (6.13)
For instance, to obtain a timing failure rate of 1 FIT (10−9), if the safety
function is executed 103 times per hour, the system designer should choose the
WCET estimate computed for the 10−12 exceedance threshold. In this way, it is
probabilistically guaranteed that the accumulated execution time exceedance rate
of all instances of the program executed per hour is below 10−9.
As opposed to the hardware and dynamic software solutions, static software
randomization (i.e., TASA) introduces randomization per binary. As a result,
the probability of exceedance determined by the use of TASA is equivalent to
the execution-time exceedance probability of all systems with the same randomly-
generated binary. For redundant systems, using a different TASA-generated binary
in each of the redundant nodes would therefore reduce the probability of experienc-
ing execution time exceedance events in all nodes. However, this approach implies
each unit having a different binary, which may not be acceptable if each individual
unit is not fully tested. If in contrast all redundant nodes are deployed with the
same binary, if the binary exceeds the pWCET, it may do so in all units.
Diagnostic Coverage
As exposed in Equation 6.8, diagnostic coverage for WCET estimate overruns
needs to be considered in the quantification of the probability of failure since
existing safety mechanisms can factor in the execution-time exceedance’s impact
and prevent its escalation into a system failure (i.e., they can be categorized as
dangerous detected failures, λDDT ). The standard suggests the usage of watchdog
timers to detect the consequences that a fault in a hardware component may have
in the program sequence (e.g. the program not executing, too slow execution or
too fast program execution). In this scenario, standards categorize the diagnostic
coverage achievable by watchdogs (for errors in the control logic of processing units)
as low (60%) or medium (90%). Accordingly, watchdogs can also detect (possibly
with a high (>99%) diagnostic coverage) timing overruns in the operational system.
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On the occurrence of such an event, the safety mechanisms detect the error and a
proper action is taken, efficiently reducing the residual risk.
The nature of the safety function, either fail safe or fail operational, conditions
the action to take after the detection of the exceedance event and has a different
impact in the residual risk:
• In the case of fail safe systems, the system is moved to a safe state each time
a diagnostic mechanism detects an execution time exceedance event, and
hence, system’s safety is preserved at the expense of making some function-
ality (or the entire system) unavailable. As a result, the degree of diagnos-
tic coverage that the safety mechanisms provide for timing failures (DCT )
shall be considered when determining the cut-off probability as described in
Equations 6.11 and 6.12. Whereas in such circumstances an execution-time
exceedance may not compromise system safety, the MBPTA approach can
improve the design by assessing the availability of the system from a timing
perspective.
• In the case of fail operational systems, i.e. systems that cannot reach a safe
state because they need to be operational to maintain safety, safe operation
in the advent of a deadline violation can be preserved by, for instance, using
redundant architectures so that the failure of one unit does not stop (safe)
operation of the entire system. Whenever this is not possible, having a
high diagnostic coverage against timing exceedance events is not sufficient to
preserve safety and a sufficiently low cut-off probability needs to be chosen to
ensure that the contribution of timing faults to the residual risk is sufficiently
low.
6.4 Domain-specific Standards
Standards derived from IEC 61508, like automotive ISO 26262 or railway EN
5012x, follow the same philosophy for the management of systematic and ran-
dom faults although they may include additional refinements fit for the particular
domain. For instance, the fault models and calculation of the corresponding met-
rics used in the automotive ISO 26262 standard are more detailed than in the
IEC 61508 meta-standard. ISO 26262 addresses non safely-ignorable faults by
defining the single-point fault metric (SPFM) that determines the item’s robust-
ness to single-point and residual faults by either design or safety mechanisms,
and the latent fault metric (LFM) that determines the item’s robustness to latent
faults. These metrics are evaluated against pass/fail reference intervals defined
in the standard for each target integrity level. The railway domain instead de-
fines the Tolerable Hazard Rate (THR) per hour and function, analogously to
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PFH in IEC 61508. Regarding software faults, however, the approach is identical
in the three reference standards: software faults are considered systematic and
qualitative measures are recommended for fault avoidance, such us the support of
WCET analysis to sustain temporal independence among software elements. As
IEC 61508, ISO 26262 and EN 5012x determine the requirements for avoiding or
controlling systematic faults based on expert judgment from practical experience
and assume that they can be neglected compared with random hardware failures
if necessary software engineering measures are taken.
Overall, all IEC 61508 based standards retain the notion of random hardware
faults and propose a qualitative approach for software faults that may not scale
well against increasingly complex systems. Arguably, therefore, all the application
domains covered by the IEC 61508 umbrella might equally benefit from incorpo-
rating an execution-time exceedance quantification approach following the solution
presented in this chapter.
6.5 Experimental Support Evidence
To sustain MBPTA application in safety-critical systems and the quantification of
execution time exceedance rates, this section discusses an exemplary application
of MBPTA in the railway case study defined in Chapter 3. We do not aim to
present a full WCET analysis method for the target platforms, the intent of this
section is just to provide an empirical evaluation of the application of MBPTA in
an industrial safety-related case study and show that the execution-time jitter of
hard-to-predict resources like the cache can be handled with MBPTA.
6.5.1 Collecting Analysis-time Observations
The application we consider is a subset of the railway case study introduced in
Section 3.2.1, referred to as UoA. As a matter of illustration, from the 10 execution
paths, we only show the results for the path with longest average execution times
(path 7) and the one with shortest average execution times (path 9). For the sake of
comparison, we collect execution time observations for the UoA when executed in
the plain LEON3-MC and P4080 platforms and their MBPTA-compliant versions:
LEON3-MC-HR, LEON3-MC-DSR and P4080-DSR.
• Hardware Modifications: Figure 6.4 reports the execution-time variabil-
ity observed for the railway case study in the LEON3-MC platform. The left
side exposes the execution time samples observed across one thousand runs
of the same execution path in the MBPTA-compliant platform (LEON3-MC-
HR). In the left side, Figure 6.4 presents the observations resulting from the
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same experiments in the baseline LEON3-MC platform, where the sources
of jitter are not controlled.
(a) Path #7 - LEON3-MC-HR (b) Path #7 LEON3-MC
(c) Path #9 - LEON3-MC-HR (d) Path #9 LEON3-MC
Figure 6.4: Observed execution time variability in the railway application.
Figures 6.4a - 6.4c report that the execution time variation in the time ran-
domized architecture range up to 7% over the average while the non time
randomized variation is below 1%. The increased variability in the MBPTA-
compliant platform (in the range of 600-1000 cycles for all paths) represents
the conditions that, at operation, may result in varying execution times.
In particular, the effects of L1 and L2 cache conflicts, FPU operations la-
tency and bus arbiter are exhibited in the analysis-time measurements. This
variability is typically hardly disclosed in the measurements obtained with-
out any control on hard-to-reach low-level hardware/software interactions.
This is reflected in the results of the baseline platform where the observed
variability is small (less than 60 processor cycles in all analyzed paths).
• Software Randomization: In Figure 6.5 we compare software random-
ized results in the LEON3-MC-DSR and P4080-DSR with respect to their
counterparts without randomization. In particular, the impact of memory
placement and cache layout is made probabilistically analyzable by means of
dynamic software randomization.
We observe that execution time variation, which may also incorporate the
effects of other sources of execution-time jitter, is around 3 times bigger
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(a) Different memory layouts (LEON3-MC-
DSR)
(b) Same memory layout (LEON3-MC)
(c) Different memory layouts (P4080-DSR) (d) Same memory layout (P4080)
Figure 6.5: Execution time variability caused by program layout (Path #7).
in the software randomized versions of both platforms when compared to
the results in the baseline architectures. This kind of variability resulting
from program layout is typically hardly controlled or taken into account
by traditional, static and measurement-based, WCET analysis procedures.
Even more critical is the fact that classic measurement-based techniques do
not allow building arguments on whether and to what extent the effect
of jittery resources has been captured at analysis time.
Results in both, hardware and software, solutions show how MBPTA-compliant
platforms deal with execution-time jitter to ensure that MBPTA outcomes are
representative and hence, sound.
6.5.2 Application of MBPTA
We then applied MBPTA to the execution times observed in the three platform
setups. Figure 6.6 shows the resulting pWCET for paths 7 and 9 and Table 6.2
compares the pWCET bounds at relevant exceedance thresholds against the HWM
for the ten analyzed paths.
The observations collected in the MBPTA-friendly platforms successfully passed
the statistical i.i.d. tests, which allowed using them as input to the subsequent
probabilistic analysis process. To the latter end, we applied the EVT to the
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(a) LEON3-MC-HR: Path 7 (b) LEON3-MC-HR: Path 9
(c) LEON3-MC-DSR: Path 7 (d) LEON3-MC-DSR: Path 9
(e) P4080-DSR: Path 7 (f) P4080-DSR: Path 9
Figure 6.6: The pWCET distributions computed by MBPTA for the railway ap-
plication subset path 7 (longest) and 9 (shortest).
observed execution times. In all cases, 1,000 measurements were sufficient for
MBPTA to converge: adding additional observations for each application would
not change the resulting pWCET distributions (solid black lines) shown in Fig-
ure 6.6. The red dotted line plots the analysis-time execution time observations,
i.e., the ATD in the form of Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function
(CCDF).
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Table 6.2: pWCET bounds at relevant exceedance thresholds (in processor cycles).










0 14268 14640 2.60 15366 7.70 16110 12.91 16836 18.00
1 14386 14632 1.71 15202 5.67 15790 9.76 16360 13.72
2 13725 13848 0.90 14396 4.89 14962 9.01 15510 13.01
3 13397 13719 2.40 14366 7.23 15030 12.19 15678 17.03
4 13813 14012 1.44 14506 5.02 15019 8.73 15531 12.44
5 13616 13941 2.39 14548 6.84 15173 11.44 15780 15.89
6 14412 14720 2.14 15415 6.96 16092 11.66 16787 16.48
7 15850 16144 1.85 16849 6.30 17553 10.74 18258 15.19
8 10041 10239 1.97 10803 7.59 11355 13.09 11907 18.58











0 16701 16744 0.26 16804 0.62 16885 1.10 16946 1.47
1 16081 16134 0.33 16232 0.94 16310 1.42 16407 2.03
2 15496 15592 0.62 15743 1.59 15874 2.44 16025 3.41
3 15290 15354 0.42 15466 1.15 15577 1.88 15670 2.49
4 15683 15815 0.84 15986 1.93 16138 2.90 16290 3.87
5 15677 15726 0.31 15802 0.80 15859 1.16 15916 1.52
6 16314 16381 0.41 16480 1.02 16579 1.62 16678 2.23
7 17803 17960 0.88 18154 1.97 18348 3.06 18520 4.03
8 12221 12294 0.60 12368 1.20 12457 1.93 12546 2.66









0 15729 16242 3.26 17359 10.36 18456 17.34 19552 24.31
1 12527 12911 3.07 13850 10.56 14790 18.06 15730 25.57
2 12548 13004 3.63 14068 12.11 15132 20.59 16196 29.07
3 12356 12781 3.44 13673 10.66 14565 17.88 15457 25.10
4 12328 12886 4.53 14029 13.80 15173 23.08 16316 32.35
5 12382 12650 2.16 13471 8.80 14275 15.29 15079 21.78
6 12237 12815 4.72 13949 13.99 15067 23.13 16202 32.40
7 13322 13716 2.96 14639 9.89 15579 16.94 16501 23.86
8 10290 10603 3.04 11326 10.07 12048 17.08 12771 24.11
9 9203 9499 3.22 10061 9.32 10623 15.43 11184 21.53
Our experiments show that, limited to the processor architectures considered
in this chapter, a safety margin at 20% would be conservatively pessimistic and
therefore sound in some cases (e.g., LEON3-MC-DSR). Yet, for other processor
architectures like P4080-DSR, that margin would be optimistic for low exceedance
thresholds (10−9, 10−12) and hence, unsound. The slope of the pWCET distri-
bution, and hence the margin above the highest observed value, depends on the
particular characteristics of the program under analysis and how it uses the un-
derlying processor hardware. That would be the exceedance probability if all
upper-bounded sources of jitter always caused their highest latency. In general,
this is not the case but how often this would happen cannot be told beforehand
since this depends on application’s input data during operation. MBPTA provides
130
6.5 Experimental Support Evidence
a method to strictly upper-bound the residual risk of execution-time exceedance.
Cut-off probability determination
The particular cut-off probability can be determined based on system safety met-
rics as proposed in Section 6.2. Considering a single channel of the emergency
module of the railway case study we make the following assumptions:
• PFH share: The safety function is executed in high demand mode by a
safety loop that includes a set of sensors, programmable electronic logic
(either LEON3-MC-HR, LEON3-MC-DSR or P4080-DSR) and an actuator
(emergency break). The PE logic (including timing failures) takes a 25%
share of the overall failure rate (sensors and the actuator are assumed to
take 30% and 45% respectively).
• λDUHW : A failure analysis determines that the dangerous undetected hard-
ware failure rate of the logic is of 18 FIT (for simplicity, same value is assumed
for all three platforms).
• TPTI : The proof time interval is of one year (8760h).
• DCT : The system includes a watchdog to detect timing overruns with a high
(99%) diagnostic coverage.
• FUoA: The task under analysis is executed 103 times per hour.
We first obtain the target probability of failure for the complete safety loop
from IEC 61508 (Table 6.1) and we compute the 25% that applies to the logic and
timing failures:
PFH = 0.25× 10−7
With all these data, we derive the target timing failure rate, λT , from Equa-
tion 6.12:
λT =
2× (PFH(0.25× 10−7)− λDUHW (18× 10−9))
1−DCT (0.99)
= 1.4× 10−6
According to Equation 6.13, as the task is executed 103 times per hour, the
failure rate of 1.4×10−6 can be achieved by the WCET estimate that corresponds
to 10−9 exceedance probability per execution (EPpWCET ).
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6.6 Summary
Postulating that execution-time violations can all be prevented by the procedures
defined in standards for systematic faults is becoming increasingly prohibitive with
the use of increasingly complex hardware and software, yielding unsustainable
ratios of effort versus quality of outcome. The latter question leverages the need
to step up the guidelines of current safety standards to new-generation processors.
In this chapter, we have presented a quantitative approach for determining
the likelihood of execution-time exceedance events – similarly to what is done for
random hardware faults – to assess the corresponding residual risk of exceeding
a deadline. The proposed approach relies on MBPTA, which allows deriving the
WCET estimation from a probabilistic WCET distribution. We determine the
cut-off probability based on the risk reduction required for the integrity level asso-
ciated with the safety function. This chapter presents the approach in the context
of the IEC 61508 software development process with the intent of facilitating the
acceptance of execution-time exceedance rate quantification in the standard, fol-
lowing the procedure established for random hardware faults. In addition, we
analyze the safety implications of both hardware and software modifications to
achieve MBPTA-compliance in the platform. In contrast with current practice
where a safety margin “assesses” (qualitatively) that the estimated WCET cannot
be exceeded, our solution provides scientific reasoning with quantitative evidence





As discussed in previous chapters, MBPTA rests on the premise that the timing
behavior of certain processor resources is time randomized. In particular, random-
ization helps achieving representativeness for those resources whose jitter is big
enough to prevent them to work on their worst latency. For hardware-injected
randomization, the approach on which we build, this requires a built-in source of
randomization, SoR.
Some platform resources require using random data from the SoR at every few
processor cycles, for example for random replacement in caches or on-chip bus ar-
bitration. This requirement raises pressing needs for high-frequency hardware SoR
and for addressing the challenges entailed in achieving trustworthy randomization.
In this chapter, the requirements on hardware SoR are identified and addressed,
whose satisfaction allows MBPTA to be used with safety-related software pro-
grams. As this SoR is a key component to attain the randomization required by
MBPTA technology, in order to prevent introducing faults by the use of MBPTA
in safety related systems, the design of the SoR shall guarantee its correct behav-
ior. To this end, in this chapter we design an SoR that meets with the following
non-functional requirements:
• Area and Power. Embedded systems are subject to stringent area and
power constraints. A hardware SoR should therefore be implemented with
low complexity, and equally low area and power budgets.
• Randomness. Preventing correlation among randomized events is a pre-
requisite to use with MBPTA (CSH+12). A hardware SoR must therefore
deliver long sequences of high-quality random numbers that do not cause
correlation patterns in the results, thus achieving and preserving indepen-
dence.
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• Safety. To achieve IEC 61508 compliance in mixed-criticality implemen-
tations that use a hardware SoR, its design must conform with the safety-
related principles that apply to the highest SIL in the system.
To this end, in this chapter we evaluate the benefits that a hardware SoR
provides as PRNG and we make four key contributions to foster the applicability
of MBPTA for IEC 61508 compliant mixed-criticality systems that employ modern
multicore processors:
1. We start by devising two high quality PRNG designs, the Multiply-With-
Carry (MWC) and Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR), and propose a
low-area low-power MBPTA specific PRNG implementation taking one of
them as a baseline in Section 7.1.
2. Section 7.2 then analyzes the number of SoRs required for a reference multi-
core architecture in which the timing behavior of the caches, TLBs, on-chip
bus and memory controller is randomized.
3. We study how a hardware PRNG can be made compliant with IEC 61508
SIL 3 design principles in Section 7.3.
4. Section 7.4 provides an evaluation of the proposed PRNG, showing that it
achieves good randomization properties.
Finally, Section 7.5 presents a summary of the chapter.
7.1 High-Quality Low-Cost PRNG
Implementing a trustworthy random source is complex. The stringent require-
ments on low-power and area pose hard constraints on hardware solutions. More-
over, the need for reproducibility put forward by verification and validation pro-
cesses discourages the use of true random sources. IEC 61508 remarks the impor-
tance of repeatability in all testing phases and so does to evaluate the adequacy
of support tools (IEC 61508-3 §7.4.4). This makes PRNGs an attractive solution
as an SoR. PRNGs have been studied in several fields, most notably in cryptog-
raphy, to approximate the properties of sequences of random numbers (RSN+10).
Whereas the generated numbers are not truly random – as they can be completely
determined from the initial set of values (a.k.a. seeds) used to initialize the PRNG
– they still show good randomness properties.
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7.1.1 Sought Properties
The main properties that a PRNG must exhibit to be fit for use with MBPTA are
period and randomness. In addition, even if it is not a mandatory property for a
hardware SoR, PRNGs provide reproducibility by construction. As stated above,
reproducibility is a very valuable feature for verification and validation purposes.
Period
A PRNG provides a sequence of numbers whose period must be long enough to
ensure that either repetition does not occur during system lifetime or, if it occurs,
it does after a long enough time for any potential correlation between the outcomes
of the system at different time instants to be probabilistically irrelevant.
Randomness
Randomness should not be understood as an all-or-nothing metric since it has vari-
able degrees. The degree of randomness for a number of bit sequences generated
with a PRNG is proven statistically by checking the lack of meaningful patterns,
repetitions, imbalance between different values, etc. In this way, a suitable PRNG
supports the claim that the sequences of random bits produced exhibit the same
properties as those sequences generated by a truly random number generator. The
quality of the randomness attained by the generator can be measured with stan-
dard tests such as the one used by the US National Institute of Standards and
Technology (RSN+10). Those tests are specifically designed to assess the sensi-
tivity to certain weaknesses of the PRNG as those described before.
Reproducibility
A PRNG produces a sequence of pseudo-random numbers starting from one or
several seeds. This sequence has a finite and fixed size (i.e. period) before it
repeats. The particular seeds used for its initialization determine the particular
sequence produced. Every time a new pseudo-random number is produced, the
seed is updated automatically so as to determine the next pseudo-random number.
This process repeats until the full sequence is produced and the new seed is the
one set initially. Hence, PRNGs provide reproducibility as a function of the initial
seed. Yet, randomness is maintained by using a random seed (e.g., generated
by software means). Using different seeds leads to different starting points, and
thus to uncorrelated random sequences. In this way, the starting point in the full
sequence of the PRNG becomes controllably random.
The initialization of the seeds has to be done conveniently. In general, one
can use software-generated random values to initialize a PRNG. A practical way
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to perform that task is to delegate it to system software. System software may
set the seeds on its own at boot time by writing to the addresses where seeds
are mapped or prompt the user to provide values for the seed, which is useful for
the sake of reproducibility. However, once the system is deployed, only system
software must have the privilege to set seeds.
7.1.2 MBPTA Convenient PRNG
Unlike reproducibility, which is obtained by construction, period and randomness
need to be evaluated for any PRNG as they determine the quality of the random
numbers generated with it. To this end, a reference baseline is selected against
which the acceptability of the PRNG can be justified. Based on the randomness
tests and set of PRNGs provided by the US National Institute of Standards and
Technology (RSN+10), the MWC (MZ91) and LFSR (Alf96) solutions explained
below show highest pass rate and hence, best properties.
Multiply-With-Carry (MWC) PRNG
The MWC (MZ91) produces random numbers based on the following set of equa-
tions:
seedz = 36969 · (seedz&65535) + (seedz  16) (7.1)
seedw = 18000 · (seedw&65535) + (seedw  16) (7.2)
RII = (seedz  16) + (seedw&65535) (7.3)
where seedz and seedw are the seeds of the PRNG, & stands for a logical AND
function,  and  stand for logical bit shifts, and RII is the random number
generated. Both seeds are updated to produce a different number every time
(Equation (7.1) and (7.2)).
An efficient implementation of MWC is proposed in the logical design of Fig-
ure 7.1. The proposed design comes from the observation that logical AND, bit
shifts and 16-bit additions required by MWC are simple operations in hardware.
Multiplications, which are much more complex, can be transformed into a set of
few additions given that one of the operands is known and the number of ‘1’s is low.
For instance, 36969 (9069h) has only 6 bits set to one, so we can transform such a
multiplication into an addition of 6 16-bit numbers. Similarly, 18000 (4650h) can
be transformed into an addition of 5 16-bit numbers. Thus, each seed generation
requires 6 or 7 additions in total, which can be arranged in a binary tree of 3 levels
of 2-input adders (Figure 7.1). The resulting RII just selects a subset of the bits
of the two seeds, so it does not introduce any delay.
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Figure 7.1: Proposed implementation of the MWC PRNG.
Linear-Feedback-Shift-Register (LFSR) PRNG
The baseline LSFR implementation produces one bit per iteration (see Figure 7.2
(a)). The LFSR consists of R bits that constitute the seed. The actual value
of R determines the PRNG period and the feedback bits of the shift register.
In the remainder of this chapter the value of R equals 168 as this is the largest
value described in (Alf96), and accordingly, the one with the longest period before
repetition. Note that the produced random bit is the result of carrying out XNOR
of some of those R bits. Every time a random bit b is produced, the most significant
bit of those R bits – R168 in the example – is discarded. The remaining bits
(R167−R1) are shifted left, thus occupying positions R168−R2, and b is stored in
position R1.
We propose changing the LFSR by replicating the XNOR process n times,
which allows generating n pseudo-random bits (b[n]) at every cycle. The number
(n) of bits that can be provided per cycle is limited by the lowest position of the
bits XNORed in the 1-bit version. For instance, as such bit is in position R151 in
the example, then up to 151 bits can be produced per cycle given that the last
bit produced out of those 151 bits would use the bit in position R1 and the next
random bit will use as input one of the bits produced in this cycle. Figure 7.2(b)
illustrates the parallel version of the LFSR when 32 bits are produced. As shown,
XNOR gates operate on the same relative bits and produce 32 random bits (b[32]);
bits in positions R136 − R1 are shifted 32 positions left, and bits b[32] are used to
update positions R32 −R1.
The hardware implementation of a LFSR producing 32 bits includes a register
of R bits (168 in the example). The longer the register, the longer the period.
Also 32 4-bit XNOR gates operating in parallel are needed. The total delay is just
the addition of the XNOR gate delay and the register update.
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a) LFSR producing 1 random bit
b) LFSR producing 32 random bits
Figure 7.2: 168-bit LFSR implementation (producing 1 & 32 bits).
Comparison
As stated above, both MWC and LFSR PRNGs provide similar randomness prop-
erties, passing 187 out of the 188 tests (99.5%) proposed by the authors in (RSN+10).
Despite randomness, low area, time and energy consumption features are decisive
for a PRNG to be embedded in systems subject to stringent area and power con-
straints, even more so for multicore mixed-criticality implementations whose major
benefits are in those non-functional dimensions. In terms of delay and energy over-
head, both PRNGs fit in one processor cycle at 4 GHz, and incur less energy than
an access to cache. When it comes to period, the LFSR solution provides partic-
ularly favorable response, with 2163 cycles vs. 260 for the MWC. In other words,
assuming a processor operating at 1 GHz and the PRNG delivering one random
number per cycle, the random number sequence generated with a LFSR would take
3.7× 1032 years to repeat while the one generated with the MWC would repeat in
36 years (cf. Section 7.4). Accordingly, despite both solutions show appropriate
features for their adoption in MBPTA, the LFSR PRNG is taken as a reference in
next sections.
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7.2 PRNG for Multicore Platforms
As described in previous section, the reference LFSR PRNG generates a 32-bit
number on every invocation. In spite of the quality of the generated numbers, the
rate at which the PRNG can provide the required number of bits is of paramount
importance. Based on the baseline LFSR PRNG, this section presents its inte-
gration in a multicore processor that meets MBPTA requirements and keeps costs
low by sharing PRNGs across platform resources.
7.2.1 Multicore Requirements
The PRNG is integrated in a reference architecture based on the LEON3-MC pre-
viously introduced in Section 3.1.2. The reference architecture has Nc cores, each
of which comprises private first level instruction and data caches (IL1 and DL1).
Both caches are set-associative and use random placement (RP) and random-
replacement (RR) (KAQ+13a) to meet with MBPTA time randomization proper-
ties. Each core has fully-associative data and instruction TLBs using RR. Cores
are connected to a partitioned second level cache unified for data and instruc-
tions (UL2) (PQC+09) via a bus that uses random arbitration (JKA+14). The
UL2 cache also employs RP and RR (KAQ+13b). UL2 cache misses are sent to
main memory through a memory controller that has a request queue per core.
Arbitration across cores for that request queue is random, like for the bus.
Time randomized resources that are accessed frequently, such as the first-level
caches or the on-chip bus require random bits every few cycles. In particular,
the RR policy and the random arbitration require the PRNG to generate several
random bits on every invocation. The frequency at which a resource requires
random bits determines whether they can be generated with a software PRNG or,
alternatively, a hardware PRNG is required. Table 7.1 shows the frequency and
the number of random bits required by the different time randomized resources.
Random Placement (RP) requires random bits once per run of the software
unit for which a pWCET estimate has been derived. The reason behind this is
that the mapping of addresses to sets, which is determined by RP, is fixed during
the execution of a program and changes only across runs. Given that random bits
for RP are needed at such coarse granularity, they can be provided by software
means, e.g., by the OS or any other system software writing the random bits into
a special register in the architecture. The hash function used to implement RP
requires 32 bits. Note that each core will use its own set of random bits for RP in
the UL2 so that the placement used by each core is independent and one core can
change its random bits whenever needed.
Random Replacement (RR), the access to the bus, and the memory controller
instead, all require random bits at much higher frequency. RR requires random bits
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Table 7.1: Random bit requirements in reference multicore and LEON3-MC.
Resource Frequency Worst Timing Level Bits LEON3-MC
of Use Requirements Required Bits
IL1 RP per run SW dependent SW 32 32
DL1 RP per run SW dependent SW 32 32
UL2 RP per run SW dependent SW 32 32
IL1 RR per miss Every cycle HW log2(N
IL1
ways) 2
DL1 RR per miss Every cycle HW log2(N
DL1
ways) 2
UL2 RR per miss Every cycle HW log2(N
UL2
ways/Nc)×Nc 4
ITLB RR per miss Every cycle HW log2(N
ITLB
ways ) 6
DTLB RR per miss Every cycle HW log2(N
DTLB
ways ) 6
Bus per access Every cycle HW log2(N
bus
cont) 2




on every miss in the corresponding cache and Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB)
as, in the event of a miss, a victim in the corresponding set has to be randomly
selected. Thus, the number of bits required in every case equals log2 the number
of ways of the cache and TLB entries. As UL2 is partitioned across cores, each
core needs its own random bits for RR in its own UL2 cache ways. For instance,
assuming the LEON3-MC architecture with an 8-way UL2 cache and Nc = 4 so
that each core has 2 ways in UL2, 1 random bit would be required per core to choose
among its 2 ways, thus 4 random bits in total for the UL2 cache. Finally, the bus
and the memory controller require log2(Nc) bits for every round of arbitration, so
2 bits each. Consecutive accesses can occur in caches, bus and memory controller,
so up to 72 random bits may be required at every cycle in the worst case in the
multicore. The count of 72 bits includes 17 bits per core, 2 for bus arbitration and
2 for memory arbitration (cf. last column of Table 7.1).
7.2.2 Sharing PRNG Modules
In principle, a single 32-bit number generated by the PRNG can be shared among
several resources. For instance, in the LEON3-MC that Nc = 4 and all DL1 and
IL1 have 4 ways, TLBs have 64 entries and the UL2 has 8 ways; the number of
bits required are 2 in the case of DL1 and IL1, 6 for DTLB and ITLB, and 4 for
the UL2 (1 per core) (cf. last column of Table 7.1). This totals 17 bits per core.
Hence, in theory, a 32-bit random number generated by a PRNG can be shared
among the different resources of one core, reducing the need for PRNG devices.
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However, while the PRNG has been proven random by testing the produced bit
sequences conveniently (cf. Section 7.1), it must be demonstrated that sharing a
PRNG does not break randomness by creating some type of undesired correlation.
For instance, first level caches require random bits much more frequently than the
UL2. This may affect the random bits UL2 is given every time, which could create
some type of correlation. In order to avoid those correlations by construction we
adhere to the following two design principles:
Principle 1. Each core has its own PRNG, which is shared across all its
cache memories (DL1, IL1, DTLB, ITLB, UL2 partition), see Figure 7.3a. Each
component uses a fixed subset of the bits as depicted in Figure 7.3b (e.g., DL1
bits 0-1, IL1 bits 2-3, DTLB bits 4-9, ITLB bits 10-15, UL2 partition bit 16).
In order to avoid any correlation between the events in the different components,
a new random number is produced every cycle. Thus, the bitstream obtained
by each component is completely independent from all other components and its
randomness can be tested in isolation (RSN+10). For instance, IL1 uses the bits
in positions 2, 3, 34, 35, 66, 67, etc., which are also random as shown later in the
evaluation section. As an alternative, one could buffer some random bits (e.g.,
64) and let caches consume them so that whenever there are less than 34 (enough
to provide 17 bits in current cycle and 17 in next cycle), a new 32-bit random
number is produced. This saves power by producing fewer random numbers, but
would make it very hard to test the bitstream received by each cache as it cannot
be determined a priori.
Principle 2. Randomly arbitrated shared components (e.g., the bus and the
memory controller) need a PRNG producing random bits every cycle. Producing
the random numbers on-demand when a task requests access to a shared resource
is not convenient because it makes the bitstream observed by a task on that com-
ponent depend on other activities of tasks in the other cores, which are unknown at
analysis time. Those components can use idle bits from one of the cores (e.g., bits
17-18 and 19-20 from core 1 for the bus and the memory controller respectively)as
illustrated in Figure 7.3b. The use of a separate set of bits and producing random
numbers every cycle prevents correlations as for non-shared components.
Following these two design principles, in the reference processor architecture
four PRNG modules – one per core – are employed as depicted in Figure 7.3.
7.3 SIL 3 Compliant PRNG
PRNG’s malfunction invalidates the pWCET estimates derived for safety-related
software. In particular, if the PRNG fails to deliver a new random number on each
processor cycle it compromises the correctness of time randomized resources and
hence, the soundness of the pWCET estimates. As a consequence, when MBPTA is
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(a) PRNG distribution across cores
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(b) Random number bits distribution
Figure 7.3: PRNG integration in the LEON3-MC architecture.
used for instance as a baseline to dimension a static cyclic scheduler in accordance
to IEC 61508-3 Annex F.5, the resulting software executable may contain design
faults derived from PRNG’s malfunction and can result in system level failures
(e.g., deadline overrun). To increase the level of reliance of MBPTA, this section
presents a certification cognizant PRNG design to achieve IEC 61508 compliance.
This is important as MBPTA, and hence the proposed PRNG design, has limited
evidence of its successful use in safety critical environments due to its novelty.
In addition, IEC 61508-3 requirements for support tools require the identification
and mitigation of potential failures in tools that may affect the executable software
(IEC 61508-3 §7.4.4.5).
The PRNG is part of the timing analysis tool and has a direct impact on the
runtime timing behavior of processor resources such as caches that depend on the
outcomes of the PRNG for the placement and replacement policies. In this section
we apply IEC 61508 SIL 3 level safety related design principles to it. SIL 3 is
the highest integrity level that can be claimed for single-chip implementations,
as higher levels (i.e, SIL 4) require off-line redundancy according to IEC 61508-2
Annex E.
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7.3.1 Safety Requirements
A failure in the PRNG is considered dangerous if it impairs timing correctness.
For instance, a wrong number sequence can starve one or some cores (e.g., by never
granting memory access to a core). To avoid this kind of situations, we define the
following safety requirements (REQ SR) for designing the PRNG:
REQ SR 1 (Safety Function). The PRNG shall provide a new random number
on each processor cycle.
REQ SR 2 (SIL). The PRNG is developed according to SIL 3 design princi-
ples.
REQ SR 3 (HFT). The HFT of the PRNG is 0, i.e., a single fault leads to the
loss of the safety function.
REQ SR 4 (DC). The PRNG implements safety measures with a Diagnostic
Coverage of DC ≥ 90%.
REQ SR 5 (Error reaction). Detected internal errors trigger a system reset
and lead to the safe state.
7.3.2 Safety Techniques
Safety requirements 1 to 5 are fulfilled by a set of safety measures and techniques
that (i) reduces the probability of systematic faults and (ii) controls faults during
operation of the PRNG (Table 7.2).
Systematic (STM) faults are mitigated by using a compliant FSM, thus re-
ducing the probability of introducing systematic faults throughout the PRNG
development process (STM ST 1 in Table 7.2). The development of the PRNG in
a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) includes the techniques and measures
listed in IEC 61508-2 Table F.2 to avoid introducing faults during ASIC design
and development.
The control of random (RND) faults instead, is done during operation by the
architecture of Figure 7.4. This architecture includes runtime safety diagnostic
mechanisms (RND ST 2 and RND ST 3) independent from the particular PRNG
implementation. The first runtime diagnosis technique, Monitored Redundancy
(RND ST 2 in Table 7.2), is achieved by deploying two replicated PRNGs oper-
ating in lockstep and by comparing their outputs with a two-out-of-two (2oo2)
voting element as depicted in Figure 7.4. This means that both PRNGs must op-
erate in coordination all the time. Any fault causing a discrepancy in their outputs
will be detected and reported as an error by the voter. In systems that already
include off-chip redundancy to conduct their safety related functionality, measure
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Table 7.2: Safety measures and techniques in the PRNG.
ID Technique IEC 61508 DC Description
STM ST 1 Compliant FSM to Table F.2 n/a Techniques and measures on
reduce the probability (part 2) the FPGA development phase:
of systematic faults 1) Design description
2) Synthesis
3) Test
4) Placement, routing and
layout generation
RND ST 2 Monitored redundancy §A.2.5 High 2 PRNGs with 2oo2
(part 7) voter comparison
RND ST 3 Temporal and logical §A.9.4 High Watchdog timer for behavior
monitoring (part 7) and time monitoring
CC ST 4 Physical separation §E.1 f) n/a Avoid short circuits
(part 2) and crosstalk
CC ST 5 Sufficient design indepen- §7.4.3.4 n/a Diversity between
dence between elements (part 2) the two channels
RND ST 2 can also be implemented off-chip, with each of the independent chan-
nels integrating a single PRNG and comparing the sequences of random variables
with channel crosscheck.
Figure 7.4: Safety architecture for the PRNG modules.
Moreover, to detect anomalies in the computation of random numbers, a watch-
dog timer (WDG) is incorporated (RND ST 3 in Table 7.2). The WDG is con-
figured with a time deadline that shall never be reached. When the two PRNG
are fed with a new seed (tPRNG0) the WDG timer starts a countdown and is re-
triggered at the time at which the result is obtained (tPRNG) provided that the
computed number is different to that obtained in the previous cycle. Whenever
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the WDG reaches its deadline, an error is reported. This guarantees that a new
random number is updated at every cycle, detecting unexpected delays in their
generation or voting errors. Given that both PRNGs need to coordinate in com-
puting the same random number sequence, they need to be initialized with the
same seed at the same time so that seed0 equals seed
′
0 in Figure 7.4.
In order to prevent two identical faults from affecting both PRNGs simultane-
ously, design measures to reduce the probability of common-cause (CC) failures
shall also be contemplated. Common-cause failures can originate from external
interference, systematic design failures, lack of spatial separation, etc. Measures
to reduce their probability include maximizing separation and independence be-
tween both PRNG to avoid short circuit and cross talk between both channels
(CC ST 4) and applying diversity by using, for example, different types of logic
and/or gates in each PRNG, or by designing different bit cells to implement seed
registers (CC ST 5).
7.3.3 System Reaction to Errors
Table 7.3 lists a set of possible errors and the defined system reactions in the safety
architecture of Figure 7.4. As explained above, any fault resulting in dissimilar
outputs of both PRNGs (SR1 and SR2 in Table 7.3) is reported by the 2oo2 voting
element. However, if both PRNGs do not update their value in the same cycle (SR3
in Table 7.3) (for example owing to simultaneous failure in both seed registers)
the voter may not notice it, leaving the diagnosis responsibility to the watchdog.
The same happens whenever a delay occurs in both PRNGs or in the voter, thus
causing the absence of the random number when required (SR4 in Table 7.3).
Different system reactions are possible. For this design, a system reset is trig-
gered in all the defined situations as specified in requirement REQ SR 5. During
reset and system initialization, the system must remain in the safe state as de-
scribed in IEC 61508. Then, health check for the PRNG is carried out at start-up
and the system only starts normal operation if the check-up step is successfully
passed.
Table 7.3: System reaction to errors.
ID Error System Reaction
SR1 Incorrect value in one PRNG Detected by 2oo2 voter. Trigger a reset.
SR2 Missing value in one PRNG Detected by 2oo2 voter. Trigger a reset.
SR3 Number repetition in the result Detected by WDG timer. Trigger a reset
SR4 Missing value in the result Detected by WDG timer. Trigger a reset
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7.4 Evaluation
This section evaluates the PRNG properties required for MBPTA compliance and
described in Section 7.1.1. We assess the properties of the PRNG based on its
integration in the LEON3-MC quad-core prototype.
7.4.1 LFSR’s Sought Properties
The properties of the LFSR PRNG are evaluated through specific tests that sta-
tistically prove that bit sequences produced by the PRNG are truly random and
have sufficient period (RSN+10). Those tests look for a wide variety of repe-
titions, patterns, imbalance in the values, among other properties. In addition,
other non-functional aspects like area, energy and delay are evaluated.
Randomness
We use the test battery provided by the US National Institute of Standards and
Technology (RSN+10) to assess the randomness properties of LFSR. LFSR passed
187 out of the 188 tests for a set of 100 sequences of 400,000 bits each1. Only the
Linear Complexity test was failed. This test is devised to determine whether
random bits have been produced by a LFSR. In particular, the test computes
whether one bit is produced as the combination of several others, which is the
case for a LFSR where each bit is produced by XNORing several others as shown
in Figure 7.2(a). Thus, although the LFSR produces highly random sequences it
cannot pass this test. Interestingly, this weakness is also an advantage in that it
simplifies hardware implementation.
In addition, we have further validated that the subset of bits that each com-
ponent would receive (e.g., bits 2-3 for the IL1) also passes the tests (RSN+10).
Results show that all subsets passed all tests (including the one failed by the whole
sequence). This occurs because any arbitrary subset of a random sequence is still
random and the sub-sequences obtained by selecting some of the bits break the
dependence that made one test to be failed for the original sequence.
Period
The period of the LFSR is particularly large and it was the main differentiating
factor over the MWC PRNG. Given a LFSR of R bits producing 32-bits per cycle,
it would repeat the sequence after 2R/32 − 1 cycles. In other words, assuming




R = 168, a processor operating at 1GHz, and the need to deliver 1 random number
per cycle, the random number sequence only repeats in 3.7× 1032 years.
Area, Energy and Delay
The implementation overhead of the proposed LFSR is estimated using the CACTI
tool (MBJ09), which is an accurate delay, energy and area model for cache mem-
ories. The LFSR delay is very small: it fits in one cycle even for very high oper-
ating frequencies (below 0.1ns in 65nm technology). Its energy is also very low:
2-3 orders of magnitude lower than the energy required for a cache read operation
(0.08pJ per random number versus 24pJ per read access for a 8KB 4-way 16-byte
line cache). Moreover, a single LFSR suffices to provide random bits to all com-
ponents in a core so its energy consumption is negligible even when it is replicated
for redundancy as shown in Figure 7.4. Therefore, the LFSR energy consumption
is negligible even if it needs to be replicated to be SIL 3 compliant, as shown in
Figure 7.4. Note that the overhead is very low given that a random number is
enough to feed all components in a core.
7.4.2 PRNG Integration in a Multicore Prototype
The proposed LFSR is integrated in the LEON3-MC. All LFSR modules required
by the multicore (cf. Figure 7.3a) to fulfill MBPTA requirements have been inte-
grated in a single hardware module (randbank) that is attached to the advanced
peripheral bus (APB) of the SoC. The randbank module has a pool of 32-bit reg-
isters devoted to the initialization of the different seeds required to randomize
multicore elements as described in Section 7.2. There are two types of seeds: ran-
dom and fixed. Random seeds provide processor features with bits that change at
every cycle after initialization. Fixed seeds keep the same value until it is modified
by overwriting the contents of the register. Therefore, random seeds are used by
the features gathered in Table 7.1 that require random bits every cycle (e.g., RR
policies of caches and bus arbitration). Fixed seeds can be used for the cache
placement as the same cache layout must be kept for a given execution and it
thus requires random bits only once per run. As noted in Section 7.2, the random
bits for RP can be provided by software means given the required coarse granular-
ity. Consequently, in the experiments reported here we analyze the RR policy of
the multicore prototype to evaluate the proposed LFSR PRNG and thus, random
seeds are used. The randbank seed initialization is carried out writing in a specific
address of the APB address space where this component is mapped to.
To evaluate randbank integration the LFSR random bits are routed to the L1
caches to carry out the replacement in the data and instruction caches of the
LEON 3 processor. The EEMBC Autobench benchmark suite (Poo07), a well-
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Figure 7.5: CDF for 1000 runs of the matrix benchmark.
known suite reflecting the current real-world demand of some automotive embed-
ded systems, was run 1, 000 times with the RR policy, collecting execution time
results for each run. Figure 7.5 shows the empirical cumulative distributed func-
tion (CDF) of the observed execution times when using the RR policy and the
random bits generated by the LFSR. These experiments show the good properties
of the developed LFSR as the collected execution time values were proven inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) in all benchmarks, following the i.i.d.
tests described in (CSH+12). In contrast, the measurements collected with the
default random policy in the LEON 3 processor failed those tests. In Figure 7.5
steps are caused by different (random) placements that may lead different ad-
dresses to compete (or not) for the space in some particular cache sets during the
whole program execution. Variations within each step show smooth distributions
caused by the RR policy using the LFSR, as expected from a good PRNG, which
properly randomizes each replacement keeping events independent and identically
distributed.
7.5 Summary
The confidence of MBPTA results rest on its ability to derive trustworthy WCET
bounds. To this end, it is crucial to ensure that the platform is MBPTA-compliant
and that hence, it includes time randomization properties. The SoR is a key
component to ensure the platform level randomization needed by MBPTA. In this
chapter, we have described the benefits of a hardware PRNG for its use as an
SoR in MBPTA-compliant platforms. Based on a reference LFSR PRNG, we have
designed an IEC 61508 compliant PRNG for multicore processors that meets with
the desirable properties for its integration in MBPTA-compliant platforms.
Results show that the LFSR PRNG produces high-quality random numbers
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with sufficiently long period. In addition, the bits produced by the LFSR are
shared among different platform components to increase the efficiency and reduce
the number of required PRNG modules. The SIL 3 PRNG implementation in-
cludes safety design procedures and techniques that improve the level of reliance
of the MBPTA approach. In this way, we guarantee that platform random timing
properties for which the pWCET is computed are preserved at runtime and we
reduce the likelihood of introducing faults in the system by the use of MBPTA.
Therefore, the work in this chapter paves the way towards the adoption of MBPTA







COTS multicore processors are the preferred industry choice to deal with the
increasing integration demands in the embedded domain. The use of readily avail-
able and tested COTS components considerably shorten the development time
and associated costs. In spite of these benefits, however, most COTS processors
are primarily designed towards increasing the average performance at the expense
of increasing timing unpredictability. In addition, the often incomplete – rather
functional – platform documentation, seriously limits providing guarantees on tim-
ing and certification as safety standards do not provide sufficient guidance yet for
such architectures. The latter question has motivated the joint endeavor of certi-
fication authorities in the airborne domain to provide support for the certification
of systems integrating multicore processors. As a result, they have published the
CAST-32A (CAST-32A) support document, which is, at the time of writing, the
only explicit certification guidance for multicore architectures.
In this chapter, we focus on assessing the practical compliance of multicores
with respect to certification guidance. In particular, we provide a deep analysis
of CAST-32A objectives and discuss the feasibility of achieving them with cur-
rent COTS multicore design trends. We show potential limitations that embedded
system designers may face in achieving those goals. We then evaluate CAST-
32A principles on a specific COTS multicore processor, the P4080 (P4080). We
show that, despite CAST-32A is a step forward for software planning, develop-
ment and verification on multicore systems, the application of its objectives is not
straightforward and requires in-depth analysis of the architecture and appropriate
hardware support to deal with interference channels.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.1 introduces the
definitions and main objectives of CAST-32A position paper. Section 8.2 provides
the analysis and feasibility of achieving those objectives with current COTS design
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trends. Section 8.3 evaluates CAST-32A objectives on the P4080 processor, to-
gether with some quantitative results that support the claims made in this chapter.
Finally, Section 8.4 presents the main conclusions of this work.
8.1 Overview of CAST-32A Principles
CAST-32A analyzes multicore processor elements potentially impacting the safety,
performance and integrity of a software airborne system. It is partially motivated
by the fact that current standards in civil avionics cover single-core systems, since
those standards precede multicore usage in civil avionics.
8.1.1 General Definitions
CAST-32A builds on several definitions that classify multicores based on the type
of support they provide to reach its goals. Emphasis is put on hardware/software
elements that create ‘coupling’ among software tasks running on the multicore, and
hence may lead to interference among them. Below, we introduce those CAST-32A
definitions related to timing.
CAST-32A Definition 1 (Robust Resource Partitioning (RRP)). RRP requires
(i) software partitions not to manipulate the code, I/O or data of other software
partitions; (ii) software partitions not to consume more than their assigned portion
of shared resources; and (iii) hardware failures unique to a software partition not
to affect other software partitions.
CAST-32A Definition 2 (Robust Time Partitioning (RTP)). RTP requires iden-
tifying and mitigating inter-partition interferences such that no software partition
exceeds its deadline even in the presence of software executing simultaneously in
other cores.
CAST-32A Definition 3 (Robust Partitioning). Robust partitioning encom-
passes both, RRP and RTP. CAST-32A classifies multicore processors into two
categories depending on whether or not they provide robust partitioning.
CAST-32A Definition 4 (Interference Channel). An interference channel refers
to a platform property that may cause interference between independent applica-
tions (i.e., with no explicit data or control flow between them).
CAST-32A Definition 5 (Configuration Settings). The configuration settings of
the multicore cover any software-configurable element that affects timing behavior,
e.g., frequency and cache partitioning. Special care is required to prevent the inad-
vertent changes of those settings that affect planned application’s timing behavior.
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8.1.2 CAST-32A Objectives
Table 8.1 lists CAST-32A objectives related to interference analysis and WCET
determination. Their identifiers refer to whether the objective relates to planning
(PL), resource usage (RU), software verification (SWV) or error handling (EH).
Table 8.1: Summary of CAST-32A objectives (CAST-32A).
Phase ID Description
Software PL 1 Include multicore specific planning details in the SW plan doc.
Planning Specific processor, number of cores, SW architecture,
dynamic SW features, IMA-like systems, Robust Partitioning
methods and tools for development and verification.
Planning RU 1 Determine configuration settings that enable to satisfy the
and functional, performance and timing requirements.
Setting RU 2 Critical configuration settings shall be static and protected
Resources against unintended modifications.
PL 2 Include a high level description of shared resource usage
and dynamic HW features in the HW and SW planning docs.
Intended shared resource allocation and verification to
prevent resource capabilities from being exceeded.
Intf. RU 3 Identify interference channels and verify the chosen means
channels of mitigation.
and Interferences caused by shared memory, shared cache,
Resource interconnect, shared I/O or any other shared resource.
usage RU 4 Identify available resources in the final configuration,
allocate them to the applications and verify that the
demands do not exceed the available resources.
Consider worst-case resource usage scenarios.
SW SWV 1 Verify that all software components function correctly and
Verification have sufficient time when all the software is executing in the
intended final configuration.
Depends on the platform classification:
1. Platforms with Robust Partitioning: SW verification and
WCET analysis can be done separately for each SW app.
2. All Other Platforms: If interference is mitigated,
the verification of such components can be done separately.
Otherwise, verification and WCET analysis shall be done
with all software components executing together.
SWV 2 Data and control coupling between SW components is
exercised during testing (for inter-partition data and
control flows on different cores).
Error EH 1 Planify, design, implement and verify means to detect
Handling and handle failures in a fail-safe manner
(e.g. safety-net external to the multicore).
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The objectives of Table 8.1 can be grouped into four high level principles:
1. Determining the final configuration. The designer shall determine
which is the intended final configuration that will enable to satisfy system
requirements (RU 1 ). This configuration is protected against unintended
modification at runtime (RU 2 ). The decisions taken at this phase should
be documented as required in objective PL 1.
2. Managing interference channels. It is required to identify interference
channels in the intended final configuration and to define the means to ei-
ther avoid interference by design or upper-bound it so that timing deadlines
are not exceeded (RU 3 ). Upper-bounding interference involves analyzing
the use of shared resources and designing the means to control multicore
contention. This should be documented in the appropriate certification de-
liverables (PL 2 ).
3. Verifying the use of shared resources. Resource usage and data and
control flows among cores shall be verified by guaranteeing that in the chosen
final configuration the software does not exceed the use of available resources
even in worst-case scenarios (RU 4, SWV 1 and SWV 2 ).
4. Error Management. The system shall include features for multicore spe-
cific error detection and handling. CAST-32A suggests using an external
Safety Net for this purpose.
8.2 Interpretation and Achievability of CAST-
32A Objectives
The safety argumentation of CAST-32A is based along the partitioning line of
reasoning: guaranteeing robust partitioning is crucial at the time of meeting the
objectives of CAST-32A, specially for allowing incremental verification of different
software components integrated in the multicore system as stated in objective
SWV 1. This section provides a critical analysis of CAST-32A objectives, their
achievability under current design practices.
8.2.1 Robust Resource Partitioning (RRP)
CAST-32A definition of RRP translates into i) spatial partitioning, ii) resource
quota monitoring and enforcement, and iii) fault containment at (software) parti-
tion level.
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Spatial Partitioning
The definition of spatial partitioning in CAST-32A is analogous to spatial indepen-
dence requirement in IEC 61508 where the data of a software element shall not be
modified by another element or partition. This can be achieved with MMU/MPU
support in most current COTS multicore architectures.
Quota Monitoring and Enforcement
The second aspect of resource partitioning is to ensure that software partitions
do not consume more than their allocations of shared resources. Achieving this
requirement with current COTS multicores involves many difficulties and it de-
pends on the way in which partitioning is implemented and enforced in the shared
resources. For some shared resources, like a data array in memory, partitioning
can be statically defined and enforced in hardware as defined for achieving spatial
partitioning. However, the contention in bandwidth resources, like buses, may be
influenced by many factors (e.g., request overlap) and partitioning can only be
implemented by monitoring and enforcing some events (like maximum number of
requests) at runtime. For each shared resource it should be identified which events
provide more accurate information about resource usage.
In terms of quota monitoring, intuitively, while access counts can provide a
good approximation, different type of accesses use the shared resource for different
time. This does not just require deriving this information from available manuals,
but also checking whether the target platform provides support for monitoring
architectural events (e.g. PMCs) that allow tracking the desired type of accesses.
For instance, in the LEON4 architecture, the last-level (L2) cache is write-back.
L2 cache misses not evicting dirty data take shorter than those evicting dirty
data. However, the L2 miss count PMC only captures non-dirty misses (JFA+16).
While authors (JFA+16) manage to upper-bound the number of dirty misses with
existing counters, for other scenarios PMCs cannot provide enough support for
access tracking, hindering a tight quota monitoring.
Furthermore, some shared resources, like AMBA – one of the most used in-
terfaces for communication – buses, allow a single request to hold the bus for
an unbounded duration (JAQ+14). This poses new challenges, since additional
means are required to determine whether hardware masters (i.e. resources al-
lowed to start transactions on the bus) use this unbounded-duration feature for
requests. This, however, requires deep hardware understanding, which might not
be possessed by end users. Moreover, PMCs counting access types might not suf-
fice. Instead, PMCs counting the time each core uses the shared resource (hence
potentially delaying the other cores) may also be required.
The difficulty of implementing quota enforcement depends on the target re-
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source and the hardware support provided. We classify shared resources as space
and bandwidth resources.
First, for space resources, like the data array in a cache, some processors provide
partitioning so that one task cannot evict the data of another. However, despite
cache space partitioning, some tasks can still impact others. This may happen if
partitioning is not implemented at the cache bank level. That is, tasks share the
same bank though the cache ways in that bank are split among tasks. This may
make cache accesses of one task delay the accesses of another task (PQC+09).
Further, caches may have queues to hold cache miss requests, which, if shared, can
create huge contention among tasks despite cache ways are split (VYF16). This
extremely low-level type of information about hardware requires the involvement
of a hardware expert with proper access to manuals and also making experiments
to empirically determine whether this situation can happen (analyzed in the ex-
perimental section).
And second, bandwidth resources, can be split in time and space. For instance,
a task can be given 50% of the bus bandwidth over a period of 10,000 cycles. This
can be implemented with alternative full-access/no-access periods of 1,000 cycles,
2,500 cycles, 5,000 cycles, etc. Each of these ways to implement partitioning affects
tasks’ execution time. Further, given task τa and τb, where task τb makes a given
number of accesses, how those overlap with τa’s requests has an impact on τa’s
execution time. Moreover, request overlap can change drastically from run to
run with different or even the same inputs. In practice, determining how tasks’
requests overlap during operation is unaffordable (in the final configuration), so
existing approaches build on the assumption that tasks overlap their requests in
the worst possible manner (FJAQ+15; NPB+14). Worst overlapping occurs when
each request of the task under analysis has the lowest arbitration priority and it
becomes ready when all other tasks in other cores have pending requests.
Fault containment at the resource partition
For physical faults, any multicore shall be considered to form a single fault con-
tainment region, that is, it is not possible to guarantee that the immediate effects
of any possible fault are limited to a single software partition in a multicore unless
it is specifically addressed in the design (kop06). This occurs because, as a con-
sequence of sharing the same silicon die, a number of shared elements become a
single point of failure for all partitions simultaneously, such as the power supply or
clock source. Thus, it cannot be claimed that different software partitions will fail
always independently. CAST-32A suggests using an external safety net to enforce
such physical fault containment at multicore platform level preventing propagation
to other components.
Furthermore, for achieving RRP, CAST-32A requires that failures of hardware
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unique to a software partition do not propagate to other software partitions. While
partitioning techniques (e.g. hypervisor) have been commonly used to avoid the
propagation of design faults (e.g. deadline misses) among software partitions (i.e.
design fault containment), they do not usually account for hardware faults. Obvi-
ously, a failure in a time-shared (e.g. bandwidth) resource extends to all software
partitions using it. For space resources, hardware partitioning techniques provide
some degree of isolation but (physical) fault containment at the resource-partition
level is challenging, which is better illustrated taking a way-partitioned shared
cache as example. While it is possible to prevent a fault in a cache bitcell to
propagate to partitions not using that bitcell, some hardware resources, such as
sense amplifiers and data output buffers (used to read/write the data in cache),
may be independent or silently shared, thus making a permanent or intermittent
fault affect all software partitions in the latter case. Therefore, it is hard to draw
the line between hardware unique to a software partition and the features shared
on the underlying multicore platform. As a consequence, in general, end users do
not have the means to sustain or validate this claim. Hence, the only way it can
be deployed is that it comes provided by the hardware vendor.
In this regard, the requirements in IEC 61508-2 Annex E for on-chip redun-
dancy are representative of the conservative restrictions needed to prevent fault
propagation in a single chip. These requirements include, among others, a full
common cause analysis that considers all possible faults that can affect to various
channels and therefore result in the loss of physical separation. The common cause
analysis shall consider the design, fabrication, construction, procedural and envi-
ronmental factors and respective prevention measures are required, like controlling
the effects of increasing temperature in various channels, using separate physical
substratum blocks with a minimum distance among channels and assigning sepa-
rate input/outputs for each channel (e.g., separate clock signals and power supply).
However, this possibility of having hardware faults that may affect to more than
one partition does not prevent from developing and certifying each software par-
tition independently according to its assigned criticality level. Unlike CAST-32A,
this restriction in IEC 61508 only applies when the different partitions conform
different channels of a redundant architecture implemented on the same chip to
achieve HFT > 0.
8.2.2 Robust Time Partitioning (RTP)
From previous discussion, it follows that a multicore will usually have some form of
interference channels due to the difficulties of implementing RRP. Note that a form
of interference channels arise when tasks have interactions in the time domain.
In this scenario, the RTP goal of “no software partition exceeds its deadline
even in the presence of software executing simultaneously in other cores”, trans-
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lates into deriving contention bounds for a task that hold for any load that the
contender tasks can put on the shared resources. That is, the increment in time a
task is assumed to experience (in the WCET estimate) due to contention through
that interference channel, upper-bounds the actual interference it can suffer in the
presence of any task. This type of bounds, which are referred to as fully-time
composable (FJAQ+15), can be very pessimistic. For instance, let assume that τa
generates na accesses to a round-robin bus of a given type t1 that uses the bus a
single cycle. Further, assume that there are another type of accesses t2 that holds
the bus for 10 cycles. For τa access, the worst situation is that a second contender
τb generates accesses of type t2 and that arrive at the same time of τa requests but
are served first. Under a fully-time composable scenario τa is assumed to suffer an
execution time increase of 10× na× T cycles. That is, each request is assumed to
suffer a 10x increase in its access time due to contention.
To reduce this overhead, a partially-time composable approach (FJAQ+15) can
be followed. This approach accounts for the worst overlap of the actual requests of
the contenders. This requires to determine i) the number and type of requests to
the shared resources of all tasks (NPB+14); and ii) the time each request type holds
the shared resource (FJAQ+15). The WCET estimate for a task is derived under
a given template that describes the number and type of accesses performed by its
contenders. That WCET estimate holds under any workload for which the actual
number and type of requests performed by the contenders is smaller or equal to that
assumed in the template. Coming back to the previous example, τa can be derived
a WCET bound for a template that assumes K1 access of type t1 and K2 of type t2.
It is valid for any contender τb that fulfills (n
t1
b ×1)+(nt2b ×10) ≤ (K1×1)+(K2×10).
8.2.3 Individual Objectives
CAST-32A introduces new objectives in the different phases of the life-cycle to
analyze and mitigate interferences, and control shared resource usage (i.e. limit
multicore contention) in a given platform configuration. To that end, CAST-32A
resource usage objectives (RU 1, RU 2, RU 3 and RU 4 ) impose new requirements
in the design.
RU 1 is hard to achieve a priori in processors without RRP . This occurs
because the impact of interference channels on software timing can be signifi-
cant. Further, simply assuming the worst-contention (i.e. fully-time composable
bounds) is in general impractical. In this situation, the configuration achieving
software’s timing requirements cannot be determined, until the final configura-
tion is consolidated. With the partially-time composable approach (FJAQ+15),
WCET estimates are derived under different templates and hence the work at
integration reduces to check the template that upper-bounds contenders’ request
count (see example above).
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RU 2 in general can be achieved with proper hypervisor and/or OS support.
Regarding RU 3, some interference channels can be determined from processor
manuals. Others, however, are not properly documented and hence, require an
expert performance analyst that can create a set of microbenchmarks (FGQ+12)
to determine whether further interference channels can exist.
RU 4 objective encompasses the successful achieving of those above, with their
associated challenges.
Further, in terms of the general approach, it must be understood that objectives
cannot be achieved in a sequential manner, as a first read could suggest. Instead,
strong dependencies exist among them, that require considering all (or some) of
them simultaneously.
8.3 Evaluation on Complex COTS Multicore
We select the P4080 (P4080) multicore processor as a representative of the com-
plexity in modern COTS multicore architectures relevant for real-time indus-
try (NPB+14; BGG+14). In this kind of COTS architectures the identification of
interference channels and sources of execution time variability is challenging given
the complexity of the architecture and limited information in manuals.
8.3.1 Defining Hardware Configuration Settings
We evaluate the first CAST-32A principle, RU 1, of selecting a suitable platform
configuration by exploring different possible hardware setups (HWS) in the P4080
platform. Some hardware resources of the P4080 platform can be adjusted to ap-
plications’ requirements by several configuration settings. Below, we list the most
relevant customizable features that may influence performance, or partitioning,
identified with a qualitative analysis of processor specifications (P4080; Bos13). A
priori, it is not possible to determine whether a complex COTS multicore platform
such as the P4080 can provide robust partitioning as defined in CAST-32A. CAST-
32A requires identifying interferences in the intended final configuration. However,
selecting a configuration involves determining a hardware partition setup, which
in turn determines the interference channels.
Identifying Configuration Options
Configuration options can be classified as core-local settings and shared resource
settings. The former provides the following options. The eight cores of the P4080
are logically independent, each core has its own boot and reset control. The user
can select which specific cores to activate while others remain dormant. Similarly,
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each core can be set to a different operation frequency. First level caches can be
enabled or disabled. The second level backside cache can be either disabled or
configured as data only, instruction only or unified (data and instruction) cache.
Regarding the latter, shared resource settings, the following configuration setting
are available:
• CoreNet Interconnect: The interconnect can be configured in up to 32
address windows (Local Access Windows, LAWs) to route transactions. Each
LAW serves to define the internal connections by mapping different address
regions to specific target devices (such as DDR controllers or peripheral
interfaces). In addition, the configuration of each LAW includes a coherency
subdomain identifier that allows to define which cores and caching elements
should be maintained coherent.
• CoreNet Platform Cache (CPC): It supports flexible configurations on
a per-way granularity. Each CPC has 32 ways (32KB per way) that can be
configured as L3 cache or as static SRAM. For ways configured as L3 cache,
cache partitioning is supported to assign each way to a logical partition. The
ways configured as SRAM are mapped to a configurable physical address
range. With the appropriate LAW and MMU configuration, the SRAM
address space can also be segregated into different logical partitions.
• Main Memory: The two memory controllers have interleaving support.
When enabled, interleaving can be configured to switch between memory
controllers for every cache line transfer, every page line transfer or at every
bank transfer. If disabled, the two memory controllers operate indepen-
dently. Like for the SRAM, main memory can be divided into different
MMU-restricted physical regions for each of the cores.
• Peripheral devices: I/O transactions can be controlled with the PAMU
that acts as a MMU for I/O devices.
• Interrupts: They can be routed to any of the eight cores separately or to
more than one core simultaneously.
Hardware Setup (HWS) Definition
Based on the configuration options listed above, we define several different HWS,
see Figure 8.1. To that end, we establish a baseline configuration, common across
all HWS, for the core local resources and we rather focus on the different possible
setups for shared resources. To evaluate isolation, we narrow down to only one
(safety-critical) application that needs to be strongly independent from the other
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seven and assume that each core hosts at most one software application. Taking
this into account, in Figure 8.1, the resources used by the critical application
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(a) HWS 1: Maximum HW Isolation.
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(b) HWS 2: Limited HW Isolation,
CPC1 partitioned.
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(c) HWS 3: Limited HW Isolation,
CPC1 shared.
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(d) HWS 4: Minimum HW Isolation,
single shared CPC and DDR.
Figure 8.1: Examples of P4080 hardware setups.
Baseline configuration: All cores are activated with highest supported fre-
quency and local caches enabled (DL1, IL1 and unified L2) for increasing perfor-
mance. We focus on the memory hierarchy as shared resource and therefore we
assume that the same peripheral is not shared among multiple cores.
(a) HWS 1: Maximum HW Isolation.
HWS 1 (Figure 8.1a) seeks to achieve the highest possible level of resource
privatization (maximum partitioning) with the following configuration: (i)
memory controller interleaving is disabled and DDR3 1 is exclusive for c0
while DDR3 2 is shared among the remaining seven cores (c1 − c7); (ii)
as each CPC corresponds to a memory controller, CPC1 is also restricted
to c0 and can be configured either as (private) SRAM, L3 cache or both.
CPC2 may or may not be partitioned across the non-critical partitions.
In particular, we use both CPCs in cache mode; and (iii) main memory is
segregated in at least two MMU-protected memory regions, one for c0 and
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the rest for cores c1 − c7. If required, the latter can be further partitioned
to have a separate address range for each core.
(b) HWS 2: Limited HW Isolation I.
This setup, shown in Figure 8.1b, provides better balance between resource
privatization and sharing (and hence, efficiency): (i) memory controller in-
terleaving is disabled and applications are distributed across the two memory
controllers (e.g. DDR3 1 for c0 − c3 and DDR3 2 for c4 − c7); (ii) CPC1
is partitioned by assigning one or more 32KB ways to c0. As in HWS 1,
these ways may be setup as SRAM, L3 cache or both. The remaining ways
of CPC1 and CPC2 may or may not be partitioned across the non-critical
partitions. In particular, in CPC1 we give 8 ways to c0 and 24 ways (shared)
to c1− c3; and (iii) main memory is segregated as in HWS 1.
(c) HWS 3: Limited HW Isolation II.
This setup matches HWS 2, but CPC1 is not way partitioned but shared
by c0− c3, see Figure 8.1c.
(d) HWS 4: Minimum HW Isolation.
Most resources are shared across all cores for evaluating the impact of shared
resources in the worst-case (Figure 8.1d): (i) memory controller interleaving
is enabled so both memory controllers are interchangeably accessed by all
cores; (ii) CPC1 and CPC2 are configured as L3 cache and shared across
all cores; and (iii) main memory is segregated as in HWS 1.
8.3.2 Identifying Interference Channels
The timing behavior of an application is often affected by (hard-to-predict) jittery
resources and interference channels that are difficult, if at all possible, to control.
In COTS processors the impact of architectural features that affect on execution
time is not usually known a priori and some features are poorly documented in
processor manuals. Below we list some of the potential limitations and interference
channels for each HWS derived from the analysis of the P4080. Note that other
interference channels may exist. In fact, the challenge for the end user is to combine
information in the manuals and previous experience to derive potential interference
channels.
Note that the goal of this section is not to provide a characterization of the tim-
ing behavior of the P4080, which would be an extensive technical report. Instead,
we provide the result of specific experiments providing key insights about achiev-
ing certification objectives. We show that even the most conservative partitioning
setups can be subject to the impact of interference channels.
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Experimental setup
In this section we run simple microbenchmarks (rsk) stressing the memory hier-
archy and interconnect. As introduced in Section 3.2, the rsk consists of a single
loop with load or store instructions that traverse a data array of different sizes. In
this section we define five rsk, DL1h, L2h, L3h, L3m and mem, where we access
to a data array of of 24KB, 114KB, 256KB and 768KB and 1MB (ALLOC SIZE )
respectively and a stride that ensures that a different cache line is accessed in each
load or store operation. After traversing the array once, so that it is present in
the caches, we execute 1000 iterations of the rsk and measure execution time and
architectural events (PMCs). We use the PMCs available in each core of the P4080
to monitor processor cycles and memory related events (number of accesses, DL1
misses, L2 accesses, bus requests, etc.).
Results: Core local contenders
Each of the benchmarks is first executed in isolation to obtain a baseline latency
for memory accesses (loads) at different levels of the memory hierarchy. Then, we
execute same benchmarks concurrently with increasing number of L2lh contenders.
Figure 8.2 depicts the results obtained for increasing number of contenders where
the contender fits in L2 and hence it does not access to shared platform resources.
Figure 8.2: Impact of core local contenders on rsk DL1lh, L2lh, L3lh and mem.
As expected, the results in isolation reflect how average memory access latency
increases as going further in the memory hierarchy. At a first glance, the impact
of core local contenders is negligible, between 0%-1% slowdown for L2lh, L3lh and
mem rsk and between 0 and 5% for DL1lh rsk. With the aim of exposing the
reason behind the 5% variation in DL1lh, below we report undisclosed sources of
variability.
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Heterogeneous behavior. We start by reporting some undocumented features
impacting time. We execute DL1lh in each of the cores (ci) of the P4080 in
isolation. We derive the DL1 hit latency on each core ci as depicted in Figure 8.3a
across runs. The result of this simple experiment reveals that there are small
systematic deviations from core to core. Our analysis of the data sample of 1000
runs on each core reveals that the central quantiles (Q1-Q3) of c0 (thus discarding
outliers) are below the minimum value across all other cores (Figure 8.3b).
Even if the order of magnitude of this difference makes the variation negligible,
0.003% lower for c0 w.r.t. the other cores, its systematic nature reveals some
heterogeneity in the physical design of the cores of the P4080 that is not reported
in the (public) documentation. Thus, it is unknown whether the source of this
difference may have noticeable (relative or absolute) impact in some programs.
(a) Observed execution times
(b) Quartiles
Figure 8.3: DL1 Hit latency variation across cores and runs.
Coherence. The coherence protocol is a potential interference channel. Apart
from its impact in execution time for concurrent memory accesses (evaluated by
Nowotsch et al. in (NP12)), our evaluation results show execution time variations
even when one core is running DL1lh – hence only accessing local caches – in
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isolation (with the rest of the cores dormant). By analyzing the observed events,
we conclude that those variations are related to snoop overheads: as depicted in
Figure 8.4, the core under analysis receives unexpected snoop requests (monitored
through PMCs), that correlate with execution time variation. As for core-to-
core differences, execution time impact is negligible, but uncontrolled. Thus, an
interference channel exists and its potential magnitude is unknown. This has also
an impact on the results previously reported in Figure 8.2 where contenders in
other cores cause a 0-5% execution time variation in c0 running DL1lh. Despite
the activity in the other cores does not access to shared resources, fact that is
guaranteed by reading the access count to the bus interface unit, this experiment
reveals that there is an influence in execution time.
Figure 8.4: Impact of coherence on execution time in isolation.
Results: Shared Resources
Figure 8.5 compares the execution time of a microbenchmark performing sustained
L3 (CPC) load hits (L3lh) by using 256KB of the 2MB CPC cache memories
with increasing number of contenders (from 1 to 7) that perform all of them either
sustained CPC hits (L3lh in Figure 8.5a) or CPC misses by using 768KB rsk
(L3lm in Figure 8.5b). This experiment is performed in the four different HWS
defined in Figure 8.1 and results are normalized with respect to the execution time
observed in isolation.
As shown in Figure 8.5a, whenever all cores perform CPC hits, the influence
that c0 experiences from contenders in HWS 1 is small, with a slowdown below 1%
with all cores running together. This slowdown is the combination of core-local
sources of jitter and the shared use of the interconnect. The information about
CoreNet is scarce, which prevents from concluding whether it is an interference
channel since it may contain buffers or queues to hold pending requests. This
would make it a statefull resource and hence a source of interference. When, in
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(a) Normalized latency with L3lh contenders
(b) Normalized latency with L3lm contenders
Figure 8.5: L3 contention under different HWS.
addition, cores also share the same CPC bank, either partitioned or shared, there
is an additional slowdown per additional contender due to CPC port contention.
In the case of HWS 2 and HWS 3, where only contenders 1 to 3 hit in the same
CPC as c0 (CPC1) and the remaining cores access to CPC2, there is no big
difference between the partitioned and shared CPC HWS (as all benchmarks fit
in the CPC) and CoreNet and CPC port contention cause a slowdown that ranges
up to 10% with all cores running at the same time. Accordingly the CPC presents
access contention, in which – despite tasks use different cache parts – they impact
on each others access time to the cache. This is further illustrated in Figure 8.5b.
Figure 8.5b reflects how when contenders perform CPC misses, c0 experiences
an expected significant slowdown in HWS 3 and HWS 4 where CPC space is
shared (i.e., software partitions evict each others’ data). However, we see that it
also suffers a significant slowdown in HWS 2 despite cache space not being shared.
Although it cannot be proven based only on measurements, the CPC may have
some internal buffers that get filled with CPC miss requests, which delay new
requests. In any case, our experiment reveals the existence of severe interference
channels despite CPC partitioning.
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The memory controller and main memory are other well-known sources of
contention. HWS 4 results reveal that while tasks are assigned different address
spaces, a task can suffer a high interference from another task as those address
spaces can be mapped to the same DRAM bank, device and rank. This interference
is not just the time the other task is using the DRAM, but the other task can
change the state of the DRAM (e.g. the open page, the direction of the bus, etc).
This can cause very high delays in the task under analysis. Finally, the coherence
method in place can also impact tasks’ execution time by causing implicit accesses
to shared resources like the interconnect or shared caches.
In addition, some interference channels may exist only under the presence of
faults. Thus, assessing whether they exist is challenging until faults occur, which
may be too late to take any action. For instance, some logic may exist to drive
memory accesses to either CPC1 or CPC2. Further, such logic, despite shared,
may not have any impact in performance if the CoreNet serializes accesses. How-
ever, a fault in such logic might affect any subset of the cores in non-obvious
ways and therefore, fault containment at the RRP can not be claimed without a
thorough analysis of processor internals.
8.4 Summary
The CRTES development ecosystem is undergoing massive changes and as a result,
their development processes are being continually refined and certification needs
are continually reinterpreted to contemplate novel design paradigms. However,
safety standards are relatively unchanged. CAST-32A provides a step forward in
terms of guidance for the certification of systems incorporating multicore proces-
sors. CAST-32A guideline, as many safety-related standards, is abstract enough
to have a broad application. However, a practical application of CAST-32A is
challenging. In this chapter, we have analyzed the difficulties to apply CAST-32A
to real processor designs qualitatively. Then, through a particular case study, the
P4080 processor, we practically and quantitatively assess those difficulties.
Our work shows that appropriate hardware configurations and smart experi-
mentation can reduce the degree of uncertainty. However, for the studied processor,
the uncertainty can be neither removed nor deemed as irrelevant due to the non-
obvious interactions of tasks at hardware level. It turns out that even the most
conservative partitioning measures can be subject to execution time variations in
complex COTS architectures due to shared resources and hidden undocumented
features. As a consequence, this requires an in-depth analysis of the architecture
which, in many COTS platforms, due to the limited documentation, can only be
provided by the chip vendor. We also show that some knowledge can be gained
by executing experiments on the real platform, but quantitative evidence can only
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mitigate uncertainty to some extent, thus leaving several open questions to fully
adhere to CAST-32A.
In summary, CAST-32A recommends building a privileged relationship with
the processor manufacturer for ensuring that all relevant information is known.
CAST-32A reviews a precise list of objectives but one is expected to extrapolate
to the specifics of any processor under consideration. In conclusion, CAST-32A is
more about ensuring that problems are sufficiently studied than about how they
can be solved. This is not unexpected as it is a common pattern that certification
guidance should not prescribe solutions but ensure the quality of any solution.
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Conclusions and Future Work
Critical Real-Time Embedded System (CRTES) designers have a constant pres-
sure to provide more software functionalities that require increased performance
capabilities in order to stay competitive in the market. This, in turn, has caused a
transition towards integrated approaches where several applications run together
on a single hardware platform to reduce the overall system cost, size, weight and
power consumption. The computing performance needs and advance software func-
tionalities can only be met with advanced high-performance processor designs that
however carry a dramatic increase in hardware and software complexity. As a re-
sult, emerging systems, like multicores, are much more advanced than the processor
designs traditionally used in this kind of critical domains and their complexity re-
sults in many challenges that imperils their industrial adoption. Motivated by this
challenge, the aim of this Thesis is to support the industrial viability of integrated
mixed-criticality multicore systems, with especial emphasis on safety certification
and timing predictability of multicore architectures. In this chapter we summarize
the main contributions of the research and its impact, and we present the open
areas for future research.
9.1 Summary of Contributions
This Thesis contributes to the state-of-the-art of current and future CRTES in the
adoption of multicore architectures by formalizing the foundations for their certi-
fication. We achieve this goal by defining certification-amenable mixed-criticality
integration design principles, with special emphasis on the Measurement-Based
Probabilistic Timing Analysis (MBPTA) technique, which has been shown to pro-
vide several advantages as a means to improve the timing predictability of com-
plex systems. In summary, the contributions presented in this Thesis are classified
in three themes: (i) mixed-criticality certification upon multicores; (ii) MBPTA
169
Chapter 9. Conclusions and Future Work
safety implications; and (iii) practical multicore certification compliance.
In particular, we contribute to the certification of mixed-criticality systems
including multicore architectures as follows:
• The first contribution of this Thesis sets the key certification aspects for in-
tegrating mixed-criticality applications on multicore platforms. We present
a certification argument that defines IEC 61508 based safety measures at
different levels of abstraction: (i) conceptual reference safety ECU incorpo-
rating a multicore processor and safety mechanisms, (ii) safety analysis and
techniques at software application (partition) level, (iii) separation mecha-
nisms, and (iv) functional safety management for the development process.
In fact, we show that IEC 61508 principles can be adapted to multicores by
taking current solutions as a baseline of the argumentation and tackling spe-
cific multicore challenges like the allocation of resources and the scheduling
strategy such that independence guarantees are preserved.
• Secondly, we translate the generic assumptions and safety considerations
of previous contribution into technical solutions by defining two alternative
safety concepts for industrial railway and automotive use cases. We eval-
uate alternative multicore solutions: an ad-hoc solution, a complex COTS
architecture and a certification-friendly COTS platform:
– The railway safety concept relies on partitioning and virtualization on
top of the ad-hoc LEON3-MC and COTS P4080 architectures.
– The automotive safety concept defines the integration of mixed-criticality
applications on the COTS AURIX TC27x multicore. Thanks to the
improved determinism and the hardware protection mechanisms avail-
able in the AURIX processor, we present a solution to safely integrate
mixed-criticality applications without the need of a hypervisor.
Both solutions build on MBPTA to effectively analyze the timing behavior
of mixed-criticality systems and support the scheduling decisions. We claim
that MBPTA provides increased scientific foundations and hence confidence
with respect to the current practice of applying an engineering margin to de-
termine WCET estimates. Safety concepts have been reviewed and assessed
by a certification body that judged the assumptions and analysis considered
at this design stage as suitable for their intended purpose of evaluating the
mixed-criticality integration and inclusion of the MBPTA technology in the
CRTES domain.
MBPTA’s industry-readiness is further pursued by evaluating how MBPTA fits
the prescriptions of current functional safety standards.
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• The first contribution in this direction presents a quantitative approach to
assess the likelihood of execution-time exceedance events with respect to the
risk reduction requirements of the safety function, based on the procedure
defined for random hardware faults in safety standards. To this end, we
rely on MBPTA and analyze the impact of required hardware and software
modifications in the context of the IEC 61508 safety development process.
• The focus of next contribution is on an essential hardware element for achiev-
ing the required random properties on hardware, the PRNG. We adapt an
existing LFSR PRNG design to a MBPTA-compliant multicore architecture.
In particular, we propose a low-area, low-power design that meets IEC 61508
SIL 3 safety requirements. The presented solution guarantees that time ran-
domized resources present same probabilistic distribution at runtime and
that hence, the malfunction of the PRNG does not compromise system’s
safe operation or availability by invalidating the WCET estimates derived
from the application of MBPTA.
The last contribution of this Thesis assesses the practical compliance of current
COTS design trends to multicore certification guidance.
• We provide an analysis of CAST-32A guidance report that strives for the
certification of systems integrating multicore architectures. CAST-32A is to
our knowledge the only explicit certification guidance formalized for multi-
core solutions at the time of writing. We show the main potential stumbling
blocks we have found to reach CAST-32A goals in complex architectures
using a specific COTS multicore architecture, the P4080. In particular, as
CAST-32A is written in the scope of the avionics domain, its requirements
are more restrictive than other industrial domains. For instance, the ba-
sis of CAST-32A argumentation relies on robust partitioning, or separation,
which is the central concept to achieve fault containment and prevent in-
terferences among the applications. We reveal the difficulties to a priori
determine whether a complex COTS multicore platform such as the P4080
can provide such robust partitioning as its (often undocumented) internals
may violate separation at microscopic level. COTS architectures’ compli-
ance to CAST-32A hence require that processor manufacturers provide all
relevant information of the processor internals.
9.2 Impact
The safety certification of mixed-criticality multicore solutions is certainly one
of the main challenges and a real business-oriented need in order to enable the
exploitation of research results, in this case MBPTA, for a number of reasons:
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• Certification has become a requirement. Not only coming from the legislation
that requires a safety certified product, but also a requirement often directly
specified by the customer.
• Certification is an economic need. It complements the cost-competitive re-
placement of mechanical parts or manually operated products by (safety)
functionality performed by programmable electronics providing legal protec-
tion to the high cost associated to their failure.
• Certification is a competitive parameter. It could be related to additional
functionalities or benefits included in a new safety related product within a
new market niche where fewer providers offer this kind of solutions.
Accordingly, the outcomes of this Thesis – that has been done in direct con-
tact with industry – have served to bring multicore technology, and particularly
MBPTA, closer to the CRTES industry. The strategy followed to assess certifica-
tion arguments, based on industrial safety concept definition and review, served
to disseminate the work and associated novel technologies to a certification body.
Their concept approval is a step forward in the acceptation of the presented tech-
niques. In addition, the collaborations in the scope of PROXIMA FP7 project
lead to interesting interactions with certification experts from influential avionics
and space companies (Airbus and Airbus Defence and Space). Furthermore, the
evaluation of MBPTA technology in an industrial railway case study involved the
integration of industrial technology solutions (SYSGO’s PikeOS RTOS, RAPITA
Timing analysis toolset) and resulted in a number of collaborations and joint pub-
lications listed in the Introduction (Section 1.5). These include, but are not limited
to, the evaluation of a credit-based arbitration policy, the extended path coverage
technique and an analysis of the instrumentation overhead in the case study.
In the same line, the membership of PROXIMA in the European Mixed-
Criticality Cluster (http://mixedcriticalityforum.org) derived in joint activities
and publications with DREAMS (DREAMS) FP7 research project. PROXIMA
and DREAMS projects share the same key challenges that the development and
certification of mixed-criticality multicore systems involve, where the approach tar-
geted by DREAMS includes the definition of modular safety cases composed of a
large number of ‘building blocks’. In addition, other work in progress is performed
in the context of SAFEPOWER H2020 project (SAFEPOWER) and other PhD
students, where the safety argumentation of this Thesis is used as a baseline to




The results and foundations of this dissertation can be extended in various direc-
tions, leading to the identification of future research paths.
• As a short-term objective, the research work of this dissertation could be ex-
tended to the certification constraints of other domains. The effort required
by this porting to different application areas covered by the IEC 61508 um-
brella is comparatively simple as the standards share the same philosophy
and core requirements. However, IEC 61508 does not cover all engineer-
ing domains, like space or avionics, that have also shown a big interest in
multicore architectures and MBPTA technology. A promising future work
should therefore consider the constraints of avionics certification standards
like DO-178 (DO178) and DO-256 (DO297) or software qualification needs
of the space domain (e.g., ECSS-E-ST-40C/ECSS-Q-ST-80C (ECSS)). In
addition, this also involves considering the limits of fail operational systems,
common in the avionics domain, where timing correctness is still more cru-
cial because the system does not dispose of a safe state to reach in case of
failure and needs to remain operational.
• The relentless adoption of novel value-added functionalities does not only in-
crease the computational demands and system complexity, but also the risk
of security attacks on the system overtakes a new dimension. Security can
also have an influence on system safety by, for instance, the misuse of offered
services or an unauthorized access and modification of the (safety-related)
software. As a result, in future CRTES, safety and security shall go hand
by hand and safety functions have to be secured against attacks. Accord-
ingly, as a mid-term objective, the certification arguments presented on this
dissertation could be aligned with security requirements to systematically
address both concerns consistently. For example, the proposed partition
level FMEAs shall be extended to include an analysis of security threats
complemented by the definition of the associated protection mechanisms.
• In the same research line, the impact of MBPTA technology to security
standards could be evaluated in an analogous way to the safety certification
analysis conducted in this research work. While randomization may often
be seen as counter-intuitive for safety purposes, it could provide numerous
advantages for security.
• Another key non-functional property to be considered is energy efficiency.
A well known property of multicore architectures is in fact their potential
to reduce power consumption. Though, safety or average performance are
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often prioritized over energy efficiency. As for security, low power consump-
tion solutions should be considered in the scope of safety critical systems in
multicore architectures and their impact on timing.
• Finally, in the long term, as the core count in new generation processors
continues to increase, further research shall consider the potential adoption
by the CRTES industry of different design paradigms, like many-core archi-
tectures or MPSoCs that combine multiple processors with discrete graphics
processing units (e.g., NVIDIA DRIVE PX (NVIDIA) that already pursues
automotive safety certification) for high-end applications like autonomous
driving. Of course such approaches massively increase hardware complex-
ity and will involve new certification and timing predictability challenges
that should be addressed in order to foster their industrial application. We
strongly believe that multicores are the first fundamental step for gaining
experience towards increased parallelization in CRTES domains.
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List of Acronyms









CPU Central Processing Unit












ERTMS European Railway Traffic
Management System
ETCS European Train Control
System
EVC European Vital Computer
EVT Extreme Value Theory
FCR Fault Containment Region
FPGA Field-Programmable Gate
Array
FPU Floating Point Unit




FIT Failures In Time
GSN Goal Structuring Notation
HFT Hardware Fault Tolerance
HWM High-Water Mark
i.i.d. independent and identically
distributed
IMA Integrated Modular Avionics
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MMU Memory Management Unit

























SFF Safe Failure Fraction
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SoJ Sources of Jitter
SoR Source of Randomization
SPB System Peripheral Bus
SRI Shared Resource
Interconnect
STA Static Timing Analysis
TASA Toolchain-Agnostic Software
rAndomization
TLB Translation Lookaside Buffer
UoA Unit of Analysis
WCET Worst-Case Execution Time
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